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In this dissertation, we address a range of topics in the context of the impact of different types of 
ownership on corporate outcomes. 
The first chapter compares the performance of local versus foreign institutional investors 
using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings in 32 countries during the 2000-2010 period. 
We find that foreign institutions perform as well as local institutions on average. Local 
institutions, however, perform better in stocks subject to high information asymmetry such as 
small, illiquid, growth, low analyst coverage and high insider ownership stocks. The local 
advantage is more pronounced in countries with low accounting transparency and high levels of 
corruption. Local investors also outperform foreigners in periods of market turmoil and in bear 
markets. While both domestic and foreign investors induce a strong price pressure effect on their 
stock holdings, only domestic investors show a trading pattern consistent with an information 
advantage. 
The second chapter studies the long-term real effects of the rise in the internationalization of 
firm ownership structures. We find that greater foreign institutional ownership fosters long-term 
investment in R&D, fixed capital and human capital. Foreign institutions also lead to significant 
increases in innovation output and productivity. Using the exogenous variation in foreign 
institutional ownership that follows the addition of a stock to the MSCI World index, we show 
that the effect of foreign institutions on long-term investment and innovation output is causal. 
This effect is explained by the monitoring role of foreign institutions when managers are more 
entrenched. These findings challenge the popular belief that label foreign investors as “locusts” 
interested only in short-term gains and preventing firms from making long-term investments. 
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The third chapter studies the performance of equity mutual funds run by asset management 
divisions of commercial banking groups worldwide. We show that bank-affiliated funds 
underperform unaffiliated funds by 70 basis points per year. Consistent with conflicts of interest, 
the underperformance of affiliated funds is more pronounced among funds with larger stock 
holdings of the bank’s lending clients. Disinvestments of asset management divisions by banking 
groups and placebo tests using international and passive funds support a causal interpretation of 
the results. Our findings suggest that affiliated funds support their lending division operations at 
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1. Introduction  
Financial globalization and the substantial growth of the global mutual fund industry have 
expanded investment opportunities for global investors (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005)). 
Investors seeking to allocate money to foreign assets face a choice between investing through an 
international and perhaps sophisticated money management company or investing through a 
local management company (in the same country as the target securities) that may have better 
information about the local securities. Our research aims to shed light on which of these two 
investment options is better.     
A large literature investigates the effects of geographic distance on investors’ portfolio 
decisions and investment performance. Empirical evidence shows that the information 
asymmetry that foreign investors face is a determinant of their investment decision (e.g., Gehrig 
(1993), Chen, Covrig, and Ng (2005), and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009)), which may help 
explain the home-bias phenomenon (French and Poterba (1991), Lewis (1999), and Karolyi and 
Stulz (2003)). Home bias may also be the outcome of rational investor choice, whether because 
of incentives to hold portfolios similar to those of their neighbors (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 
(2001), DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004)) or to make their information set as different as 
possible from other investors (Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)). The preference of investors 
for local stocks takes place not only internationally, but also domestically. U.S. money managers 
and analysts who are geographically closer to the headquarters of a firm seem to have an 
information advantage (Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Malloy (2005), and Baik, Kang, and Kim 
(2010)). 
Empirical evidence also indicates that local investors outperform foreigners on average: 
Shukla and Van Inwegen (1995) in the United States; Hau (2001) in Germany; Choe, Kho, and 
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Stulz (2005) in Korea; Dvorak (2005) in Indonesia; and Teo (2009) in Asia. Local analysts also 
seem to have an information advantage over foreign analysts (Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008)).  
In alternative to this local information advantage hypothesis, Albuquerque, Bauer, and 
Schneider (2009) develop a theory of equity trading in international markets that is consistent 
with the idea that foreign investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many 
countries simultaneously. Sophisticated U.S. investors may have a particular advantage in 
foreign markets over local investors through global private information that they have acquired 
in the U.S. market.  
 Consistent with this hypothesis, other authors find that foreign investors who participate in a 
market can actually be better informed than local investors: Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) in 
Finland; Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) in emerging markets; Huang and Shiu (2005) in 
Taiwan; Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2007) in Singapore and Thailand; and Froot and Ramadorai 
(2008) in closed-end funds of 25 countries. Some others find no difference between the 
performance of local and foreign investors: Kang and Stulz (1997) in Japan, and Seasholes and 
Zhu (2010) using portfolios of individual investors. In short, the evidence is mixed on whether 
local investors or foreigners have an information advantage.  
We compare the performance of institutional investors in stocks of their own country 
(domestic holdings) to the performance of money managers located in other countries (foreign 
holdings). While most of the research to date compares investor performance in a single country 
(of stock market or institution origin), we use a large sample of institutional money managers in 
32 countries over the 2000-2010 period. Sample limitations may be the reason for the mixed 
evidence in the literature, as a local advantage may differ according to stock and country 
characteristics. With our worldwide sample, we provide a more complete picture of the 
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performance of local and foreign investors around the world. 
The results show that, on average, domestic and foreign investors perform equally well. The 
unconditional average return on domestic portfolios is statistically indistinguishable from the 
average return on foreign portfolios. We find that the levels of both types of institutional 
ownership – domestic and foreign – have significant forecasting power for one-quarter-ahead 
stock returns. This is consistent with the results of Gompers and Metrick (2001), but extended to 
a worldwide sample. Furthermore, we find that this effect of both holding types on future returns 
comes mostly from a price-pressure effect, rather than from the informed trading of institutional 
investors.  
It is reasonable to expect that domestic investors may perform better in specific stocks or 
market conditions in the event of more information asymmetry. To test this hypothesis, we use 
several country-level and stock-level proxies for the quality of a firm’s information environment. 
We find a local advantage in harder-to-value stocks, that is, in stocks with lower analyst 
following, more illiquid or volatile stocks, stocks with higher insider ownership or more 
concentrated ownership, and in smaller or lower book-to-market (growth) stocks.  
Similarly, we find a local advantage in shares of firms located in more opaque countries, that 
is, in countries with weaker accounting standards or in countries with more corruption. There is 
also evidence of a local advantage during periods of higher aggregate market uncertainty. When 
information asymmetry is likely to be low, foreigners perform equally as well as or even 
outperform local investors. 
To further analyze the local advantage in high-information asymmetry environments, we 
distinguish between the price-pressure and information explanations. Consistently with our 
hypothesis, we find that there is an “information” advantage of local investors in stocks with 
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high information asymmetry. While domestic investors increase their holdings of a stock before 
its price goes up, foreign investors do not.   
2. Methodology 
We start by examining the determinants of the level of institutional ownership. We run the 
regression: 
 , =		
, + , +	, (1) 
for either total institutional ownership (,), domestic institutional ownership (,
), or 
foreign institutional ownership (,
). The independent variables (X) include firm-specific 
characteristics expected to influence the portfolio choice of institutional investors, namely, log 
book-to-market ratio (BM), log market capitalization (SIZE), volatility (VOL), turnover (TURN), 
log stock price (PRICE), MSCI index membership dummy (MSCI), momentum (MOM), 
dividend yield (DY), ADR dummy (ADR), analyst coverage (ANALYSTS), foreign sales 
(FXSALES), and closely held shares (CLOSE). We also include industry, country, and time 
dummies. 
Our main research goal is to analyze the performance difference between the domestic and 
foreign holdings of institutional investors. We begin with a simple comparison of excess returns 
denominated in U.S. dollars. We calculate monthly value-weighted portfolio excess returns on 
the local and foreign equity holdings in each market, and then compare the time-series averages 
of the domestic and foreign portfolio returns.  
To adjust returns for risk using the four-factor Carhart (1997) model, we run a time-series 
regression of portfolio returns on global risk factors: 
 , =  + 	, + , + , ! + ", + , (2) 
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where , is the excess return in U.S. dollars of portfolio i (either the domestic or foreign 
portfolio) in month t;  is the excess return in U.S. dollars on the global stock market;  
(Small minus Big) is the  return on the small capitalization minus the return on the large 
capitalization global portfolios;  ! (High minus Low) is the return on the high book-to-
market minus the return on the low book-to-market global portfolios; and  (Momentum) is 
the return of the past 12-month winners minus the return on the past 12-month losers global 
portfolios. The global , ,  !, and  factors are constructed as value-weighted 
averages across countries.  
We first report the alpha from a simple univariate regression on the market factor, and then 
the alpha from the full regression on the four factors. In both cases, we are interested in whether 
the alpha for the portfolio of domestic holdings is different from the alpha for the portfolio of 
foreign holdings.  
We also employ the risk adjustment method of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1997), who subtract from each stock return the return of a well-diversified portfolio of similar 
size, book-to-market, and momentum (past-year return) attributes. The procedure first sorts all 
stocks into size quintiles, and then within each size quintile sorts stocks into book-to-market 
quintiles, and finally within book-to-market quintiles sorts stocks into momentum quintiles. The 
benchmark portfolios are formed by value-weighting the stocks within each of these 125 groups 
constructed at the global level. A given stock is then matched with one of the 125 portfolios on 
the basis of its size, book-to-market, and past-year return from the previous month. The return of 
the matched portfolio is subtracted from each stock return in each month to give the 
characteristic-adjusted return. 
Next we study the performance difference between domestic and foreign institutional 
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ownership using multivariate regressions. Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Baik, 
Kang and Kim (2010), we run a regression of one-quarter-ahead stock returns (,#	) on the 
current levels of domestic and foreign institutional ownership: 
 ,#	 = 	,
 +	,
 + 	
, + , + , (3) 
where X includes several variables known to influence returns, and the dummies control for 
industry, country, and time patterns. A higher coefficient on  for a type of investor suggests 
better performance of that group, in the sense that their stock pickings are followed by higher 
stock returns.   
Given the literature, it is not clear whether we should expect any unconditional aggregate 
performance difference between domestic and foreign investors. Nevertheless, we expect 
domestic investors to perform better with regard to stocks and market conditions where 
information asymmetry is likely to be higher. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample using 
several country-level and stock-level proxies for the quality of the firm’s information 
environment. We then run the same regression for each separate subsample and check whether 
the domestic holdings have stronger predictive ability in high information asymmetry 
environments.   
There are two explanations for why a group of investors’ flows may predict stock returns. 
The first, which is known in the literature as the price-pressure explanation, is that such 
investors generate movements in equity returns that are unrelated to underlying fundamentals. In 
models such as Frankel and Froot (1987), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003), and Hong and Stein (2003), the reliable trading pattern of a group 
of investors (e.g., positive feedback trading) temporarily soaks up the available liquidity for an 
asset. This pushes the asset price temporarily away from its fundamental value. As additional 
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liquidity arrives, however, this transitory effect is undone, and the asset price reverts to 
fundamental value. The second, which is known as the information explanation, is that one group 
of investors is more informed than other investors. This group of investors perceives relevant 
fundamentals better than other investors, and engages in purchases or sales when they anticipate 
movements in these fundamentals. When fundamentals are later revealed, equity prices adjust to 
their new level.  
To understand the source of the local or foreign advantage, we employ the methodology of 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010). Specifically, we decompose total 
ownership into its lagged level (,$	) plus its change (Δ,), and regress future returns on 
these variables:  






 +	&'()*'+, + , + , (4) 
A positive coefficient on the lagged level suggests a price-pressure explanation, while a 
positive coefficient on the first difference suggests an information explanation. As in the 
previous regression, we compare the performance of domestic and foreign investors both in the 
full sample and in subsamples that distinguish different information asymmetry environments. 
3. Data and variable construction 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample combines several data sources. We first collect a list of all firms covered in the 
Datastream/WorldScope database for 32 countries. We also collect a set of characteristics for 
each firm and for its stock market from Datastream/WorldScope. 
Institutions defined as professional money managers with discretionary control over assets 
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(such as mutual funds, pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance companies) are frequently 
required to disclose their holdings publicly. We obtain historical filings from the 
FactSet/LionShares database from January 2000 through December 2010 on a quarterly basis. 
FactSet/LionShares is a leading source for institutional equity holdings worldwide. The data 
sources are public filings by investors, such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13-F 
filings (fund family level) and N-SAR (individual fund level) in the United States. For equities 
traded outside the United States, FactSet/LionShares collects ownership data directly from 
sources such as national regulatory agencies or stock exchange announcements, mutual fund 
industry directories, and company proxies and annual reports. Ferreira and Matos (2008) use this 
data set to study the role of institutional investors in corporations around the world. Following 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), we set institutional ownership variables to zero if a stock is not 
held by any institution in FactSet/LionShares. 
We extract the number of analysts following a stock from the IBES database. The list of 
MSCI components is obtained from the Bloomberg Financial Services database. Country-level 
variables are obtained from the World Bank collection of development indicators database. The 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index (VXO series) is obtained from the 
CBOE website. Our final sample covers 632,505 firm-quarters. Table A1 in the Appendix 
provides variable definitions and data sources. 
3.2. Classifying domestic versus foreign holdings 
We first define total institutional ownership (IO) as the sum of the holdings of all institutions in a 
firm’s stock divided by market capitalization at the end of each calendar quarter. We sum 
institutional positions in both local and American Depositary Receipts (ADR) shares.  
For each stock, we compute the holdings of investors based on the country of the institution 
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that holds a position in the stock. We classify each institutional holding as domestic when a 
stock’s country equals the institution’s country and foreign when a stock’s country does not 
equal the institution’s country. We consider as a stock’s country the country where the company 
is domiciled according to the Datastream/Worldscope database. We consider as an institution’s 
country the country where the investment company is domiciled according to the 
FactSet/LionShares database. 
We also explore alternative classifications of institutional holdings. First, we divide each 
institution’s portfolio into a same region and different region portion, using the geographic 
region (Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Japan, Latin America, North America, Oceania, Western 
Europe) of the institution and of the stock. We classify an institutional holding as same region 
when an institution is located in the same region where the stock is domiciled. We classify an 
institutional holding as different region when an institution is located in a different region from 
the one where the stock is domiciled. 
Finally, we divide each institution’s portfolio into a local and distant portion, using the 
distance between the institution and the stock as in Coval and Moskowitz (2001). More 
specifically, we classify an institutional holding as local when an institution’s country is less than 
1,000 kilometers away from the stock’s country (distance measured as the distance between 
capital cities). We classify an institutional holding as distant when an institution’s country is 
more than 1,000 kilometers away from the stock’s country. 
Table 1 presents domestic versus foreign institutional holdings as a percentage of market 
capitalization in each country as of December 2010. Figure 1 shows that the prevalence of 
foreign and domestic institutional money managers varies considerably across countries. 
Domestic investors hold large fractions of the market in the United States, Canada, and Sweden, 
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but foreign institutions actually hold the largest fraction of local market capitalization in 
countries like Australia, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland.  
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics on stock returns, institutional ownership variables, and firm-
level control variables. Table A1 in the Appendix provides variable definitions and data sources. 
Stock returns, volatility, turnover, share prices, and financial ratios are winsorized at the bottom 
and top 1%. 
We find that the mean institutional ownership is 20.6%, with a median of 7.2%. The mean 
foreign ownership is small compared to the mean local ownership, 3.6% versus 17%. The mean 
one-quarter-ahead stock return is 3.2%. The mean book-to-market ratio is 0.87. The mean 
(median) market capitalization is $2.03 billion ($188.6 million). Stock return volatility is 14.5%, 
and turnover is 1.1, on average. The MSCI membership dummy shows that about 12% of our 
sample firms are included in the MSCI All Country World Index. Mean and median dividend 
yields are close to 2% and 1%, respectively. The ADR dummy shows that about 7% of our 
sample firms are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. On average, our sample firms have one analyst 
following the stock. Finally, foreign sales are 18% of total sales, and closely held shares are 39% 
of shares outstanding.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Determinants of local and foreign institutional ownership 
Table 3 presents the estimates of regressions of total, foreign, and domestic institutional 
ownership on several firm-level characteristics that may influence the preferences of institutions. 
Regressions also include industry, country, and time dummies to control for systematic 
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differences across these dimensions. 
The results in Table 3 show that institutional investors, whether foreign or domestic, share 
many common preferences in their stock investments. Consistent with the findings of Gompers 
and Metrick (2001) and Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010), our results show a strong institutional 
demand for stocks with larger market capitalization, as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient on Size. We also find that institutions prefer stocks of firms with greater transparency 
and subject to less asymmetric information. Institutional holdings are positively correlated with 
the number of analysts following a stock and negatively correlated with the fraction of closely 
held shares by insiders. Moreover, the regressions also show that institutions prefer stocks with 
lower dividend yields and higher prices. 
The preferences of domestic and foreign institutions, however, diverge on other 
characteristics: MSCI, ADR, foreign sales, momentum, book-to-market, turnover, and volatility. 
Foreign investors have a bias for companies in the MSCI World Index, the leading index used in 
international asset management, as shown by the positive MSCI coefficient. Foreign institutional 
ownership is about three percentage points higher for MSCI firms than non-MSCI firms. The 
negative MSCI coefficient for domestic institutions indicates that this investor group prefers non-
MSCI stocks.  
Foreign investors also prefer to invest in cross-listed firms. The positive ADR coefficient for 
foreign institutional investors shows the positive effect of cross-listing on a U.S. exchange. 
Foreign institutional ownership is five percentage points higher for firms with a U.S. cross-
listing. When they invest domestically, institutions do not seem to prefer cross-listed firms. This 




Furthermore, foreign institutions prefer firms with larger fractions of foreign sales and firms 
with higher momentum. For domestic investors these variables do not seem to be relevant. 
Domestic investors prefer stocks with higher book-to-market ratios (value stocks), stocks of 
firms with lower volatility, and higher turnover stocks. Foreign investors prefer stocks with the 
opposite characteristics. These findings are in line with those in Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
Finally, we investigate how periods of market uncertainty influence the preferences of 
investors. To proxy for periods of increased uncertainty we use two proxies: (1) the CBOE 
volatility index (VIX); and (2) a dummy that takes a value of one when the VIX exceeds its 75th 
percentile, and zero otherwise (STRESS). The results in Table 4 show that domestic investors 
increase their positions in periods of high market uncertainty, while foreign investors reduce 
their positions. Our results are in line with the finding of Giannetti and Laeven (2013) that the 
local bias in U.S. mutual funds is more pronounced at times of higher stock market uncertainty. 
4.2. Average performance of domestic and foreign portfolios 
Table 5 presents the time-series average of monthly excess returns for each country in the 
sample. For example, in the row for Australia, the domestic return represents the value-weighted 
average return of all Australian shares held by Australian investors, while the foreign return 
represents the value-weighted average return of all Australian shares held by investors located 
outside Australia. Our focus is on the difference between the returns of these two groups. 
As the average excess returns of domestic and foreign holdings are similar, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis of equality of average excess returns at conventional significance levels in almost 
every country. Computing a global average excess return across all domestic and all foreign 
holdings, we find that domestic holdings earn an average return of 0.09% per month, while 
foreign holdings earn an average return of 0.18% per month. Overall, the difference in average 
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returns is not statistically significant.  
This lack of statistical difference is confirmed when we use risk-adjusted returns. The alphas 
from the global market model, the alphas from a global four-factor model, and the average 
characteristics-adjusted returns consistently show that the performance of domestic investors is 
statistically similar to the performance of foreign investors. 
To verify that these results do not depend on our domestic and foreign institution 
classifications, the last two rows of the table show global average returns according to alternative 
classifications of holdings from the same versus different geographic region and from close 
versus distant investors.1 Once again, we find that the performance of the two groups of investors 
is not significantly different. 
We find overall that domestic and foreign holdings of institutional investors earn similar 
average stock returns. However, this unconditional average may mask significant return 
differences in specific stocks or market conditions. We explore this possibility in the following 
sections.  
4.3. Domestic versus foreign institutions: Who does better? 
In this section, we examine how future stock returns are related to total, local, and foreign 
institutional ownership using multivariate regressions. We expand the Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) analysis of U.S. stocks to a worldwide panel with firms from 32 countries. Table 6 
presents the results of regressing future quarterly stock returns on institutional ownership as well 
as several control variables.  
First, we find that the level of total institutional ownership predicts one-quarter-ahead stock 
returns (column (1)). To further analyze this result, we follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and 
                                                 
1 The results at the country level are available in Table IA.1 (Internet Appendix). 
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Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010), and use the level of lagged institutional ownership as a measure of 
future institutional demand and the change in institutional ownership as a measure of 
institutional information advantage. The results in model 2 show that the coefficient on lagged 
institutional ownership is significantly positive, while the change in institutional ownership is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that institutional flows predict future stock returns due to a 
demand shock explanation, which is in line with the results in Gompers and Metrick (2001). 
Hence, our results suggest that institutions worldwide do not seem to have a significant 
information advantage over other investors such as insiders and individuals. 
Next, we compare the performance of institutional investors in domestic and foreign 
holdings, classified according to the nationality of the domicile of the institution and of the stock. 
Columns (3), (5), and (7) present the results. The coefficients show that a 10 percentage point 
increase in domestic institutional ownership increases one-quarter-ahead returns by 0.4%, while 
the effect is only slightly lower for foreign institutional ownership at 0.3%. To compare both 
coefficients, we run an F-test for the equality of coefficients on local and foreign institutional 
ownership. We cannot reject the null of equal coefficients at the 5% significance level. 
Therefore, using a worldwide sample, we conclude that neither domestic investors nor foreign 
investors have a performance edge over the other. This finding may help to explain why the 
results in single-country studies are mixed in general. 
To disentangle the smart institutions and demand shock explanations, we also run a 
specification with the level of and changes in domestic and foreign institutional ownership 
(columns (4), (6), and (8)). Lagged institutional ownership is positive for both domestic and 
foreign holdings, consistent with a demand shock effect. Furthermore, we find that foreign 
institutions seem to be at a slight information disadvantage. While an increase in foreign 
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holdings is associated with a reduction in future stock returns, a change in local holdings is not 
statistically related to future returns. 
To summarize, our results generalize to a worldwide basis the finding of Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) for the U.S. market. We find that the unconditional forecasting power of 
institutional ownership for stock returns comes from a demand shock effect, not from a smart 
institutions effect. 
4.4. Who does better in which stock?  
It is possible that local and foreign investors perform differently in markets and stocks with 
different levels of information asymmetry (Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010)). Therefore, we 
investigate further the performance of local and foreign investors conditioning on different stock 
and country characteristics. 
To test whether the extent of information asymmetry influences the performance of local and 
foreign institutions, we examine the difference in performance between both types of institutions 
across a variety of stock characteristics. To do so, we first divide stocks into those with high 
information asymmetry and those with low information asymmetry, and then test the equality of 
the coefficients in the regression of quarterly future stock returns on domestic and foreign 
institutional ownership (and other firm- and country-level controls). Panel A of Table 7 shows 
the results. 
Our first proxy for information asymmetry is the number of analysts covering the stock. 
Coverage by analysts can significantly reduce any information gap between local and foreign 
institutions. The results show that domestic institutions have an advantage in firms without any 
analyst coverage, i.e., in firms where the information asymmetry is likely to be higher. For these 
firms, the coefficient on the level of domestic institutional ownership is 0.069, while the 
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coefficient on foreign institutional ownership is not statistically different from zero.  
To better gauge the economic significance of the results, suppose that the level of domestic 
ownership increases by 10 percentage points. Then, the one quarter-ahead stock return increases 
on average by 69 basis points. An increase in foreign ownership, however, is not related to future 
stock returns in these firms that have no analyst coverage.    
For firms that are covered by at least one analyst, i.e., where the information asymmetry is 
likely to be lower, foreign institutions perform better. Here, an increase of 10 percentage points 
in the level of domestic ownership is followed on average by an increase of 26 basis points in the 
following quarter return, while the same increase in foreign ownership is followed by a larger 
increase of 45 basis points. This difference is statistically significant. 
Other proxies for information asymmetry confirm this pattern. First, we split the sample 
according to the volatility of the stock. In stocks with higher volatility there is more room for 
exploitable information asymmetry trading opportunities. The results show that domestic 
institutions perform better than foreign institutions in firms with high volatility, while the reverse 
is true for firms with low volatility.   
Next, we analyze how performance changes with the ownership structure of the firm. We 
expect domestic institutions to be at an advantage in firms with high insider ownership, as there 
are more private benefits of control, and managers will have fewer incentives to seek 
transparency. Indeed, the results show that domestic holdings forecast returns in firms with high 
insider ownership, while foreign holdings do not. Foreign holdings actually have a stronger 
effect on future returns than domestic holdings in firms with low insider ownership. This pattern 
is also confirmed using an Herfindahl index of ownership concentration. We find that foreign 
investors significantly outperform domestic investors in firms with a low index, i.e., in firms 
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where there is more dispersion of ownership and thus probably less information asymmetry.  
Our tests also include additional proxies for information asymmetry that again confirm that 
domestic investors have an advantage in stocks with high information asymmetry, and there is no 
statistically significant difference between domestic and foreign investors in stocks with low 
information asymmetry. One proxy is firm size, measured by the value of the firm’s assets in 
U.S. dollars, as larger firms are usually considered to have lower information asymmetry than 
smaller firms. We find that domestic institutions have an advantage in small firms, while for 
large firms the difference between the ownership coefficients is not statistically significant.  
Another proxy is the book-to-market ratio (B/M). Value stocks are usually characterized by 
more stable cash flows, while growth stocks need a clearer insight about the prospects of future 
growth opportunities, i.e., the information asymmetry is likely higher in growth stocks (low 
B/M). Accordingly, the results show that domestic holdings have a stronger predictive ability 
than foreign holdings in growth stocks, while there is no statistically significant difference in 
value stocks. Domestic institutions seem to take advantage of their geographic proximity to 
better assess future growth prospects of companies domiciled in the institution’s country. 
We also compare the performance of domestic and foreign institutions in liquid versus 
illiquid stocks, measuring illiquidity by the percentage of days with zero stock return, as 
illiquidity is positively related to information asymmetry. Again, the results show that domestic 
investors possess an edge over foreign investors in illiquid stocks and that foreigners perform 
equally well in liquid stocks.  
In summary, the results show that domestic institutions outperform foreign institutions in 
stocks with high information asymmetry, i.e., in stocks that are less easily understood by 
foreigners. On the other hand, foreigners perform equally well or even outperform local investors 
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in stocks with low information asymmetry. 
4.5. Who does better in which market condition? 
To evaluate how the performance of local and foreign investors varies with market conditions, 
we explore the ex-post performance of both categories of investors during periods of different 
market performance and volatility. Panel B of Table 7 presents the results. 
First, we analyze the returns of local and foreign stocks held by institutions during different 
market cycles by splitting the sample into bull and bear markets. Specifically, we consider that 
the periods from 2000:Q1 through 2002:Q2 and from 2008:Q1 through 2009:Q1 are 
characterized by a bear market, while the other periods are characterized by a bull market. The 
results show that during bear markets local investors have a clear advantage. While domestic 
holdings forecast future positive returns, foreign holdings forecast negative returns. However, 
there is a slight foreign advantage during bull markets. This is consistent with the idea that the 
information asymmetry is greater during worse economic conditions. 
Second, we compare the performance of local and foreign institutions in different periods of 
market uncertainty. As in Table 4, we again define a period of increased market uncertainty 
when the VIX is above its 75th percentile. The results in Table 7 show that local investors have a 
significant return forecasting advantage over foreigners in periods of increased market 
uncertainty (stress period). However, in periods of low uncertainty (no stress period) foreigners 
do as well as local investors. 
Overall, the results show that domestic institutions outperform foreign institutions in periods 
of market turmoil. This adds to the previous results (in Table 4) that domestic money managers 
increase their holdings in periods of increased market uncertainty, while foreign institutions 
reduce their holdings. During periods of market turmoil, it may be more costly or more difficult 
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for institutional investors to acquire information in foreign stocks, increasing the gains of 
investing domestically during these periods. These findings are consistent with theories linking 
the home bias to an information advantage over local stocks (Brennan and Cao (1997)). Our 
results extend to portfolios of international equity investors worldwide the findings of Giannetti 
and Laeven (2013) that the U.S. local bias is more pronounced in periods of market uncertainty, 
and fund managers earn superior returns on local stocks during these periods. 
4.6. Who does better in which country type? 
In Panel C of Table 7 we examine how the performance of local and foreign holdings varies 
according to characteristics of the country where the firm is located. The results show that 
domestic investors outperform foreign investors in countries with low levels of accounting 
standards and in countries with high levels of corruption. There is no statistically significant 
difference between domestic and foreign holdings in countries with high accounting standards 
and low levels of corruption. This is consistent with the notion that in countries with weaker 
legal institutions and worse information environment, local money managers are able to take 
advantage of the information asymmetry.  
We also find that domestic institutions outperform foreigners in countries with weaker 
investor protection (i.e., anti-director rights index below four), while foreigners outperform 
domestic in countries with strong investor protection (i.e., anti-director rights index equal to or 
above four). The differences in the two groups, however, are not statistically significant.  
Finally, we examine performance by geographic region, splitting the sample between U.S. 
and non-U.S. stocks. In this case, we do not find a statistically significant difference between 
local and foreign institutions. Therefore, the relative performance of domestic and foreign 




4.7. Price pressure or information? 
So far we have shown no significant performance gap between domestic and foreign investors. 
When we split the sample to control for the extent of information asymmetry, however, we find 
that local investors outperform foreigners in stocks with higher information asymmetry. The 
local advantage disappears (and sometimes is even reversed) in stocks with lower information 
asymmetry.  
To further understand the source of these performance differences, we run a regression of 
future returns on the level of and changes in domestic and foreign institutional ownership. A 
positive coefficient on the level of ownership suggests a price pressure or demand shock effect, 
while a positive coefficient on the change in ownership suggests an information or smart 
institutions effect.  
Table 8 shows the results using the same sample splits as in Table 7. Coefficients on the level 
of ownership are significantly positive for both domestic and foreign institutions in almost every 
sample split. This indicates that, whatever the information environment, institutions have a 
strong price pressure effect, which is consistent with earlier results.  
More important, we find evidence of a smart institutions effect in several cases where there is 
likely to be more information asymmetry. In particular, when we split the sample according to 
individual firm characteristics (Panel A of Table 8), we find that increases in the holdings of 
domestic investors predict higher future returns in firms with no analyst coverage, in illiquid 
firms, and in firms with a high percentage of closely held shares. In contrast, a change in the 
holdings of foreign investors does not predict returns in these firms. 
The results also suggest an information difference according to market condition (Panel B of 
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Table 8). During bear markets or during periods of higher market uncertainty, foreign investors 
rebalance their portfolios in the wrong direction, that is, an increase in their holdings is followed 
by lower stock returns. Domestic investors, though, are able to trade in the right direction, 
particularly during bear markets.  
Finally, the results also show that the information advantage of domestic investors depends 
on the country characteristics (Panel C of Table 8). In countries with high levels of corruption 
and weak investor protection, an increase in the holdings of domestic investors is followed by 
higher stock returns, while an increase in the holdings of foreign investors is followed by lower 
stock returns.      
Overall, our results show that domestic institutions trade with an information advantage over 
foreign institutions in firms or markets where there is a higher information asymmetry. Our 
results show that that the information advantage of domestic investors shows up only in stocks or 
market conditions where the information asymmetry is likely to be high using a global sample of 
32 countries. 
5. Robustness 
5.1. Alternative institutional ownership classifications  
Our main results use a classification of domestic or foreign holdings according to the nationality 
of the institution versus the nationality of the stock. We now check whether the results are robust 
to alternative classifications. 
First, we consider a coarser criterion of geographic region instead of country, and split 
holdings into same region and different region (Panel A of table 9). Second, we measure 
proximity by the actual geographical distance, and split holdings into local and distant (Panel B 
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of Table 9).  
The results in Table 9 are similar across the two classifications. We find that all institutional 
holdings variables predict one-quarter-ahead stock returns. All coefficients are statistically 
significant and quite similar in magnitude to the coefficients based on the domestic and foreign 
classification in Table 6. We also decompose the level of holdings into its first difference and the 
lagged level, in order to distinguish the price pressure from the smart institutions effect. In both 
classifications, we find evidence of a price pressure effect, but not of a smart institutions effect. 
Again, these results are consistent with our primary conclusions based on the domestic and 
foreign classification.  
In summary, we find no difference between same versus different region investors and 
between local versus distant investors. Hence, these results confirm that our findings are robust 
to different classifications of institutional ownership, including the geographic proximity 
measure used by Coval and Moskowitz (2001).   
5.2. Additional tests 
To further check the robustness of our results we complete our analysis with three additional 
tests. First, we run Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions and find no statistically significant 
difference between the return forecasting power of domestic and foreign institutions (Table 10, 
Panel A). Next, we perform the same regression but clustering standard errors at the country 
level (Table 10, Panel B). Again, we cannot find a statistically significant difference between 
local and foreign investors. Finally, we perform a regression with standard errors adjusted to two 
dimensions of clustering: by stock and by quarter (Table 10, Panel C). We also cannot reject the 
equality of coefficients between domestic and foreign institutional ownership.  
In all three panels we find evidence of a price pressure effect, but no evidence for a smart 
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institutions effect. If anything, we find weak evidence that foreign institutions are at a slight 
information disadvantage when standard errors are clustered at the country level (column (8) in 
Panel B). To sum up, our additional tests show that our benchmark results are robust to different 
forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. 
6. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine the portfolio performance of domestic 
institutions versus foreign-based institutions using a worldwide sample of stocks. We find that 
domestic institutional investors perform as well as foreign institutional investors during the 
2000-2010 period, although, domestic institutions enjoy superior return forecasting power in 
stocks with high information asymmetry. While both types of institutional holdings have a strong 
price pressure effect, only domestic investors seem to have an information advantage, which is 
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Domestic and foreign institutional ownership 
This table reports, for each country in the sample, the average across all firms of total institutional ownership (IO), domestic 
institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) in percentage of market capitalization as of 
December 2010. 
Country IO IO_DOM IO_FOR 
Number of 
firms 
Australia 0.156 0.022 0.134 821 
Austria 0.179 0.018 0.162 69 
Belgium 0.160 0.013 0.147 96 
Brazil 0.252 0.047 0.205 153 
Canada 0.498 0.272 0.227 675 
China 0.184 0.022 0.162 442 
Denmark 0.260 0.055 0.205 98 
Finland 0.297 0.086 0.211 97 
France 0.221 0.052 0.170 453 
Germany 0.234 0.048 0.186 389 
Hong Kong 0.144 0.027 0.117 853 
India 0.137 0.040 0.097 1,340 
Ireland 0.394 0.007 0.387 45 
Israel 0.329 0.009 0.320 92 
Italy 0.155 0.013 0.142 219 
Japan 0.137 0.041 0.097 1,747 
Korea (South) 0.149 0.001 0.148 779 
Luxembourg 0.278 0.002 0.276 21 
Malaysia 0.080 0.008 0.072 569 
Netherlands 0.334 0.034 0.299 98 
Norway 0.233 0.101 0.132 120 
Poland 0.212 0.134 0.079 135 
Portugal 0.115 0.010 0.105 37 
Singapore 0.134 0.023 0.110 415 
South Africa 0.213 0.046 0.166 180 
Spain 0.168 0.014 0.154 119 
Sweden 0.363 0.234 0.129 185 
Switzerland 0.282 0.048 0.235 207 
Taiwan 0.176 0.017 0.159 596 
Thailand 0.121 0.019 0.102 324 
U.K. 0.299 0.121 0.178 1,067 
U.S. 0.728 0.649 0.079 3,916 
     







This table reports mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for firm-level 
variables. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
RET 0.032 0.012 0.277 -0.667 1.333 632,505 
IO 0.206 0.072 0.282 0.000 1.000 632,505 
IO_DOM 0.170 0.026 0.274 0.000 1.000 632,505 
IO_FOR 0.036 0.006 0.073 0.000 1.000 632,505 
BM 0.868 0.647 0.785 0.029 4.733 632,505 
SIZE ($ Mil.) 2,029.39 188.60 10,600.73 10.00 571,197.10 632,505 
VOL 0.145 0.115 0.123 0.009 1.467 632,505 
TURN 1.117 0.540 1.679 0.001 12.605 632,505 
PRICE 2.719 2.547 2.658 -3.297 11.419 632,505 
MSCI 0.121 0.000 0.326 0.000 1.000 632,505 
MOM 0.225 0.072 0.804 -0.894 5.044 632,505 
DY 0.020 0.009 0.031 0.000 0.179 632,505 
ADR 0.068 0.000 0.252 0.000 1.000 632,505 
ANALYSTS 1.043 0.693 0.995 0.000 4.007 632,505 
FXSALES 0.183 0.000 0.287 0.000 0.975 632,505 





Determinants of institutional ownership 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of total 
institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR)  as a 
percentage of market capitalization. Regressions include industry, country, and time dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix 
A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. The robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm-level. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 IO IO_DOM IO_FOR 
BM 0.024*** 0.026*** -0.001*** 
 (23.17) (24.49) (-3.18) 
SIZE 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.003*** 
 (46.89) (47.39) (7.14) 
VOL -0.189*** -0.194*** 0.005*** 
 (-35.29) (-35.82) (3.82) 
TURN 0.0187*** 0.019*** -0.001*** 
 (30.75) (32.88) (-3.35) 
PRICE 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 
 (13.53) (9.30) (11.77) 
MSCI -0.078*** -0.106*** 0.028*** 
 (-21.14) (-30.46) (16.93) 
MOM 0.002*** -0.0002 0.002*** 
 (3.28) (-0.41) (9.69) 
DY -0.401*** -0.367*** -0.034*** 
 (-16.75) (-16.31) (-4.04) 
ADR -0.032*** -0.085*** 0.053*** 
 (-7.36) (-24.25) (17.80) 
ANALYSTS 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 
 (36.21) (29.03) (21.87) 
FXSALES 0.020*** 0.002 0.018*** 
 (5.84) (0.63) (11.53) 
CLOSE -0.124*** -0.095*** -0.029*** 
 (-30.34) (-24.24) (-19.09) 
Number of observations 637,415 637,415 637,415 






Determinants of institutional ownership and market uncertainty 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of total 
institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR)  as a 
percentage of market capitalization. Regressions include industry, country, and time dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix 
A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm-level. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 IO IO_DOM IO_FOR IO IO_DOM IO_FOR 
VIX 0.004*** 0.007*** -0.003***    
 (3.54) (6.15) (-6.42)    
STRESS    0.002*** 0.002*** -0.0004*** 
    (8.23) (10.53) (-5.61) 
BM 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.001*** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.001*** 
 (23.08) (24.40) (-3.20) (23.08) (24.41) (-3.20) 
SIZE 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.003*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.003*** 
 (47.04) (47.48) (7.33) (47.03) (47.47) (7.32) 
VOL -0.188*** -0.193*** 0.006*** -0.188*** -0.193*** 0.006*** 
 (-35.19) (-35.79) (4.10) (-35.19) (-35.78) (4.09) 
TURN 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.001*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.001*** 
 (30.73) (32.87) (-3.38) (30.73) (32.87) (-3.38) 
PRICE 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 
 (13.59) (9.39) (11.73) (13.59) (9.38) (11.73) 
MSCI -0.077*** -0.105*** 0.028*** -0.077*** -0.105*** 0.028*** 
 (-21.11) (-30.42) (16.91) (-21.11) (-30.42) (16.91) 
MOM 0.001* -0.001* 0.002*** 0.001* -0.001* 0.002*** 
 (1.84) (-1.70) (9.12) (1.82) (-1.73) (9.16) 
DY -0.400*** -0.366*** -0.034*** -0.400*** -0.366*** -0.034*** 
 (-16.72) (-16.28) (-4.05) (-16.72) (-16.29) (-4.05) 
ADR -0.032*** -0.085*** 0.053*** -0.032*** -0.085*** 0.053*** 
 (-7.36) (-24.25) (17.79) (-7.36) (-24.25) (17.79) 
ANALYSTS 0.053*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 
 (36.34) (29.18) (21.83) (36.33) (29.17) (21.83) 
FXSALES 0.020*** 0.002 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.002 0.018*** 
 (5.86) (0.66) (11.51) (5.86) (0.65) (11.51) 
CLOSE -0.124*** -0.095*** -0.029*** -0.124*** -0.095*** -0.029*** 
 (-30.33) (-24.23) (-19.07) (-30.33) (-24.23) (-19.07) 
Number of observations 637,415 637,415 637,415 637,415 637,415 637,415 






This table shows value-weighted returns on the portfolios of domestic and foreign institutional holdings. The average monthly return in excess of the risk-free rate, the alpha 
from a global market factor, and the alpha from a global four-factor (Carhart) model, and the average return after subtracting from each stock the return on a portfolio with 
similar size, book-to-market, and momentum are shown. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. 
Country 

























Australia 1.27% 1.45% -1.04 0.96% 1.12% -0.94 0.26% 0.52% -1.29 0.11% 0.36% -1.46 
Austria 1.19% 0.71% 2.92 0.93% 0.43% 3.08 -0.37% -0.68% 1.71 -0.58% -0.56% -0.13 
Belgium 0.47% 0.24% 1.54 0.16% -0.07% 1.57 -0.70% -0.68% -0.13 -0.87% -0.99% 0.87 
Brazil 1.92% 1.84% 0.25 1.57% 1.47% 0.33 1.94% 1.92% 0.05 0.43% 0.39% 0.27 
Canada 0.89% 0.58% 1.05 0.66% 0.29% 1.30 0.33% 1.04% -2.94 -0.23% -0.26% 0.16 
China 1.52% 0.87% 1.53 1.20% 0.55% 1.52 1.40% 0.53% 1.79 -0.27% -0.76% 1.07 
Denmark 0.60% 0.98% -1.78 0.29% 0.71% -2.05 -0.09% 0.62% -3.07 -0.96% -0.39% -3.80 
Finland 0.90% 0.02% 1.66 0.36% -0.60% 1.79 0.31% 0.30% 0.02 -0.61% -1.18% 1.29 
France 0.27% 0.27% 0.01 0.02% 0.02% -0.04 -0.37% -0.35% -0.28 -0.77% -0.77% -0.01 
Germany 0.27% 0.22% 1.05 -0.01% -0.07% 1.05 -0.16% -0.16% 0.04 -0.88% -0.80% -1.94 
Hong Kong 0.84% 0.67% 1.62 0.60% 0.43% 1.63 0.88% 0.87% 0.12 -0.45% -0.56% 1.21 
India 1.55% 1.31% 1.30 1.24% 1.02% 1.23 1.08% 0.99% 0.43 0.16% 0.18% -0.09 
Ireland 0.00% -0.03% 0.11 -0.26% -0.28% 0.06 -1.05% -0.88% -0.49 -1.12% -1.50% 1.20 
Israel -0.51% -0.73% 0.23 -0.04% -0.42% 0.46 2.12% 1.67% 0.44 -2.46% -1.33% -1.18 
Italy 0.07% 0.13% -0.77 -0.26% -0.18% -0.96 -0.70% -0.68% -0.22 -1.00% -0.90% -1.29 
Japan -0.34% -0.35% 0.10 -0.51% -0.52% 0.12 -0.54% -0.57% 0.41 -1.08% -1.03% -0.63 
Korea (South) 1.16% 0.92% 0.93 0.83% 0.62% 0.85 1.14% 0.78% 1.25 -0.48% -0.17% -1.25 
Luxembourg 0.68% 0.65% 0.06 0.20% -0.01% 0.38 -0.15% 1.17% -2.31 -0.74% -0.68% -0.11 
Malaysia 1.33% 1.48% -1.21 0.52% 0.70% -1.39 0.37% 0.54% -1.19 -0.95% -0.24% -4.79 
Netherlands 0.26% 0.27% -0.09 -0.01% 0.01% -0.22 -0.46% -0.37% -0.79 -0.89% -0.67% -1.93 
Norway 1.15% 1.19% -0.26 0.68% 0.71% -0.25 0.40% 0.21% 1.26 -0.65% -0.40% -1.82 
Poland 1.82% 1.78% 0.20 0.47% 0.49% -0.08 -0.29% -0.30% 0.02 -1.10% -0.52% -2.63 
Portugal 0.44% 0.65% -0.78 -0.01% 0.21% -0.86 -0.05% 0.74% -2.74 -1.05% -0.45% -2.11 
Singapore 0.67% 0.42% 0.46 0.41% 0.08% 0.65 0.28% 1.25% -1.78 -0.59% -0.78% 0.39 
South Africa 1.67% 1.61% 0.14 1.13% 1.10% 0.07 0.52% 0.38% 0.30 0.14% 0.35% -0.54 
Spain 0.59% 0.53% 0.59 0.28% 0.21% 0.68 -0.05% 0.10% -1.24 -0.60% -0.56% -0.41 
Sweden 0.48% 0.25% 1.89 0.16% -0.07% 1.88 0.58% 0.53% 0.36 -0.41% -0.44% 0.32 
Switzerland 0.49% 0.37% 1.25 0.31% 0.19% 1.22 -0.10% -0.04% -0.56 -0.45% -0.40% -0.71 
Taiwan 2.31% 2.39% -0.35 0.13% 0.48% -1.55 0.41% 0.69% -1.12 -0.23% 0.13% -1.94 
Thailand 1.75% 1.81% -0.54 1.46% 1.51% -0.47 1.20% 1.41% -1.56 0.08% 0.43% -3.38 
United Kingdom 0.21% 0.10% 1.08 0.01% -0.09% 0.98 -0.38% -0.32% -0.51 -0.88% -0.79% -0.90 
United States 0.04% -0.02% 1.60 -0.16% -0.22% 1.52 -0.10% -0.08% -0.56 -0.78% -0.79% 0.56 
All countries:             
Domestic - Foreign 0.09% 0.18% -0.59 -0.12% -0.05% -0.43 -0.06% 0.04% -0.64 -0.77% -0.70% -0.51 
Same - Different Region 0.11% 0.13% -0.13 -0.10% -0.09% -0.04 -0.04% -0.02% -0.13 -0.76% -0.72% -0.33 




Regression of future returns on levels of and changes in total, domestic and foreign 
institutional ownership 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of one-quarter-
ahead returns on levels of and changes in total institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and 
foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) and other firm characteristics. Regressions include industry, country and time 
dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IO t 0.040***        
 (18.22)        
IO t-1  0.037***       
  (16.93)       
∆ IO  -0.011       
  (-1.10)       
IO_DOM t   0.039***    0.041***  
   (17.29)    (17.71)  
IO_DOM t-1    0.035***    0.037*** 
    (15.50)    (16.05) 
∆ IO_DOM    -0.004    -0.003 
    (-0.34)    (-0.24) 
IO_FOR t     0.021***  0.031***  
     (3.98)  (5.86)  
IO_FOR t-1      0.028***  0.038*** 
      (5.38)  (7.08) 
∆ IO_FOR      -0.059**  -0.055** 
      (-2.19)  (-2.04) 
BM 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (32.89) (33.25) (32.78) (33.24) (34.97) (35.28) (32.78) (33.21) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (-6.86) (-6.64) (-6.58) (-6.30) (-2.37) (-2.66) (-6.90) (-6.62) 
VOL -0.084*** -0.078*** -0.084*** -0.078*** -0.091*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.078*** 
 (-18.07) (-16.87) (-18.01) (-16.83) (-19.70) (-18.36) (-18.01) (-16.87) 
TURN -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (-16.44) (-15.01) (-16.47) (-14.94) (-13.99) (-12.53) (-16.48) (-14.94) 
PRICE -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (-28.23) (-27.41) (-27.85) (-27.03) (-27.20) (-26.49) (-28.07) (-27.31) 
MSCI 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (5.36) (5.90) (6.26) (6.60) (1.87) (2.61) (5.62) (5.88) 
MOM 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (12.00) (15.92) (12.07) (15.85) (11.88) (15.61) (12.02) (15.93) 
DY 0.220*** 0.212*** 0.219*** 0.211*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.220*** 0.212*** 
 (17.50) (16.88) (17.39) (16.76) (16.39) (15.90) (17.50) (16.87) 
ADR -0.002 -0.001 0.0002 0.0005 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.42) (-1.01) (0.15) (0.36) (-3.16) (-2.96) (-0.98) (-1.00) 
ANALYSTS 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (17.47) (16.27) (18.60) (17.46) (20.75) (19.16) (17.53) (16.18) 
FXSALES 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.42) (3.43) (3.92) (3.89) (3.72) (3.61) (3.52) (3.42) 
CLOSE 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (10.40) (10.24) (9.79) (9.62) (7.95) (8.14) (10.28) (10.21) 
Number of observations 632,505 620,038 632,505 620,038 632,505 620,038 632,505 620,038 
R-squared 0.207 0.208 0.207 0.208 0.206 0.208 0.207 0.208 
Test-of-difference in coefficients (p-values) between:      
IO_DOM = IO_FOR      0.09 0.87 




Regression of future returns on levels of local and nonlocal institutional ownership:  
Effect of information asymmetry 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of one-quarter-
ahead returns on levels of and changes in total institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and 
foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) and other firm characteristics (coefficients not shown). Stocks are divided into two 
subsamples for each characteristic indicated in the table. The low and high sample splits are based on the median of each 
variable. Regressions include industry, country and time dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix A for variable definitions. 
The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, 
and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 










Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Analyst 
coverage 
0  0.069*** (11.31)  0.013 (0.76)  220,115 0.169  0.00 
>0  0.026*** (9.14)  0.045*** (7.93)  412,390 0.240  0.00 
Volatility 
Low  0.014*** (5.86)  0.029*** (5.02)  316,297 0.210  0.01 
High  0.058*** (16.02)  0.026*** (3.00)  316,208 0.233  0.00 
Close 
Low  0.041*** (13.91)  0.055*** (8.09)  316,301 0.212  0.05 
High  0.044*** (10.50)  0.014 (1.57)  316,204 0.207  0.00 
Herfindahl 
Low  -0.038* (-1.81)  0.036** (2.16)  267,299 0.214  0.01 
High  0.008*** (2.78)  0.020*** (2.85)  269,738 0.239  0.10 
Assets 
Low  0.060*** (14.45)  0.035*** (2.80)  316,146 0.200  0.05 
High  0.021*** (7.10)  0.025*** (4.29)  316,343 0.235  0.58 
Book-to-
market 
Low  0.053*** (18.07)  0.027*** (4.01)  316,230 0.215  0.00 
High  0.020*** (5.51)  0.035*** (3.85)  316,275 0.202  0.13 
Illiquidity  
(zero return) 
Low  0.036*** (11.98)  0.042*** (6.51)  312,029 0.240  0.40 
High  0.064*** (11.50)  0.012 (1.14)  310,932 0.191  0.00 
Panel B: Market condition 
Bull/Bear 
Bull  0.026*** (9.68)  0.041*** (6.52)  442,342 0.178  0.02 
Bear  0.068*** (15.82)  -0.028** (-2.47)  190,163 0.183  0.00 
Stress 
No  0.037*** (13.93)  0.039*** (6.16)  448,450 0.113  0.79 
Yes  0.045*** (10.91)  -0.008 (-0.78)  184,055 0.299  0.00 
Panel C: Country characteristics 
Disclose 
Low  0.068*** (5.15)  0.033*** (3.81)  79,584 0.323  0.03 
High  0.039*** (16.40)  0.039*** (5.64)  537,625 0.199  0.99 
Corruption 
Low  0.040*** (16.68)  0.042*** (6.51)  484,021 0.196  0.83 
High  0.058** (2.15)  0.008 (0.80)  133,188 0.282  0.09 
Anti-Director 
<4  0.038*** (3.57)  0.019** (2.48)  151,280 0.258  0.14 
>=4  0.038*** (15.18)  0.048*** (6.30)  481,225 0.199  0.19 
Geography 
U.S.  0.043*** (12.94)  0.073*** (3.21)  198,595 0.185  0.19 




Regression of future returns on levels of and changes in local and nonlocal institutional ownership:  
Effect of information asymmetry 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of one-quarter-ahead returns on levels of and changes in total 
institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) and other firm characteristics (coefficients not shown). 
Stocks are divided into two subsamples for each characteristic indicated in the table. The low and high sample splits are based on the median of each variable. Regressions 
include industry, country and time dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 




Test of difference 
in coefficients  
(p-value) 
IO ∆ IO 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Analyst coverage 
0  0.063*** (10.42)  0.015 (0.89)  0.068*** (2.95)  -0.019 (-0.25)  217,002 0.167  0.01 0.28 
>0  0.021*** (7.27)  0.050*** (8.69)  -0.026** (-2.11)  -0.058** (-2.26)  403,036 0.243  0.00 0.26 
Volatility 
Low  0.013*** (5.37)  0.034*** (5.67)  0.013 (1.10)  -0.038 (-1.44)  310,062 0.214  0.00 0.08 
High  0.053*** (14.64)  0.033*** (3.81)  -0.008 (-0.54)  -0.068* (-1.76)  309,976 0.233  0.02 0.15 
Close 
Low  0.038*** (12.76)  0.062*** (9.04)  -0.022 (-1.58)  -0.067** (-2.01)  310,074 0.213  0.00 0.21 
High  0.039*** (9.26)  0.020** (2.27)  0.037** (2.07)  -0.036 (-0.87)  309,964 0.209  0.05 0.11 
Herfindahl 
Low  -0.029 (-1.37)  0.054*** (3.29)  -0.024 (-0.54)  0.024 (0.35)  262,600 0.216  0.00 0.56 
High  0.005* (1.79)  0.024*** (3.33)  -0.037*** (-3.28)  -0.095*** (-3.36)  264,968 0.242  0.01 0.06 
Assets 
Low  0.055*** (12.98)  0.045*** (3.49)  -0.0005 (-0.03)  -0.074* (-1.80)  309,915 0.199  0.45 0.10 
High  0.019*** (6.60)  0.027*** (4.64)  -0.002 (-0.13)  -0.040 (-1.16)  310,107 0.239  0.25 0.31 
Book-to-market 
Low  0.048*** (16.40)  0.032*** (4.78)  0.007 (0.54)  -0.012 (-0.44)  310,014 0.215  0.02 0.53 
High  0.018*** (4.88)  0.044*** (4.92)  0.0004 (0.02)  -0.097* (-1.92)  310,024 0.205  0.01 0.07 
Illiquidity  
(zero return) 
Low  0.031*** (10.41)  0.046*** (7.02)  -0.010 (-0.78)  -0.022 (-0.75)  305,893 0.243  0.04 0.72 





Table 8: Continued 






Test of difference 
in coefficients  
(p-value) 
Panel B: Market conditions 
Bull/Bear 
Bull  0.027*** (10.21)  0.044*** (7.02)  -0.027** (-2.19)  -0.029 (-0.88)  442,342 0.178  0.01 0.96 
Bear  0.055*** (12.42)  -0.013 (-1.17)  0.077*** (3.69)  -0.140*** (-3.18)  177,696 0.187  0.00 0.00 
Stress 
No  0.031*** (11.29)  0.045*** (6.97)  -0.007 (-0.59)  -0.015 (-0.49)  435,983 0.111  0.04 0.82 
Yes  0.046*** (11.12)  -0.002 (-0.21)  0.020 (0.99)  -0.197*** (-4.75)  184,055 0.299  0.00 0.00 
Panel C: Country characteristics 
Disclose 
Low  0.064*** (4.83)  0.037*** (4.14)  0.032 (0.86)  -0.044 (-1.05)  78,279 0.326  0.09 0.17 
High  0.036*** (14.92)  0.048*** (6.81)  -0.007 (-0.66)  -0.071** (-2.05)  526,604 0.200  0.10 0.08 
Corruption 
Low  0.036*** (14.91)  0.049*** (7.60)  -0.020* (-1.85)  -0.044 (-1.41)  472,892 0.198  0.05 0.47 
High  0.060** (2.18)  0.014 (1.37)  0.145* (1.91)  -0.048 (-0.83)  131,991 0.281  0.13 0.04 
Anti-Director 
<4  0.034*** (3.09)  0.024*** (3.06)  0.086*** (2.83)  -0.079** (-2.00)  149,372 0.260  0.61 0.00 
>=4  0.033*** (13.56)  0.054*** (7.09)  -0.008 (-0.74)  -0.042 (-1.18)  470,666 0.200  0.01 0.37 
Geography 
U.S.  0.039*** (11.71)  0.097*** (4.17)  -0.026** (-2.04)  -0.194*** (-3.35)  193,130 0.186  0.01 0.00 
Non-
U.S. 






Regression of future returns on levels of and changes in institutional ownership: Alternative classifications  
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of one-quarter-ahead returns on levels of and changes in total 
institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) and other firm characteristics (coefficients not shown). 
Panel A reports the results for institutional ownership based on the geographical region (same/different) where the stock and the institution. Panel B reports the results for 
institutional ownership based on the distance between the capital city where the firm and institution are domiciled using a threshold of 1,000 km. Regressions include industry, 
country and time dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm-level. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Same and different region 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
IO_SAME t 0.039***      0.039***  
 (17.44)      (17.74)  
IO_SAME t-1  0.035***      0.036*** 
  (15.85)      (16.24) 
∆ IO_SAME  -0.008      -0.007 
  (-0.73)      (-0.63) 
IO_DIFF t    0.029***   0.040***  
    (3.98)   (5.34)  
IO_DIFF t-1     0.038***   0.047*** 
     (5.10)   (6.34) 
∆ IO_DIFF     -0.053   -0.049 
     (-1.36)   (-1.27) 
Number of observations 632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038 
R-squared 0.207 0.208  0.206 0.208  0.207 0.208 
       
Test-of-difference in coefficients (p-values) between:       
IO_SAME = IO_DIFF     0.97 0.15 









Table 9: Continued 
Panel B: Local and distant 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
IO_LOCAL t 0.038***      0.040***  
 (17.31)      (17.76)  
IO_ LOCAL t-1  0.035***      0.036*** 
  (15.68)      (16.24) 
∆ IO_ LOCAL  -0.008      -0.007 
  (-0.80)      (-0.69) 
IO_DISTANT t    0.023***   0.037***  
    (3.73)   (5.80)  
IO_ DISTANT t-1     0.031***   0.043*** 
     (4.88)   (6.76) 
∆ IO_ DISTANT     -0.042   -0.037 
     (-1.28)   (-1.12) 
Number of observations 632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038 
R-squared 0.207 0.208  0.206 0.208  0.207 0.208 
       
Test-of-difference in coefficients (p-values) between:       
IO_LOCAL = IO_DISTANT     0.68 0.29 







This table reports estimates of coefficients of the quarterly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression of one-quarter-
ahead returns on levels of and changes in total institutional ownership (IO), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), and 
foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) and other firm characteristics (coefficients not shown). Panel A reports Fama-
MacBeth regressions with robust t-statistics adjusted for autocorrelation with Newey-West standard errors using four lags. 
Panel B reports regressions with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level. Panel C reports regressions with 
standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at the stock- and quarter-level. Regressions include industry, country and time 
dummies. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix A for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
IO t 0.034***           
 (2.98)           
IO t-1  0.032***          
  (3.30)          
∆ IO  -0.025*          
  (-1.97)          
IO_DOM t    0.037***      0.037***  
    (3.02)      (3.05)  
IO_DOM t-1     0.035***      0.035*** 
     (3.27)      (3.30) 
∆ IO_DOM     -0.020      -0.020 
     (-1.42)      (-1.42) 
IO_FOR t       0.005   0.011  
       (0.33)   (0.84)  
IO_FOR t-1        0.005   0.011 
        (0.34)   (0.88) 
∆ IO_FOR        -0.038   -0.033 
        (-0.81)   (-0.71) 
Number of 
observations 
632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038 
R-squared 0.176 0.175  0.177 0.175  0.175 0.174  0.177 0.176 
    
Test-of-difference in coefficients (p-values) between:    
IO_DOM = IO_FOR  0.15 0.16 




Table 10: Continued 
Panel B: Standard errors clustered by country 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
IO t 0.040***           
 (6.70)           
IO t-1  0.037***          
  (7.15)          
∆ IO  -0.011          
  (-0.59)          
IO_DOM t    0.039***      0.041***  
    (7.26)      (7.35)  
IO_DOM t-1     0.035***      0.037*** 
     (7.08)      (7.27) 
∆ IO_DOM     -0.004      -0.003 
     (-0.16)      (-0.11) 
IO_FOR t       0.021*   0.031**  
       (1.97)   (2.07)  
IO_FOR t-1        0.028**   0.038** 
        (2.28)   (2.27) 
∆ IO_FOR        -0.059*   -0.055* 
        (-1.90)   (-1.84) 
Number of 
observations 
632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038 
R-squared 0.207 0.208  0.207 0.208  0.206 0.208  0.207 0.208 
    
Test-of-difference in coefficients (p-values) between:    
IO_DOM = IO_FOR  0.51 0.96 






Table 10: Continued 
Panel C: Standard errors clustered by firm and quarter 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
IO t 0.040***           
 (4.02)           
IO t-1  0.037***          
  (3.99)          
∆ IO  -0.011          
  (-0.50)          
IO_DOM t    0.039***      0.041***  
    (3.44)      (3.59)  
IO_DOM t-1     0.035***      0.037*** 
     (3.34)      (3.52) 
∆ IO_DOM     -0.004      -0.003 
     (-0.15)      (-0.11) 
IO_FOR t       0.021   0.031*  
       (1.20)   (1.89)  
IO_FOR t-1        0.028   0.038** 
        (1.59)   (2.21) 
∆ IO_FOR        -0.059   -0.055 
        (-1.35)   (-1.27) 
Number of 
observations 
632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038  632,505 620,038 
R-squared 0.207 0.208  0.207 0.208  0.206 0.208  0.207 0.208 
    
Test-of-difference in coefficients (p-values) between:    
IO_DOM = IO_FOR  0.67 0.97 







Domestic and foreign institutional ownership  
This figure shows the average institutional ownership by foreign and domestic institutions by country at the end of 2010. 
Domestic (foreign) institutional ownership is the sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in the same country (in a 




Table A1: Variables definition 
Variable Definition 
RET Quarterly stock return in US$ (Datastream item RI ($)). 
IO Institutional ownership by all institutions as a percentage of market capitalization. 
IO_DOM Institutional ownership by domestic institutions as a percentage of market capitalization. 
IO_FOR Institutional ownership by foreign institutions as a percentage of market capitalization. 
IO_SAME_REG Institutional ownership by institutions sharing the same geographic region as a percentage of market capitalization. 
IO_DIFF_REG Institutional ownership by institutions not sharing the same geographic region as a percentage of market capitalization. 
IO_LOCAL Institutional ownership by local (< 1000 kms) institutions as a percentage of market capitalization. 
IO_DISTANT Institutional ownership by distant (>= 1000 kms) institutions as a percentage of market capitalization. 
BM Log of the book-to-market equity ratio (market value is WorldScope item 08001 and book value is WorldScope item 03501). 
SIZE Log market capitalization in US$ (Datastream item MV). 
VOL Return volatility estimated for US dollar monthly returns. 
TURN Ratio of share volume (Datastream item UVO) by the shares outstanding (Datastream item NOSH). 
PRICE Log of the stock price (WorldScope item 05001). 
MSCI MSCI member dummy, which equals one if a firm is in the MSCI All-Country World Index. 
MOM 12-month trailing stock return in US$. 
DY Dividend yield (WorldScope item 04551 divided by WorldScope item 08001). 
ADR ADR dummy, which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. 
ANALYSTS Number of analysts covering a firm as reported by IBES. 
FXSALES International annual net sales as a proportion of net sales (WorldScope item 08731). 
CLOSE Number of shares held by insiders as a proportion of the number of shares outstanding (WorldScope item 08021). 
ASSETS Assets in US$ (WorldScope item 02999). 
ILLIQ Illiquidity measure computed as the number of daily returns in local currency that are zero divided by the number of observations in each year. 
HERF Ownership concentration ratio - Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
BULL Market condition dummy, which equals one during bull markets. 
VIX CBOE market volatility index (VXO index). 
STRESS Uncertainty dummy, which equals one in quarters during which the VIX index exceeded (was below) its 75th percentile. 
ANTI_DIRECTOR Anti-director rights multiplied by the rule of law index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,and Vishny (1998)). 
DISC Accounting transparency index (Global Competitiveness Report). 
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Portfolio tests: Alternative measures of ownership 
This table shows value-weighted returns on the portfolios of domestic and foreign institutional holdings using alternative 
measures of ownership based on the geographical region (same/different) and on the distance between the capital city where 
the firm and institution are domiciled using a threshold of 1,000 km. The average monthly return in excess of the risk-free 
rate, and the average return after subtracting from each stock the return on a portfolio with similar size, book-to-market, and 
momentum are shown in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The sample period is from 2000 to 2010. 
 
Panel A: Excess Return 









Australia 1.07% 1.51% -2.27 1.27% 1.45% -1.00 
Austria 0.20% 0.93% -2.25 0.72% 0.75% -0.20 
Belgium 0.28% 0.42% -0.92 0.28% 0.40% -0.95 
Brazil 1.85% 1.83% 0.15 1.92% 1.84% 0.25 
Canada 0.62% 0.58% 0.24 0.62% 0.58% 0.24 
China 0.98% 0.67% 1.42 1.52% 0.90% 1.47 
Denmark 0.91% 1.01% -0.41 0.91% 0.99% -0.33 
Finland 0.04% -0.23% 1.14 0.33% -0.18% 1.35 
France 0.25% 0.27% -0.38 0.26% 0.26% -0.12 
Germany 0.24% 0.24% -0.06 0.24% 0.23% 0.21 
Hong Kong 0.80% 0.64% 1.54 0.84% 0.64% 1.67 
India 1.59% 1.23% 1.45 1.55% 1.31% 1.33 
Ireland 0.13% -0.07% 0.61 0.31% -0.11% 1.31 
Israel -0.24% 0.24% -1.05 -0.51% -0.73% 0.23 
Italy -0.03% 0.17% -2.50 0.17% 0.08% 0.82 
Japan -0.34% -0.34% 0.01 -0.34% -0.34% 0.05 
Korea (South) 1.18% 0.93% 1.00 1.16% 0.91% 1.62 
Luxembourg 0.45% 0.43% 0.04 0.33% 0.44% -0.30 
Malaysia 0.69% 0.83% -2.01 0.66% 0.82% -1.92 
Netherlands 0.19% 0.34% -1.38 0.19% 0.33% -1.46 
Norway 1.04% 1.23% -1.14 1.27% 1.20% 0.49 
Poland 0.87% 1.03% -0.93 0.81% 0.99% -1.18 
Portugal 0.32% 0.41% -0.66 0.41% 0.56% -0.60 
Singapore 0.87% 0.39% 0.78 0.67% 0.43% 0.44 
South Africa 1.67% 1.59% 0.19 1.67% 1.59% 0.19 
Spain 0.42% 0.43% -0.11 0.59% 0.52% 0.66 
Sweden 0.42% 0.21% 1.36 0.40% 0.25% 1.20 
Switzerland 0.44% 0.36% 0.92 0.44% 0.37% 0.88 
Taiwan 0.26% 0.33% -0.35 2.31% 2.39% -0.37 
Thailand 1.60% 1.58% 0.29 1.75% 1.81% -0.54 
United Kingdom 0.15% 0.14% 0.15 0.12% 0.14% -0.16 
United States 0.04% -0.06% 2.22 0.04% -0.06% 2.22 
       






Table IA.1: Continued 
Panel B: Characteristics-adjusted return 









Australia 0.07% 0.38% -1.90 0.11% 0.35% -1.42 
Austria -0.75% -0.41% -2.18 -0.74% -0.50% -2.07 
Belgium -1.03% -0.89% -0.96 -1.04% -0.92% -0.93 
Brazil 0.39% 0.36% 0.20 0.43% 0.38% 0.28 
Canada -0.24% -0.31% 0.52 -0.24% -0.31% 0.52 
China -0.67% -0.73% 0.26 -0.27% -0.76% 1.08 
Denmark -0.76% -0.24% -2.69 -0.78% -0.27% -2.82 
Finland -0.99% -1.26% 1.12 -0.76% -1.21% 1.25 
France -0.77% -0.78% 0.30 -0.76% -0.79% 0.53 
Germany -0.87% -0.73% -2.51 -0.88% -0.75% -2.47 
Hong Kong -0.46% -0.57% 1.18 -0.45% -0.56% 1.07 
India 0.16% 0.16% 0.02 0.16% 0.17% -0.05 
Ireland -1.19% -1.62% 1.07 -1.01% -1.63% 1.67 
Israel -0.90% -0.54% -0.98 -2.46% -1.33% -1.18 
Italy -0.93% -0.90% -0.35 -0.91% -0.91% 0.04 
Japan -1.07% -1.02% -0.66 -1.08% -1.02% -0.71 
Korea (South) -0.45% -0.18% -1.15 -0.16% -0.18% 0.09 
Luxembourg -0.66% -0.53% -0.31 -0.72% -0.53% -0.45 
Malaysia -0.29% -0.05% -3.22 -0.37% -0.06% -3.63 
Netherlands -0.82% -0.55% -2.61 -0.81% -0.57% -2.61 
Norway -0.60% -0.34% -1.59 -0.63% -0.39% -1.66 
Poland -0.85% -0.44% -2.50 -0.94% -0.46% -3.04 
Portugal -0.60% -0.32% -1.68 -0.93% -0.44% -1.73 
Singapore -0.52% -0.80% 0.52 -0.59% -0.78% 0.37 
South Africa 0.14% 0.33% -0.50 0.14% 0.33% -0.50 
Spain -0.59% -0.52% -0.95 -0.60% -0.56% -0.40 
Sweden -0.44% -0.44% -0.06 -0.45% -0.43% -0.14 
Switzerland -0.42% -0.40% -0.29 -0.42% -0.40% -0.47 
Taiwan -0.71% -0.44% -1.48 -0.23% 0.13% -1.95 
Thailand 0.39% 0.41% -0.27 0.08% 0.43% -3.37 
United Kingdom -0.88% -0.76% -1.41 -0.89% -0.77% -1.40 
United States -0.78% -0.81% 0.99 -0.78% -0.81% 0.99 
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 “We support those companies, who act in interest of their future and in interest of their 
employees against irresponsible locust swarms, who measure success in quarterly intervals, 
suck off substance and let companies die once they have eaten them away.”
 
 
Franz Müntefering, 2005, German Social Democratic Party Chairman 
1. Introduction 
How does financial globalization affect long-term corporate investment and productivity? Over 
the last decade, there has been a trend away from the “stakeholder capitalism” and concentrated 
ownership model, historically predominant in continental Europe and Japan, which promoted 
long-term relationships with labor, creditors, and other stakeholders. In its place, many 
companies worldwide are moving towards the Anglo-Saxon “shareholder capitalism” model 
(Tirole (2001), Carlin and Mayer (2003), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2013)) with a dispersed 
and globalized shareholder structure. The agents bringing about this change are foreign 
institutional investors who increasingly play a significant role as shareholders of corporations 
worldwide (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011)). 
Many analysts and policy makers fear that pressure from foreign institutions may lead to 
managerial short-termism, undermining reinvestment of profits into fixed capital, research and 
development (R&D), and human capital. Success in technological innovation is a driving force 
of corporate success and growth in the long-run. However, investing in new technologies, 
products, and services is risky and challenging, and requires both managerial effort and 
shareholder engagement to bear these risks and tolerate failure. Alternatively, foreign portfolio 
investors may help to mitigate managerial entrenchment, making managers more willing to act in 
the interests of shareholders and to exploit growth opportunities by ramping up long-term 
investment and innovation efforts. 
We entertain two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the presence of foreign institutional 
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investors as shareholders may lead managers to cut long-term investment by reducing capital 
expenditures, R&D and employment. This view argues that foreign portfolio flows are “hot 
money” in search of short-term profits and have no concern about the long-term prospects of the 
firm.1 Franz Müntefering, German Social Democratic Party Chairman, made the front page of 
newspapers when, at his party’s convention, compared foreign (mostly Anglo-Saxon) investors 
with an invasion of “locusts” stripping companies bare (see quote at the beginning of the paper).2 
This stance against foreign investors is part of a more general phenomenon of protectionism 
towards foreign capital flows. Dinc and Erel (2013) find evidence of economic nationalism in 
mergers and acquisitions in Europe where governments prefer that target companies remain in 
domestic hands.  
Foreign institutional investors may induce a short-term bias by increasing managerial focus 
on efficiency-seeking strategies that help short-term earnings at the cost of long-term investing. 
Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014) argue that the stock market pressures corporate managers to 
select incremental projects that are easier to communicate to investors.3 Managers may then 
forgo innovation and try instead to acquire ready-made technologies as this strategy is more 
transparent to the stock market. Moreover, foreign institutions may be less failure-tolerant and 
thus increase the risk of executives being fired, which could lead to career concerns. These 
factors may dissuade risk-averse managers from pursuing growth opportunities by innovating.4  
The second hypothesis is that foreign institutional investors promote long-term investment in 
                                                 
1 Brennan and Cao (1997) argue that foreign investors, less informed about the prospects of local stocks, may react 
more strongly rebalancing their portfolios and amplify the stock reaction to negative public news.  
2 See also “German Deputy Still Targets Locusts”, Financial Times, February 14, 2007. 
3 Stock markets have been criticized for providing incentives for managers to pursue short-term performance at the 
expenses of long-term value. See Stein (1988, 1989) for a more general discussion of investor myopia on optimal 
managerial decision-making when facing irrational stock markets. Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) show 
that short termism distort investment and innovation decisions of publicly-listed firms. 
4 There are also wider implications as the investment of scarce corporate resources in innovation activities may have 




fixed capital, innovation, and human capital. Large institutions may be better at monitoring 
managers and influencing strategic decision making. This positive impact derives from the 
disciplinary effect of institutions on “lazy” managers. Additionally, large portfolio investors are 
more sophisticated and may be better able to tolerate the high risk/high return trade-off of long-
term investment as they have the ability to diversify these risks across their international 
portfolios. The presence of institutions may also boost investment and innovation activities by 
increasing tolerance for failure and reducing managers’ career concerns.  
A recent study by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) finds a positive impact of 
institutional ownership on innovation in U.S. firms by reducing career concerns rather than by 
reducing managerial entrenchment. They show that the relation between institutional ownership 
and innovation is more pronounced when product market competition is more intense and CEOs 
are less entrenched. Furthermore, CEO turnover is less sensitive to poor performance when 
institutional ownership is high. Bushee (1998) finds that U.S. firms with greater institutional 
ownership are less likely to cut R&D investment in order to reverse a decline in earnings.5 
Harford, Kecskes and Mansi (2015) find that long-term institutional investors monitor corporate 
managers and encourage corporate policy decisions that increase shareholder value.  
There are reasons to believe that the channel by which institutional ownership fosters long-
term investment is different outside of the United States. Domestic institutional investors, 
because they are more likely to have business ties with local corporations, may have less of an 
arm’s-length relation with invested firms. Domestic institutions may be affiliated with local 
banks that act as creditors, have board seats, or sell other services to firms (e.g., underwriting or 
                                                 
5 In related evidence, Francis and Smith (1995) find a positive relation between institutional ownership 
concentration and R&D expenditures. In terms of private equity investors, Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) 
find that LBO targets do not cut on patenting activity, and Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) find that LBO targets 
become more profitable and grow faster. 
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advising). This implies that domestic institutional money managers may be more sympathetic to 
incumbent management and can act less as external monitors (Gillan and Starks (2003), Ferreira 
and Matos (2008)). Management and controlling shareholders are likely to pursue their own 
interests at the expense of outside investors (Stulz (2005)).6 In contrast, foreign institutions are 
less encumbered by ties with management, and so these owners can promote investment in 
riskier growth opportunities. Foreign institutional investors can act in the interest of shareholders 
either through “voice” (e.g., using quiet diplomacy to persuade management, vote their shares, or 
trigger confrontational proxy fights) or by threatening to “exit” (e.g., selling and depressing stock 
prices which can hurt managers). Consistent with this idea, Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos 
(2011) show that international portfolio investments promote better corporate governance that 
align the interests of shareholders and increase CEO-turnover performance sensitivity. 
To test these hypotheses, we use a panel data set of portfolio equity holdings by institutional 
investors covering over 30,000 publicly-listed firms across 30 countries over the 2001-2010 
period. We find a robust positive association between foreign institutional ownership and long-
term investment as proxied by R&D plus capital expenditures (scaled by assets), as well as 
between foreign institutional ownership and innovation output (as measured by patent counts). 
The effect is both statistically and economically significant. A ten percentage point increase in 
foreign institutional ownership is associated with a 0.4% increase in long-term investment 
(nearly one-tenth of the median ratio) and a 6% increase in patent counts.  
An important concern with our results is that foreign institutional ownership is endogenously 
determined. More innovative firms are likely to attract portfolio investment from foreign 
                                                 
6 This hypothesis builds on evidence that domestic institutions tend to be more conflicted. Several markets have 
witnessed the development of “independent” domestic institutions. For example, Giannetti and Laeven (2009) 
document that a Swedish reform of pension system increased investor monitoring, but only by independent private 
pension funds. More generally, Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) document a positive relation between the level of 
financial intermediation development and capital investments. 
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institutions and this could explain the positive association with long-term investment. We 
address this concern using instrumental variable methods. We use the addition of a stock to the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All Country World Index, the most commonly 
used international stock benchmark, as an instrumental variable for foreign institutional 
ownership. A stock in the MSCI is more likely to be owned by foreign institutions as their 
portfolios are typically benchmarked against this index. The identification assumption is that the 
addition to the MSCI is uncorrelated with a firm’s long-term investment and innovation output, 
except through foreign institutional ownership. Differences-in-differences estimates show that 
the exogenous increase in foreign institutional ownership that follows the addition of a stock to 
the MSCI has a positive effect on long-term investment and innovation output, suggesting that 
these findings are causal and not due to self-selection. Importantly, we find the opposite effect 
following the deletion of a stock from the MSCI.  
Firms located in countries with weaker investor protection (civil-law countries) are likely to 
benefit more from the monitoring effects of international institutional investment (Agarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2011)). Consistent with this idea, we find that the relation is stronger in 
firms located in civil-law countries. We also differentiate among institutions on the basis of their 
legal origin, business ties to firms, and investment horizon. We find that U.S. institutions, and 
more generally those institutions based in common-law countries, are associated with higher 
innovation output, while institutions from civil-law countries are not. Furthermore, our analysis 
shows that independent institutions (mutual fund managers and investment advisers) that are 
unlikely to have business ties with the invested firm are also the main drivers of innovation in 
civil-law countries, rather than non-independent institutions (bank trusts and insurance 
companies). Finally, the characterization of foreign investors as “locusts” blends the idea of both 
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their alien nature and their myopic behavior. Therefore, we control for investor horizon as 
proxied by the investors’ portfolio turnover (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), Harford, Kecskes 
and Mansi (2015)). We show that the effect of foreign institutional ownership is distinct from the 
pure effect of shareholder horizons as proxied by the investors’ portfolio turnover (Gaspar, 
Massa, and Matos (2005)). We find a positive association between long-term foreign institutional 
ownership and innovation, which is consistent with the evidence of Bushee (1998) and Aghion, 
Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) for long-term domestic institutional ownership in U.S. firms. 
Next, we investigate the channel through which foreign institutions enhance long-term 
investment and innovation output: career concerns or monitoring efforts. Consistent with the 
monitoring hypothesis, we find that the positive relation between long-term investment and 
innovation output and foreign institutional ownership is stronger when firms have weaker 
corporate governance (i.e., managers are more entrenched), product market competition is less 
intense, and firms are less financially constrained. If corporate governance standards and 
competition is low, then there is more need for intensive monitoring by foreign institutions as 
managers are not disciplined by other mechanisms such as board monitoring and the threat of 
bankruptcy or takeover; the career concern channel has the reverse predictions. Furthermore, we 
show that the decision to fire the CEO is more affected by poor stock market or accounting 
performance when foreign institutional ownership is higher. The evidence also does not support 
the hypothesis that institutional investors relax financial constraints as we show that our results 
are stronger in less financially constrained firms. Overall, these findings suggest that foreign 
institutions act as effective monitors forcing managers to pursue more innovative projects instead 
of enjoying a “quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)).  The evidence differs from the 
career concern channel that explains the role of domestic institutions in U.S. corporate 
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innovation in Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013). This is explained by the fact that 
domestic institutions represent the large majority of institutional ownership in U.S. firms. Indeed, 
we find that the role of domestic and foreign institutions in promoting innovation differs in 
common-law (such as the U.S.) versus civil-law countries.  
Finally, while foreign institutional ownership may be positively related to both fixed and 
intangible capital formation we address the concern that it could have negative externalities to 
labor. The concern from local politicians is that “locust” foreign capital might lead not just to 
“asset stripping” but also to labor-unfriendly policies, namely employee layoffs. However, our 
results show that foreign institutional ownership is positively and significantly associated with 
increases in employment, wages, and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). 
Therefore, we conclude that foreign capital is also positively linked to human capital formation 
and organizational capital. Furthermore, foreign institutional ownership is associated with 
increases in total factor productivity and, specifically, to foreign operations. Finally, we show 
that larger foreign institutional ownership is associated with higher shareholder value as proxied 
by Tobin’s Q.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by studying the role of cross-border portfolio flows for 
long-term investment, innovation, and productivity. Our evidence challenges the conventional 
wisdom that foreign investors are associated with reductions in long-term investment which 
leads to value destruction. In contrast, we find that foreign institutional investors promote long-
term investment and enhance productivity and value. This paper also contributes to the literature 
on the role of different stakeholders in the innovation process, such as blockholders, creditors, 
and workers. Using country-level data, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2013) show that 
employee-friendly laws (stringent laws governing the dismissal of employees) promote 
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innovation, and Acharya and Subramanian (2009) show that creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes 
hinder innovation. Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014) show that equity market development positively 
affects aggregate innovation levels. Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012) show that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has a positive impact on innovation in local firms, typically through a 
direct technology and know-how transfer associated with controlling stakes.  
2. Data and Variables 
The initial sample includes all publicly-listed firms in the Worldscope database in the 2001-2010 
period. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 
because these tend to be regulated. We restrict the sample to firms based in the 30 countries 
whose publicly-listed firms have, in total, at least 10 patents granted over the sample period and 
also $10 billion of total stock market capitalization (as of 2009). Table 1, Panel A, groups 
countries into four geographical regions: North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, and Other. Panel 
A of Table 1 shows that the total number of firms consists of 30,952 unique firms for a total of 
181,173 firm-year observations.  
2.1. Long-Term Investment 
The first component of long-term investment measure is the capital expenditures to assets ratio 
(CAPEX). Panel A of Table 1 shows that close to $16.3 trillion was collectively invested in fixed 
capital by the sample firms over the 2001-2010 period.  U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms have 
similar average CAPEX ratios at around 5%. Panel A of Figure 1 shows it is well distributed 
around the world and Panel A of Figure 2 shows that there has been a shift towards higher 
CAPEX in firms located in Asia Pacific and Other regions. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the 
industries with the highest capital intensity are “Energy”, followed by “Telecom”. Figure 3 
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shows that 7 out of the top 10 firms worldwide in CAPEX are energy firms as of 2010.  
The second component of long-term investment is Research and Development (R&D) 
expenditures scaled by total assets. We set R&D to zero for firms that do not report R&D 
expenditures in Worldscope. There are potentially sample selection issues due to the voluntary 
nature of R&D disclosure since there has historically been some variation in national accounting 
standards. Hall and Oriani (2006) conclude that R&D disclosure standards have improved and 
our data shows that total R&D dollars are now well distributed across regions in the world.7  
Panel A of Table 1 shows that close to $4.7 trillion was collectively invested in R&D by the 
sample firms over the 2001-2010 period. U.S. firms have the highest average R&D ratio at 5.1%, 
which well exceeds the average of 1.5% for non-U.S. firms. The United States also has the 
highest number of unique firms reporting positive R&D, but Canadian companies have the 
highest average R&D ratio in the sample of firms with positive R&D. While U.S. firms lead in 
terms of R&D intensity, the combined R&D spending of non-U.S. firms exceeded that of U.S. 
firms over the sample period (see also Panel B of Figure 1). Panel B of Figure 2 shows a rise in 
the share of R&D dollars of Asia Pacific firms from 24% to 34% of the worldwide total during 
the 2000s. This suggests an increase in the internationalization of corporate innovation activity. 
Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates the rise of Toyota and Roche as the top R&D spenders in the last 
years of the sample period surpassing major U.S. firms such as Ford and Pfizer.8  
Panel B of Table 1 illustrates the R&D intensity across firms using the Fama-French 12 
industry classification. The industries with the highest R&D intensity are “Healthcare” (medical 
                                                 
7 International Accounting Standards “IAS 38 Intangible Assets” defines the accounting requirements for 
investments in creating intangible assets such as R&D. Hall and Oriani (2006)) conclude that even though reporting 
R&D was not required in some countries in continental Europe, in fact, a fairly large share of major R&D-doers 
actually reported it. In the second half of the 2000s, the move by many firms to use International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) improved considerably R&D reporting practices.  
8
 These firm rankings are consistent with those in European Commission (2010) and Booz & Co (2013).  
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equipment and drugs), followed by “Business Equipment” (computers, software, and electronic 
equipment) and “Consumer Durables”.  
In our main tests, we focus on total long-term investment in both fixed and intangible capital, 
which we will proxy for by summing CAPEX plus R&D expenditures.  
2.2. Innovation Output 
We measure the output of R&D activity by the number of patents, the exclusive rights over an 
invention of a product or a process. Researchers have argued that patent counts are the most 
important measure of firms’ innovation output (Griliches (1990)). While patent counts per se do 
not necessarily measure the economic value of patents, there is ample evidence of a positive 
relation between patents and firm value both in the United States (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2005)) and also in Europe (Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi (2007)).  
We collect information from the complete set of patent grant publications issued weekly by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from January 1990 to June 2013. In this 
way, we obtain the universe of patents awarded by the USPTO to both U.S. and international 
companies, individuals, and other institutions. The USPTO is also the raw source for the NBER 
patent database developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) which is commonly used in 
prior literature. For each patent, we identify patent assignees listed on the patent grant document, 
the country of these assignees, and the indicator of whether each assignee is a U.S. corporation, a 
non-U.S. corporation, an individual or a government. Using this information, we match patents 
to publicly-listed firms in the Worldscope database. Our matching algorithm involves two main 
steps. First, we standardize patent assignee and firm names – focusing on unifying suffixes and 
dampening the non-informative parts of patent assignee and firm names. Second, we apply 
multiple fuzzy string matching techniques to identify the firm, if any, to which each patent 
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belongs. Using this procedure, we match 1,411,376 patents to 13,045 unique firms for patents 
applied in the period 1990-2010.9 Of these patents, close to half of the assignees of the patents 
are foreign corporations. In the Internet Appendix, we offer a detailed description of the 
matching procedure as well as a comparison to the NBER patent matching in terms of examples 
of top U.S. firms (Table IA.1), total distribution of patent counts (Table IA.2), and statistics on 
the coverage of USPTO patents by country (Table IA.3). 
There are several reasons to focus on USPTO patents to measure innovation output in our 
international setting. First, we follow the commonly used approach to calculate patent indicators 
based on information from the most important patent office, the USPTO. Patent regulations (on 
the scope of patent protection) and practices followed by patent offices (processing and 
publishing of patent filing documents) in different countries may not be fully compatible. This 
makes the aggregation of patent statistics difficult across different patent offices and over time.  
Second, for non-U.S. firms, patents in the sample arguably reflect relatively more important 
innovations as these firms are willing to accept additional costs of patenting in the United States. 
Therefore, we address the common criticism that there is an excessive heterogeneity in the 
quality of patents, mainly, that there are many “useless” patents. In our regressions, we include 
country and year fixed effects that remove a possible “home” advantage bias by U.S. firms as 
well as any foreign country-level bias of applying for patents at the USPTO.  
Finally, the publicly-listed firms in our sample tend to be large firms that commonly protect 
their innovations by simultaneously applying for patents at the USPTO, the European Patent 
Office (EPO), and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). The use of USPTO patents therefore does 
not necessarily underestimate innovation output. However, in robustness checks we will also 
                                                 
9 We stop our sample period in 2010 because of the 2 to 3-year lag between the patent application and award date. 
So for many patents with applications filed after December 2010, we do not know yet by the end of 2013 whether 
they are awarded. 
63 
 
examine “triadic” patents – i.e., patents applied simultaneously at the three patenting offices 
(USPTO, EPO, and JPO). 
We use PATENTS as the main measure of firm-level innovation output. In the OLS 
regression tests, we use log(1 + PATENTS), which is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of patents applied by a firm in a given year. We include firms with zero patents in the 
analysis and assume that the patent count is zero for firms with missing USPTO information.10 
The innovation output measure is based on dates when each patent application is filed, i.e., at the 
point in time that is the closest to when the innovation was created. Since our institutional 
ownership data starts in 2000 and we lag the explanatory variables by one year, the measure of 
innovation spans the period 2001-2010.11  
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the sample of firms was granted a total of 686,541 patents 
over the 2001-2010 period. The distribution of patent filing across countries illustrates the global 
nature of innovation. More than half of these USPTO patents were granted to non-U.S. firms. 
Japanese firms have the highest average patent count per year, surpassing even U.S. firms.  The 
United States has the highest number of unique firms reporting positive patents, followed by 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Germany. Although German firms are also productive, overall, 
European firms filed less USPTO patents as a region than Asian or North American companies 
(see Panel C of Figure 1). Panel C of Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of patents 
over time and illustrates that there was a significant increase in the share of patents by Asian 
firms from 39% to 54%. Panel C of Figure 3 illustrates the rise of Asian firms among the list of 
                                                 
10 In robustness tests, we follow Bena and Li (2014) and also use patents counts by a firm in a given year, adjusted 
by the average number of patents in each technology class and period. 
11 USPTO patents are awarded, on average, two to three years after applications are filed. If not yet granted, the 
patent applications are published (i.e., revealed to public) 18 months after filing. Patents start to receive citations 
after they are awarded or their applications are published. Since one needs to allow at least three- to five-year 
window for citations to arrive, we do not use citation-weighted patents in the context of our study. 
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top 10 innovator firms in the second half of the sample period. In unreported results, we find a 
similar pattern when we study “triadic” patents filed with all three major patent offices (the EPO, 
JPO and the USPTO) which alleviates any bias from relying on USPTO data.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the “Business Equipment” sector (computers, software, and 
electronic equipment) accounts for over 50% of all patents. It is followed by “Consumer 
Durables” (cars, TV's, furniture, and household appliances).12  
2.3. Alternative Measures of Long-Term Investment 
Along with investments in physical capital and R&D, firms need to make long-term investments 
in human capital and organizational capital. We use the log of the firm’s number of employees 
(EMPLOYEES), staff costs to sales ratio (STAFF_COSTS), and also the log of the average staff 
costs per employee (AVG_STAFF_COSTS) to capture investment in human capital. We use the 
ratio of annual selling, general, and administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A) to capture 
investment in organizational capital (Eisfeldt and Papanikolau (2013)). The fear regarding 
“locust” foreign investors is that they may push efficiency-seeking strategies that lead firms to 
de-localize production and use employee layoffs as a mean to cut costs and boost performance. 
Both of these are potentially costly to the local economy and are typically cited by politicians for 
their stance against foreign portfolio investors.  
2.4. Institutional Ownership  
We draw institutional holdings data from the FactSet/LionShares database for the period 2000-
2009. The institutions in the database are professional money managers such as mutual funds, 
                                                 
12 Some scholars have argued that computer, electronics, and software patents may be applied merely to build patent 
portfolios for strategic reasons rather than for protection of real inventions. In robustness tests, we address this issue 
by using patent counts adjusted by technological class effects. 
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pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance companies. See Ferreira and Matos (2008) for more 
details on this data.  
We define IO_TOTAL as the sum of the holdings of all institutions in a firm’s stock divided 
by its total market capitalization at the end of each calendar year.13 Following Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), we set institutional ownership variables to zero if 
a stock is not held by any institution in FactSet/LionShares.14 We also separate total institutional 
ownership by the nationality of the institution. Domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM) is 
the sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in the same country in which the stock is 
listed divided by the firm’s market capitalization. Foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) is 
the sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in a country different from the one in which 
the stock is listed divided by the firm’s market capitalization.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the countries with the highest average total institutional 
ownership as of 2009 are the United States (75%), Canada (53%), Israel (48%), and Sweden 
(40%). The average institutional ownership is at 43% worldwide and at 23% for non-U.S. firms 
in our sample in 2009.15 Despite being, on average, the minority shareholders, institutions tend to 
be the most influential group in terms of share of trading (effectively being the marginal 
investors for asset pricing purposes) and also in terms of shareholder activism (through “voice” 
and “threat of exit”). Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) show that foreign institutional 
investors play a role in exporting corporate governance practices outside the United States. In 
most countries, the holdings of foreign institutions exceed those of domestic institutions. Some 
exceptions are the United States, Canada, and Sweden.   
                                                 
13 In calculating institutional ownership, we include ordinary shares, preferred shares, American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs), Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), and dual listings. 
14 When we repeat the empirical analysis using only firms with positive holdings, our main results are not affected. 
15 We show statistics for 2009 as our sample period ends in 2010 and we employ a one-year lag in the explanatory 
variables in our tests.  
66 
 
2.5. Firm Characteristics 
We obtain firm characteristics from the Worldscope database. Table 2 shows summary statistics 
and Appendix A provides variable definitions and data sources. We use several firm-specific 
control variables in our regressions. First, we control for insider ownership, which is measured 
by the percentage of closely held shares (CLOSE). As we argued in the introduction, the interests 
and risk-taking incentives of blockholders are likely to diverge from those of institutional 
owners. Second, we control for foreign sales to total sales (FXSALES) since firms that sell 
internationally may be more likely to innovate and patent their products and services with the 
USPTO. For innovation output regressions, we use the same firm-level controls as in Aghion, 
Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), namely the log of the ratio of capital to labor (K/L), the log of 
total sales in U.S. dollars (SALES), and the cumulative R&D expenditures (R&D_STOCK). 
Following Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), we define R&D_STOCK using a 
depreciation rate of knowledge of 15% per year. For long-term investment regressions, we also 
include the net property, plant, and equipment to assets ratio (PPE), the Tobin’s Q ratio 
(TOBIN_Q), free cash-flow to assets ratio (FCF), debt to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), and cash 
holdings to assets ratio (CASH). We winsorize variables at the bottom and top 1% levels.  
3. Empirical Results 
In this section, we test the main hypotheses on the relation between foreign institutional 
ownership and measures of long-term investment and innovation output.  
3.1. Long-term Investment and Innovation Output Results 
Our main outcome variables are based on firm-level: (1) long-term investment (proxied by the 
ratio of CAPEX plus R&D expenditures to total assets); and (2) innovation output (proxied by 
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patent counts). We estimate regression models that include firm-level controls and country, 
industry, and year fixed effects. In alternative, we estimate firm fixed effects regressions that 
account for unobserved firm heterogeneity and address omitted variable bias.16  
Table 3 presents results using long-term investment (CAPEX+R&D) as the dependent 
variable. Column (1) shows that total institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL) is only weakly 
positively associated with long-term investment. But, in columns (2) and (3), we split 
institutional investors based on their nationality relative to the firm’s domicile country (IO_FOR 
and IO_DOM). We find that foreign institutional ownership fosters firm-level long-term 
investment. The effect is both statistically and economically significant. A ten percentage point 
increase in foreign institutional ownership is associated with a 0.4% increase in the 
CAPEX+R&D-to-assets ratio, which corresponds to about one-tenth of the median ratio of 4.3%. 
When we split institutional investors by their geographical origin in columns (2) and (3), we find 
that only foreign institutional ownership is positively related to long-term investment. Columns 
(4)-(6) confirm these results with firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. In addition, we find similar results for foreign institutional ownership when we 
split long-term investment in its individual components: R&D and CAPEX (see Table IA.4 in 
the Internet Appendix). 
Table 4 presents our main test focusing on patent-based measures of innovation output. The 
positive coefficient on IO_TOTAL in column (1) shows that there is a positive relation between 
institutional ownership and innovation output. The effect is economically significant with a ten 
percentage point increase in foreign institutional ownership implying a 6% increase in patent 
counts. We find a positive and significant effect of both foreign and domestic ownership. In 
                                                 
16 In unreported results, we find that results are robust when we use firm fixed effects using the pre-sample mean 
scaling method proposed by Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999). 
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columns (4)-(6), we confirm these findings with firm fixed effect regressions. 
While foreign institutional ownership is dominant outside of the United States, domestic 
institutional ownership is dominant in the United States. In Table IA.5 of the Internet Appendix, 
we show that there is a statistically significant effect of foreign institutional ownership on both 
long-term investment (Panel A) and patent counts (Panel B) when we include separately non-
U.S. and U.S. firms. However, the positive and significant effect of domestic ownership on 
patent counts is observed only in the sub-sample of U.S. firms, which is consistent with the 
findings of Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013). 
We perform robustness checks related to the models of patent counts. Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001) recommend using count-based models such as a Poisson regression as 
alternatives to the ordinary least squares regression model. Table IA.6 in the Internet Appendix 
shows that our findings are robust to the use of Poisson regressions. We confirm that the positive 
association between institutional ownership and innovation output stems from foreign 
institutions. In Table IA.7 of the Internet Appendix, we check our results using “triadic” patents, 
i.e., patents filed with all three major patent offices (USPTO, EPO, and JPO). This addresses the 
potential concern that USPTO-filed patents may be especially visible or attractive to U.S.-based 
foreign investors and may drive U.S. foreign institutional holdings instead of the reverse. We 
find that our main results hold when we use only patents that are filed internationally. 
3.2. Endogeneity 
An important concern with our findings is that foreign institutional ownership is endogenously 
determined. Firms with higher investment intensity and more innovative firms may simply 
attract higher investment by foreign institutions and this could explain the positive association 
between long-term investment and foreign institutional ownership, as well as between innovation 
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output and foreign institutional ownership.   
Our first attempt to address this concern is to use instrumental variable methods. Following 
Agarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011), we use membership in the MSCI All Country World 
Index as an instrument for foreign institutional ownership. We use a dummy variable (MSCI), 
which takes the value of one if a firm is a member of the MSCI in year t, and zero otherwise. 
MSCI is the most commonly used benchmark index by foreign portfolio investors. Importantly 
for identification purposes, domestic institutions and other investors do not usually follow this 
index. The exclusion restriction assumption is that MSCI membership is uncorrelated with a 
firm’s innovation activities, except indirectly through foreign institutional ownership.  
Table 5 presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on long-term investment (Panel A) and innovation output (Panel B), 
using MSCI as an instrument. The first-stage regression results in columns (1) and (3) support the 
view that IO_FOR is positively associated with MSCI membership. The F-test on each first-stage 
regression is far above 10, which indicates that the hypothesis that the instrument can be 
excluded from the first-stage regressions is rejected and that the instrument is not weak. Columns 
(2) and (4) present the coefficients of the second-stage regression that uses either CAPEX+R&D 
(Panel A) or PATENTS (Panel B) as the dependent variable. The regressions show that the 
exogenous increase in foreign institutional ownership that follows a firm’s inclusion in the MSCI 
has a positive effect both on long-term investment and on innovation output, suggesting that the 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on long-term investment and innovation output is causal 
and not due to selection. 
An alternative approach to the instrumental variable approach is to conduct a difference-in-
differences regression approach around the time that a firm’s stock is added to or deleted from 
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the MSCI (treated firms). We employ a five-year window around the year of the index re-
compositions (between year -1 and year 0). There are 574 additions to the MSCI for which we 
have complete institutional ownership data in the two-year period before and following the 
event. Similarly, there are 167 MSCI deletion events. Control firms are the nearest neighbor 
firms that best match treated firms, in the pre-treatment period, on multiple dimensions 
(CAPEX+R&D, PATENTS, CLOSE, FXSALES, SALES, R&D_STOCK, K/L, and IO_FOR) using 
propensity scores. Table 6 reports tests of equality of means and medians between treated and 
control groups. For most dimensions, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal means or medians 
between treatment and control groups. 
Table 7 presents the difference-in-differences regression results using the treatment/control 
sample introduced in Table 6. Column (1) of Table 7 Panel A shows that the difference, between 
the treated and control groups, in the changes of IO_FOR increases significantly, on average, by 
2% around the addition of a firm’s shares to the MSCI. In contrast, the coefficient on IO_DOM 
in column (2) is close to zero, suggesting that a firm’s addition to the MSCI is indeed an 
exogenous instrument for foreign (but not for domestic) institutional ownership. We also find 
statistically significant increases both in long-term investment and innovation output (columns 
(3) and (4)). The results are also economically significant: the difference in the changes between 
treated and control groups, increases by 0.5% and by 5.4%, considering the CAPEX+R&D-to-
assets ratio and innovation output, respectively.  
Figure 4 plots the evolution of the differences between treated and control firms in the two 
years before and after firms’ shares are added to the MSCI. A visual inspection of the figures 
suggests that both groups followed parallel trends in the pre-treatment period and shows a 
discontinuity effect following the event. Interestingly, Panel B of Table 7 and Figure 5 show that 
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the results are the opposite around MSCI deletion events. We find that IO_FOR tends to drop 
more than IO_DOM and there is a similar negative trend on CAPEX+R&D (although not 
statistically significant) and PATENTS. 
Overall, the results of both the instrumental variable method and the difference-in-differences 
regression approach following MSCI additions and deletions suggest that endogeneity is unlikely 
to explain the positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and corporate innovation.  
3.3. Monitoring and Career Concerns Channels 
We have interpreted our findings of a positive causal effect of foreign institutional ownership on 
corporate innovation as consistent with foreign institutions reducing managerial entrenchment by 
exerting monitoring on managers otherwise enjoying a “quite life”. Monitoring by foreign 
investors refers to their role in influencing management (“voice”) or indirect monitoring by 
selling their shares (“exit” or “voting with their feet”). A possible alternative channel is that 
foreign institutions reduce managers’ career concerns and risks and increase tolerance for failure. 
An implication of the monitoring channel is that the benefits of foreign institutional ownership 
should be felt most sharply when managers are more “entrenched”, while, under the career 
concern channel, the impact of institutional ownership on innovation should be weaker when 
managers are entrenched. Managers have less ability to slack off and are more disciplined when, 
for example, there is more board monitoring, fewer takeover defenses, and more equity 
incentives in their compensation package.  
To test the effect of foreign institutional ownership on innovation when corporate governance 
is weaker or stronger, we measure the quality of corporate governance using a firm-level index 
consisting of 41 governance attributes defined by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) 
and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011). This is constructed using data obtained from 
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RiskMetrics (formerly Institutional Shareholder Services). The GOV index provides a firm-level 
governance measure that is comparable across countries and incorporates measures of board 
structure, anti-takeover provisions, auditor selection, compensation, and ownership structure.17  
Table 8 reports the results. In column (1), we run a regression of CAPEX+R&D (Panel A) 
and patent counts (Panel B) including, as main explanatory variables, both foreign institutional 
ownership (IO_FOR), the governance index (GOV), and the interaction IO_FOR × GOV.18 We 
find that foreign institutional ownership positively affects long-term investment and innovation 
output, controlling for corporate governance. The positive association of foreign institutional 
ownership is stronger when the quality of corporate governance is lower, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction variable IO_FOR × GOV in column (1). 
We conclude that the effect of foreign institutional ownership is more pronounced when 
managers are more entrenched. The findings are thus consistent with the monitoring channel and 
run contrary to the career concerns channel.  
We test other alternatives to the monitoring channel. The first is institutional investors’ 
horizon. Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), we measure shareholder horizons using 
the investors’ portfolio turnover (INV_TURNOVER). In column (2) of Table 8, we find that the 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on long-term investment and innovation output is more 
pronounced in firms with more long-term oriented shareholders. This is consistent with investor 
monitoring driving the effect of foreign institutional ownership on innovation.  
The second alternative is product market competition. Following Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
                                                 
17 GOV is similar in spirit to the GIM index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), but the scale is reversed (a 
higher GOV means more shareholder-friendly governance standards). 
18 The sample of firms in these tests is significantly smaller because of sparser coverage of the GOV measure, which 
is limited to the largest market capitalization firms in each country. More details on this governance measure are 
available in Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011).  
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Zingales (2013), we measure COMPETITION as one minus the Lerner index for a given three-
digit SIC industry.19 In column (3) of Table 8, we find that the effect of foreign institutional 
ownership on innovation output is actually more pronounced in less competitive industries as the 
coefficient on COMPETITION × IO_FOR is negative. This is again consistent with the 
monitoring channel.  
The third alternative we want to test is financial constraints. We measure financial constraints 
using the Kaplan-Zingales index (KZ_INDEX). In column (4) of Table 8, we find that the impact 
of foreign institutional ownership on innovation is actually stronger in firms that are less likely to 
be financially constrained. Finally, we test for asymmetric information using stock illiquidity 
measured by the AMIHUD ratio. In column (5) of Table 8, we find that the impact of foreign 
institutional ownership on both long-term investment and innovation output is stronger in less 
illiquid stocks, which are less likely to be subject to information asymmetry.  
3.4. CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
We examine whether a presence of foreign institutions affects the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance. A prediction of the monitoring hypothesis is that higher foreign institutional 
ownership does not reduce, or even improves, the ability of a firm’s board of directors to identify 
and terminate poorly performing CEOs. In contrast, the career concern hypothesis predicts that 
CEO turnover is less sensitive to performance in the presence of higher foreign institutional 
ownership.  
Following Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011), we classify a firm as having 
experienced a CEO turnover when the top executive at the end of the year is different from the 
                                                 
19
 We obtain similar estimates when we use the Lerner índex in a given country-industry or country-industry-year.  
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CEO at the end of the previous year using the BoardEx database.20 To test the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, we use a probit model of the 
CEO turnover dummy variable (CEO_TURNOVER) on lagged abnormal stock returns 
(RETURN), lagged foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR), and an interaction term of 
abnormal stock returns and institutional ownership (RETURN × IO_FOR). In alternative, we 
measure performance using the change in return on assets (∆ROA). Our coefficient of interest is 
the one on the interaction between RETURN or ∆ROA and IO_FOR. The regression also includes 
the lagged domestic institutional ownership and logarithm of sales (SALES), as well as year, 
country, and industry fixed effects.21  
Table 9 presents the results of our analysis. The interaction term in column (1) show that 
CEO turnover is more sensitive to low abnormal stock returns in firms with higher foreign 
institutional ownership. The interaction term in column (2) using accounting profitability 
confirms this finding. The estimated mean interaction effects (reported at the bottom of the table) 
are negative and statistically significant. We interpret this result to mean that firms with higher 
institutional ownership have a greater propensity to shed poorly performing CEOs.  
These findings suggest that foreign institutions act as active monitors forcing managers to 
exert effort and innovate instead of enjoying a “quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). 
We conclude that investor monitoring by foreign portfolio investors is likely the channel through 
which managers are more willing to invest in innovative growth opportunities. 
                                                 
20
 We cannot distinguish between voluntary and forced turnovers, but this distinction just leads to additional noise in 
the dependent variable, because voluntary turnovers are unlikely to be related to performance (Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003)). 
21
 Ai and Norton (2003) show that researchers cannot draw conclusions about the sign and the significance of the 
interaction term in nonlinear models (such as probit models) by examining the coefficient on the interaction term. 
To ensure that we draw valid inferences on the interaction variable effect, we estimate the marginal effect of the 
interaction variable and its significance using the delta method described by Ai and Norton (2003). 
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3.5. The Role of Country-Level Investor Protection 
Table 10 further tests our working hypotheses that institutional investors originating from high 
investor protection countries (typically Anglo-Saxon countries more closely associated with 
“shareholder capitalism”) should be particularly associated with corporate innovation. For this 
purpose, we split firms based on whether these are headquartered in Civil Law countries (Panel 
A) or Common Law countries (Panel B) based on countries’ legal origin as defined in La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). In Panel A columns (1) and (2), we find that only 
foreign (and especially U.S.-based) institutional investors are associated with higher innovation 
output in Civil Law countries. In column (3), we confirm that this result extends more broadly to 
common-law-based foreign investors.  
We also explore other dimensions of institutional investor heterogeneity beyond their 
nationality and legal origin. First, we classify institutions as independent (mutual fund managers 
and investment advisers) that are unlikely to have business ties with the invested firms versus 
non-independent institutions (bank trusts and insurance companies). Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, 
and Matos (2011) show that independent institutions are the main drivers of governance 
improvements in firms around the world. In Panel A column (4), we find that independent 
institutions are positively associated with innovation output in civil-law countries, which is 
consistent with these institutions being more involved in monitoring corporate managers. 
Finally, we split foreign institutional ownership according to institutional investor horizon. 
Long-term oriented investors should have lower costs and higher benefits of monitoring. Short-
term investors may reduce incentives for corporate managers to invest in R&D in order to meet 
short-term earnings goals. For example, the Kay Review in the U.K. argues that R&D 
expenditure by British business had been in steady decline and that short-term incentives of asset 
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managers flew down to corporate managers, many of whom were incentivized “to make 
decisions whose immediate effects are positive even if the long run impact is not”.22 In Panel A 
column (5), we show that the effect of foreign institutional ownership is driven by foreign 
shareholders with longer investment horizons as proxied by investors’ portfolio ratio (see 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005)). 
In Panel B, we conduct the same analysis for firms headquartered in common-law countries. 
We find that domestic institutions have a bigger role in promoting innovation in these markets. 
Institutions that are based in common-law and are independent continue to be associated with 
fostering innovation. 
3.6. Alternative Measures of Long-Term Investment 
Along with investment in physical and intellectual capital, firms need to make long-term 
investment in human and organizational capital. The fear regarding “locust” investors is that 
foreign institutional investors may push firms to cut wages and to use employee layoffs as a 
means to cut costs and boost short-term performance. To proxy for investment in organizational 
capital, we use the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to assets (SG&A). To 
proxy for the investment in human capital, we the log of the firm’s number of employees 
(EMPLOYEES), the staff costs to sales ratio (STAFF_COSTS), and the log of the average staff 
costs per employee in US$ thousands (AVG_STAFF_COSTS). While EMPLOYEES and 
STAFF_COSTS measure the level of employment and labor costs, AVG_STAFF_COSTS 
measures the relative importance of high-skill versus low-skill jobs.  
The estimates in Table 11 show that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated 
                                                 
22 “The Kay Review of U.K. Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making,” U.K. Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, July 2012. 
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with SG&A, EMPLOYEES, STAFF_COSTS, and AVG_STAFF_COSTS. We conclude that, in 
addition to physical and intellectual capital, foreign institutional ownership is associated with a 
significant increase in the other important production factor input such as human capital and 
organizational capital. This evidence contradicts the hypothesis of “locust” foreign capital, which 
potentially induces “asset stripping” and labor-unfriendly corporate policies. 
3.7. Firm Productivity and Performance 
So far, the evidence supports the view that, in publicly traded companies around the world, 
foreign institutional investors foster long-term investments leading to a higher innovation output. 
However, a larger quantity of innovation output does not necessarily equate to better innovation, 
in the sense that not all investment and innovative activities necessarily enhance shareholder 
value. To examine this issue, in Table 12, we carry out additional tests using several measures of 
productivity and performance.  
In Table 12 columns (1) and (2), we examine whether foreign institutional ownership leads to 
the growth in products and services, particularly those that can be marked internationally. To this 
end, we use both SALES and FXSALES as the dependent variable. The results suggest that there 
is a positive effect of IO_FOR on total firm sales and the internationalization of firm sales. In 
column (3), we estimate a regression where the dependent variable is firm valuation, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q). We find that ownership by foreign institutions is positively associated 
with TOBIN_Q, unlike ownership by domestic institutions.23 We conclude that foreign investors 
                                                 
23 In unreported results, we estimate a regression where the dependent variable is TOBIN_Q and the main 
explanatory variable is log(1 + PATENTS) and find that the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant, 
indicating that a higher innovation output is positively valued by capital markets. This is consistent with findings on 
the market value of patent citations by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) for U.S. firms and Hall, Thoma, and 
Torrisi (2007) for European firms. As mentioned above, in our study, we are using recent patent data (patents 
applied for in the 2001-2010 period), which prevents us from using citation-weighted patents innovation output 
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help focus management on long-term global competitiveness encouraging them to explore 
potential market opportunities.  
3.8. Robustness 
In Table IA.8 and Table IA.9 of the Internet Appendix, we conduct several types of robustness 
checks on the results on long-term investment and innovation output.  
In Table IA.8 of the Internet Appendix, we start with robustness checks on the long-term 
investment results using the specifications introduced in Table 3. Column (1) excludes the final 
two years of the sample period to address truncation bias concerns that arise because patents are 
typically granted two to three years after their applications are filed; the sample period is 
restricted to 2001-2008. Column (2) restricts the sample to the 2005-2010 IFRS adoption period 
to address any concerns that could arise due to changes in the accounting rules for R&D 
expenditures. Column (3) controls for country-industry-year fixed effects, which capture any 
country- and industry-specific time trends that we did not capture in the baseline specifications. 
In column (4), we use long-term investment scaled by sales instead of assets as the dependent 
variable. The results in these robustness tests are consistent with our main findings that foreign 
institutional investors actively support long-term investment in physical and intellectual capital. 
In Table IA.9 of the Internet Appendix, we perform several robustness checks on the 
innovation output results using the specifications introduced in Table 4. We start with checks in 
terms of the sample definition. Column (1) shows that the results hold for the subsample of firms 
with positive patent counts. Column (2) excludes the final two years of the sample period to 
address truncation bias concerns that arise because patents are typically granted two to three 
                                                                                                                                                             




years after their applications are filed. Therefore, in this robustness test, the sample period is 
restricted to 2001-2008. We also conduct checks on the econometric specification. Column (3) 
controls for country-industry-year fixed effects, which capture any country- and industry-specific 
time trends that are not captured in the baseline specifications. In column (4), the dependent 
variable is log(PATENTS), therefore focusing only in the firm-year observations with non-zero 
patent counts. 
The next set of checks deals with alternative proxies for innovation output. First, column (5) 
shows the results using the patent counts measure computed using a three-year window as a 
dependent variable. We still find a positive and significant relation between foreign institutional 
ownership and innovation output using this longer lens for the analysis. Column (6) estimates a 
model for adjusted patent counts, which accounts for unobserved factors that are common to 
patents’ technology classes and application years. We use this alternative measure since 
technology classes differ in the nature of R&D activities and resources required in producing a 
patentable innovation, which results in patent counts in two distinct classes not being directly 
comparable. Additionally, there are technology class-specific time trends in the number of 
patents that may not fully reflect changes in innovation output over time. In particular, large 
increases in the number of awarded patents in some classes over time might reflect the evolution 
of the USPTO practices with respect to what is a patentable invention, and hence patent counts 
from different years may not be time-consistent measures of innovation output even within the 
same technology class. This is especially relevant since one industry (“Business Equipment”) 
accounts for over 50% of all patents in our sample. The results in column (6) show that foreign 
institutional ownership is also positively associated with the adjusted patent counts. Finally, 
patents may take several years to develop so, in column (7), we use log(1 + PATENTS) three 
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years in the future and find analogous results.  
To capture productivity of R&D, in column (8), we use the ratio of patent counts to R&D 
stock, i.e., patent counts per R&D dollars spent (PATENTS/R&D_STOCK). We find that there is 
a positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on the productivity of R&D. This finding 
suggests that foreign institutional ownership affects the quality and productivity of R&D rather 
than simply stimulating more R&D expenditure. 
The results in these robustness tests are all consistent with our main findings that foreign 
institutional investors actively promote R&D to enable the development of new products, 
processes, and services. 
4. Conclusion 
We study the long-term effects of foreign institutional ownership using firm-level data from 30 
countries in 2001-2010. We find that higher foreign institutional ownership is associated with 
greater long-term investment in fixed, intellectual, and human capital. Foreign institutional 
ownership is also positively associated with significant increases in innovation and total factor 
productivity, as well as shareholder value. These effects are explained by the disciplinary and 
monitoring roles of foreign institutions. Using the exogenous increase in foreign institutional 
ownership that follows the addition of a stock to the MSCI World index, we show that the effect 
of foreign institutional ownership on long-term investment and innovation output is causal.  
Our results dismiss popular fears that portray foreign investors as predominantly interested in 
short-term gains often at the expense of employees. In fact, we conclude that the globalization of 
firms’ shareholder base is a positive force for capital formation, contributing toward making 
firms more competitive in global markets. Since more long-term investment and innovation 
output may generate positive spillover to local economy, our findings have wider implications 
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for public policy. Instead of economic nationalism aimed at protecting “national champions” 
from foreign capital, our findings suggest that openness to international portfolio investment may 
generate positive externalities to the local economy by promoting employment and development 
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Long-Term Investment by Country 
This figure shows long-term investment in terms of CAPEX in US$ billions (Panel A), R&D expenditures in 
US$ billions (Panel A) and number of USPTO patent filings (Panel B) by firms domiciled in each country for the 
total sample period from 2001 to 2010. The sample consists of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms.  
Panel A: Capital Expenditures 
 










Long-Term Investment by Country and Year 
This figure presents CAPEX (Panel A), R&D expenditures (Panel B) and the number of patents applied with the 
USPTO (Panel C) in each country as a percentage of the worldwide total in each year. The sample consists of 
Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. Bars are colored by geographical region 
(North America in orange, Europe in red, Asia-Pacific in blue, and Other in green). 
Panel A: Percent of Capital Expenditures 
 





Figure 2 (continued) 





Top 10 Firms: Long-Term Investment 
This figure lists the top ten firms in terms of CAPEX in US$ billions (Panel A), R&D expenditures in US$ billions 
(Panel B) and number of patents filed with the USPTO (Panel B) by year. The sample consists of Worldscope non-
financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. Cells are colored by geographical region (North America in 
orange, Europe in red, Asia-Pacific in blue, and Other in green).  
Panel A: Capital Expenditures (US$ billions) 
 
Panel B: R&D Expenditures (US$ billions) 
 
  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3 (continued) 
Panel C: Number of Patents 
 
  






















































































































































































































Parallel Trends of Difference-in-Differences around Stock Additions to the MSCI 
This figure shows point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of difference-in-differences regressions of 
institutional ownership, long-term investment and patent count around stock additions to the MSCI All Country 
World Index. The index additions occur between year -1 and year 0. Treated firms are firms that were added to the 
MSCI. Control firms are the nearest neighbor firms matched using propensity scores. The sample includes 
Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: Foreign Institutional Ownership 
 


















-2 -1 0 1 2
Event Year
















-2 -1 0 1 2
Event Year
Treated - Control 90% Conf. Interval
93 
 
Figure 4 (continued) 
Panel C: Long-Term Investment 
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Parallel Trends of Difference-in-Differences around Stock Deletions from the MSCI 
This figure shows point estimates and 90% confidence intervals of difference-in-differences regressions of 
institutional ownership, long-term investment and innovation output around stock deletions from the MSCI All 
Country World Index. The index deletions occur between year -1 and year 0. Treated firms are firms that were 
removed from the MSCI. Control firms are the nearest neighbor firms matched using propensity scores. The sample 
includes Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. Variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Foreign Institutional Ownership 
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Figure 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Long-Term Investment 
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Sample of Firms and Innovation Activity 
This table shows the number of publicly-listed firms in the sample by country (Panel A) and industry (Panel B). The sample consists of Worldscope non-financial 
and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Sample Statistics by Country 
  Sample of Firms  Capital Expenditures  R&D Expenditures  Number of Patents 



























North America United States 8,657 0.08 0.67 
 




Canada 1,311 0.26 0.27 
 
610.2 0.085  40.5 0.034 
 
5,957 1.15 
Europe Germany 919 0.23 0.06 
 




France 977 0.19 0.08 
 




Netherlands 192 0.34 0.03 
 




Switzerland 224 0.25 0.04 
 




Finland 145 0.26 0.09 
 




Sweden 499 0.14 0.26 
 




United Kingdom 2,199 0.20 0.13 
 




Denmark 160 0.21 0.07 
 




Belgium 135 0.18 0.01 
 




Italy 269 0.18 0.02 
 




Norway 259 0.13 0.10 
 




Austria 107 0.20 0.02 
 




Ireland 84 0.39 0.01 
 




Spain 148 0.18 0.02 
 
309.3 0.049  3.4 0.003 
 
42 0.04 
  Hungary 40 0.23 0.01 
 
18.6 0.082  1.0 0.007 
 
53 0.23 
Asia Pacific Japan 4,152 0.09 0.04 
 




South Korea 1,691 0.14 0.00 
 




Taiwan 1,573 0.15 0.02 
 




India 1,121 0.08 0.03 
 




Singapore 534 0.13 0.02 
 




China 1,904 0.09 0.06 
 




Australia 1,049 0.17 0.02 
 




Hong Kong 857 0.11 0.03 
 




New Zealand 49 0.12 0.03 
 
10.7 0.070  0.2 0.006 
 
77 0.39 
  Malaysia 898 0.06 0.01 
 
53.2 0.044  1.3 0.001 
 
14 0.00 
Other  Israel 298 0.47 0.01 
 




Brazil 205 0.24 0.03 
 
343.9 0.065  9.0 0.001 
 
192 0.21 
  South Africa 296 0.20 0.04 
 




Non-U.S. 22,295 0.16 0.07 
 
11,575.4 0.050  2,822.0 0.015 
 
388,341 2.92 
  All Countries 30,952 0.13 0.30 
 





Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Sample Statistics by Industry 






















Non-U.S. 1: Consumer Non-Durables 2,244   529.4 0.046  97.2 0.005   5,065 0.36 
Firms 2:Consumer Durables 1,013 
 




3: Manufacturing 3,838 
 




4: Energy 831 
 




5: Chemicals and Allied Products 952 
 




6: Business Equipment 4,315 
 




7:  Telecom 509 
 




9: Shops 2,622 
 




10: Healthcare 1,105 
 
269.1 0.047  511.4 0.047 
 
13,980 2.20 
  12: Other 4,866   2,072.9 0.050  67.8 0.007   1,882 0.07 
U.S. 1: Consumer Non-Durables 474   204.5 0.040  28.5 0.009   2,664 0.99 
Firms 2:Consumer Durables 209 
 




3: Manufacturing 832 
 




4: Energy 472 
 




5: Chemicals and Allied Products 215 
 




6: Business Equipment 2,306 
 




7:  Telecom 395 
 




9: Shops 954 
 




10: Healthcare 1,128 
 
267.0 0.036  524.0 0.109 
 
24,330 3.64 
  12: Other 1,672   783.5 0.052  30.6 0.019   3,562 0.41 
All 1: Consumer Non-Durables 2,718   733.9 0.046  125.6 0.006   7,729 0.47 
Firms 2:Consumer Durables 1,222 
 




3: Manufacturing 4,670 
 




4: Energy 1,303 
 




5: Chemicals and Allied Products 1,167 
 




6: Business Equipment 6,621 
 




7:  Telecom 904 
 




9: Shops 3,576 
 




10: Healthcare 2,233 
 
536.1 0.041  1,035.4 0.079 
 
38,310 2.94 
  12: Other 6,538   2,856.4 0.050  98.4 0.010   5,444 0.15 
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics 
This table shows mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations for each 
variable. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The sample consists of Worldscope non-financial and 




Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observations 
CAPEX+R&D 0.071 0.043 0.085 0 0.798 181,173 
PATENTS 1.28 0 5.809 0 43 181,173 
EMPLOYEES 4,133 650 10,888 1 70,700 166,305 
STAFF_COSTS 0.342 0.185 0.858 0.001 9.238 73,259 
AVG_STAFF_COSTS ($ thousands) 45 36 43 0 328 70,274 
SG&A 0.757 0.201 3.304 0.009 34.308 144,800 
SALES ($ million) 941 120 2,740 0.001 18,341 181,173 
TOBIN_Q 2.12 1.243 4.451 0.413 60.589 171,432 
CEO_TURNOVER 0.139 0 0.346 0 1 29,885 
IO_TOTAL 0.153 0.021 0.259 0 1 181,173 
IO_FOR 0.027 0.001 0.067 0 1 181,173 
IO_DOM 0.126 0.004 0.246 0 1 181,173 
IO_FOR_US 0.011 0 0.045 0 1 181,173 
IO_FOR_NUS 0.016 0 0.038 0 1 181,173 
IO_COMMON 0.134 0.005 0.255 0 1 181,173 
IO_CIVIL 0.018 0 0.047 0 1 181,173 
IO_INDEPENDENT 0.127 0.015 0.223 0 1 181,173 
IO_GREY 0.025 0 0.049 0 1 181,173 
IO_FOR_ST 0.009 0 0.029 0 1 181,173 
IO_FOR_LT 0.018 0 0.048 0 1 181,173 
INV_TURNOVER 0.689 0.651 0.267 0.023 3.217 112,488 
CLOSE 0.287 0.242 0.275 0 0.913 181,173 
FXSALES 0.157 0 0.272 0 0.954 181,173 
K/L  192 41 790 0.001 9,959 181,173 
R&D_STOCK ($ million) 30 0 92 0 490 181,173 
GOV 0.537 0.537 0.128 0.22 0.927 37,061 
COMPETITION 0.753 0.771 0.105 0.565 1.48 181,172 
FCF -0.132 0.015 0.729 -7.818 0.344 179,360 
KZ_INDEX 0.891 0.645 2.578 -5.031 22.602 170,107 
AMIHUD 0.048 0 0.694 0 25.092 172,743 
LEVERAGE 0.257 0.194 0.346 0 3.219 181,046 
CASH 0.18 0.116 0.189 0 0.989 180,998 
PPE 0.284 0.24 0.222 0 0.948 181,166 
DIVIDENDS 0.011 0.001 0.023 0 0.162 171,281 
RETURN 0.104 -0.042 0.809 -1.18 5.542 170,705 
ROA -0.099 0.036 0.681 -7.424 0.375 176,601 





Foreign Institutional Ownership and Long-Term Investment 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment on institutional ownership using 
a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variable is the 
sum of annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D expenditures (R&D) as a percentage of assets. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.001    0.004   
 (0.002)    (0.004)   
IO_FOR  0.041*** 0.041***   0.022*** 0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.005) 
IO_DOM   -0.003    0.001 
   (0.002)    (0.005) 
CLOSE -0.002 -0.001 -0.002  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FXSALES 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
log(SALES) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(K/L) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TOBIN_Q 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FCF -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***  -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CASH 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.101***  0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PPE 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083***  -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.20 0.21 0.21  0.65 0.65 0.65 





Foreign Institutional Ownership and Innovation Output 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of innovation output on institutional ownership using a 
sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of one plus the annual number of patents applied with the USPTO. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. For fixed-effects regressions of patents a firm is 
required to have made at least one patent application over the sample period. In addition, a firm must have at least 
two observations. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.359***    0.124***   
 (0.037)    (0.028)   
IO_FOR  0.565*** 0.611***   0.239** 0.243** 
  (0.084) (0.084)   (0.099) (0.099) 
IO_DOM   0.329***    0.107*** 
   (0.045)    (0.033) 
CLOSE -0.029 -0.079*** -0.031*  0.054*** 0.046** 0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.018)  (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
FXSALES 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.209***  -0.056** -0.056** -0.057** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
log(SALES) 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.037***  0.051*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
log(K/L) 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
log(R&D_STOCK) 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048***  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.27 0.27 0.27  0.82 0.82 0.82 




Long-Term Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership: Instrumental Variables 
This table shows estimates of two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel regressions of long-term investment (Panel A) 
and innovation output (Panel B) using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 
period. Foreign institutional ownership is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a 
member of the MSCI All Country World Index, and zero otherwise). Regressions include the same control variables 
as in Table 3 and Table 4 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. For fixed-effects regressions of patents a firm is required to have made at least one 
patent application at USPTO. In addition, a firm must have at least two observations. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for country-year level (columns (1)-(2)) or firm-level (columns (3)-(4)) clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Long-Term Investment 













Dependent variable IO_FOR  CAPEX+R&D  IO_FOR  CAPEX+R&D 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
IO_FOR   0.108***    0.094** 
   (0.016)    (0.038) 
IO_DOM -0.014***  -0.002  0.003*  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
MSCI 0.063***    0.029***   
 (0.003)    (0.002)   
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects No  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  No  No 
R
2 0.30    0.81   
Number of observations 179,125  179,125  179,125  179,125 
 
Panel B: Patent Counts 













Dependent variable IO_FOR  log(1+PATENTS)  IO_FOR  log(1+PATENTS) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
IO_FOR   7.662***    3.655*** 
   (0.815)    (1.006) 
IO_DOM -0.010***  0.463***  -0.005*  0.127*** 
 (0.002)  (0.047)  (0.003)  (0.043) 
MSCI 0.065***    0.027***   
 (0.003)    (0.002)   
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects No  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  No  No 
R
2 0.29    0.82   





Summary Statistics of MSCI Additions/Deletions Matched Samples 
This table shows tests of equality of pre-treatment means and medians of non-treated, treated and control groups. 
Treated firms are firms that were added to (Panel A) or deleted from (Panel B) the MSCI All Country World Index. 
Control firms are the nearest neighbor firms matched using propensity scores. Non-treated firms are all other firms 
in the sample. Panel A reports the statistics for the 574 firms that were added to the MSCI (treated) and the 
respective matched firms (control). Panel B reports the statistics for the 167 firms that were deleted from the MSCI 
(treated) and the respective matched firms (control). The sample includes Worldscope non-financial and non-utility 
firms in the 2001-2010 period. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Panel A: MSCI Additions 
 Mean  Median 
 Non-








CAPEX+R&D 0.093 0.080 0.075 0.07  0.048 0.063 0.062 0.62 
log(1+PATENTS) 0.220 0.823 0.854 0.58  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.76 
CLOSE 0.287 0.302 0.316 0.19  0.241 0.266 0.278 0.38 
FXSALES 0.150 0.265 0.265 0.99  0.000 0.149 0.167 0.48 
log(SALES) 11.438 14.418 14.472 0.40  11.570 14.413 14.564 0.03 
log(R&D_STOCK) 4.030 6.109 6.089 0.93  0.000 8.486 7.789 0.34 
log(K/L) 3.690 4.444 4.396 0.46  3.673 4.294 4.240 0.59 
IO_FOR 0.023 0.072 0.072 0.89  0.001 0.039 0.033 0.01 
 
Panel B: MSCI Deletions 
 Mean  Median 
 Non-








CAPEX+R&D 0.092 0.070 0.065 0.28  0.049 0.055 0.048 0.10 
log(1+PATENTS) 0.248 0.541 0.521 0.81  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.79 
CLOSE 0.287 0.280 0.311 0.07  0.241 0.248 0.294 0.03 
FXSALES 0.154 0.316 0.326 0.70  0.000 0.189 0.203 0.94 
log(SALES) 11.569 13.860 14.195 0.01  11.664 13.926 14.232 0.10 
log(R&D_STOCK) 4.104 6.946 7.543 0.13  0.000 8.885 9.072 0.70 
log(K/L) 3.724 4.060 4.114 0.60  3.705 4.014 4.243 0.14 






Difference-in-Differences around Stock Additions and Deletions to the MSCI 
This table shows estimates of difference-in-differences regressions of institutional ownership, long-term investment, 
and innovation output around stock additions and deletions from the MSCI All Country World Index (MSCI). The 
sample includes Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variable is, 
alternatively, foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR), domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), the ratio of 
the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenditures to assets (CAPEX+R&D), and the logarithm of one plus the 
annual number of patents applied with the USPTO (log(1+PATENTS)). The sample includes 574 firms that were 
added to the MSCI and 167 firms that were deleted from the MSCI. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: MSCI Additions     
Dependent variable IO_FOR IO_DOM CAPEX+R&D log(1+PATENTS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TREATED × AFTER 0.020*** -0.005 0.005*** 0.054** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.022) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 0.86 0.97 0.78 0.95 
Number of observations 5,740 5,740 5,740 5,740 
     
Panel B: MSCI Deletions     
Dependent variable IO_FOR IO_DOM CAPEX+R&D log(1+PATENTS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TREATED × AFTER -0.019*** -0.011** -0.002 -0.078** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.037) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 0.92 0.96 0.76 0.91 






Long-Term Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership: Alternative Channels 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment (Panel A) and innovation output 
(Panel B) on the interaction between foreign institutional ownership and alternative channels using a sample of 
Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variable is either the sum of 
annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D expenditures (R&D) as a percentage of assets (Panel A) or the 
logarithm of one plus the annual number of patents applied with the USPTO (Panel B). Corporate governance is 
measured using the GOV index. Investor horizon is measured by the weighted average churn rate of institutional 
investors (INV_TURNOVER). Product market competition is measured using one minus the median industry Lerner 
index (COMPETITION). Financial constraints are measured by the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ_INDEX). Stock liquidity is 
measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio (AMIHUD). Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3 
and Table 4 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one period. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Long-Term Investment      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IO_FOR 0.170*** 0.075*** 0.034** 0.042*** 0.039*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) 
IO_DOM 0.006*** -0.005** -0.004* -0.004* -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GOV 0.019***     
 (0.006)     
GOV × IO_FOR -0.249***     
 (0.036)     
INV_TURNOVER  0.010***    
  (0.001)    
INV_TURNOVER × IO_FOR  -0.059**    
  (0.027)    
COMPETITION   -0.014**   
   (0.006)   
COMPETITION ×  IO_FOR   0.009   
   (0.023)   
KZ_INDEX    0.003***  
    (0.000)  
KZ_INDEX ×  IO_FOR    -0.000  
    (0.002)  
AMIHUD     -0.003*** 
     (0.001) 
AMIHUD ×  IO_FOR     -0.011*** 
     (0.001) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.21 




Table 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Patent Counts      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IO_FOR 2.782*** 1.881*** 1.468*** 0.676*** 0.581*** 
 (0.708) (0.422) (0.188) (0.085) (0.084) 
IO_DOM 0.230*** 0.283*** 0.330*** 0.345*** 0.323*** 
 (0.027) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) 
GOV 0.271***     
 (0.050)     
GOV × IO_FOR -2.880**     
 (1.303)     
INV_TURNOVER  0.034    
  (0.022)    
INV_TURNOVER × IO_FOR  -1.933***    
  (0.556)    
COMPETITION   0.117***   
   (0.031)   
COMPETITION ×  IO_FOR   -1.114***   
   (0.209)   
KZ_INDEX    0.009***  
    (0.001)  
KZ_INDEX ×  IO_FOR    -0.096***  
    (0.031)  
AMIHUD     0.011*** 
     (0.002) 
AMIHUD ×  IO_FOR     -0.086*** 
     (0.006) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.28 




Foreign Institutional Ownership and CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity 
This table shows estimates of firm-level probit regressions of CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and foreign 
institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. 
The dependent variable (CEO_TURNOVER) is one if the firm’s CEO is terminated in year t. The marginal effects of 
the interactions between foreign institutional ownership and excess stock return (RETURN) or change in return on 
assets (∆ROA), estimated using the Ai and Norton (2003) procedure, are included at the bottom. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
IO_FOR -0.048 -0.054 
 (0.149) (0.149) 
RETURN ×  IO_FOR -0.683**  
 (0.284)  
∆ROA ×  IO_FOR  -1.362** 
  (0.635) 
IO_DOM -0.065 -0.063 
 (0.057) (0.063) 
RETURN -0.175***  
 (0.040)  
∆ROA  -0.081*** 
  (0.022) 
log(SALES) 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.02 0.01 
Number of observations 29,187 26,671 
Marginal effect:   
RETURN ×  IO_FOR -0.144**  
 (0.062)  
∆ROA ×  IO_FOR  -0.295** 




Foreign Institutional Ownership and Innovation Output: Common Law versus Civil Law 
Countries 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of innovation output on institutional ownership using a 
sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. Panel A reports the results for 
civil-law countries. Panel B reports the results for common-law countries. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of one plus the annual number of patents applied with the USPTO. Regressions include the same control variables as 
in Table 4 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one period. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Civil Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IO_FOR 0.675***     
 (0.127)     
IO_DOM -0.338** -0.286*   -0.347** 
 (0.165) (0.166)   (0.163) 
IO_FOR_US  1.197***    
  (0.191)    
IO_FOR_NUS  0.214*    
  (0.110)    
IO_COMMON   0.871***   
   (0.166)   
IO_CIVIL   -0.209   
   (0.137)   
IO_INDEPENDENT    0.560***  
    (0.143)  
IO_GREY    -0.444**  
    (0.176)  
IO_FOR_ST     0.250 
     (0.298) 
IO_FOR_LT     0.890*** 
     (0.230) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 




Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B: Common Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IO_FOR 0.360***     
 (0.065)     
IO_DOM 0.456*** 0.434***   0.456*** 
 (0.036) (0.039)   (0.035) 
IO_FOR_US  -0.080    
  (0.127)    
IO_FOR_NUS  1.325***    
  (0.252)    
IO_COMMON   0.428***   
   (0.035)   
IO_CIVIL   2.159***   
   (0.541)   
IO_INDEPENDENT    0.295***  
    (0.046)  
IO_GREY    1.475***  
    (0.190)  
IO_FOR_ST     0.355 
     (0.248) 
IO_FOR_LT     0.363* 
     (0.188) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 0.29 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.29 




Foreign Institutional Ownership and Employment 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of alternative measures of long-term investment on institutional ownership using a Worldscope sample 
of non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variables are the ratio of selling, general & administrative expenses to total sales 
(SG&A), log of the number of employees (EMPLOYEES), ratio of staff costs to total sales (STAFF_COSTS), and the log of average staff costs per employee 
(AVG_STAFF_COSTS). Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 









 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IO_FOR 2.992*** 1.131*** 0.835*** 0.426***  0.680*** 0.651*** 0.128** 0.185*** 
 (0.425) (0.104) (0.086) (0.071)  (0.215) (0.062) (0.061) (0.054) 
IO_DOM 0.683*** 0.734*** 0.299*** 0.075  0.257*** 0.392*** 0.047 0.030 
 (0.174) (0.034) (0.051) (0.063)  (0.078) (0.029) (0.047) (0.056) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No No No 
R
2 0.26 0.80 0.26 0.57  0.71 0.97 0.73 0.92 





Foreign Institutional Ownership, Productivity, and Firm Value 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of productivity and firm valuation on foreign institutional 
ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The 
dependent variables are sales (SALES), foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (FXSALES), and Tobin’s Q 
(TOBIN_Q). Regressions include additional control variables as in Table 3 (coefficients not shown). Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable SALES FXSALES TOBIN_Q  SALES FXSALES TOBIN_Q 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_FOR 1.355*** 0.596*** 3.579***  0.438*** 0.073*** 0.899** 
 (0.093) (0.025) (0.402)  (0.058) (0.020) (0.420) 
IO_DOM 0.963*** 0.054*** 0.222  0.341*** 0.023*** -0.301*** 
 (0.043) (0.007) (0.248)  (0.044) (0.008) (0.114) 
log(R&D_STOCK) 0.004***    0.000   
 (0.001)    (0.002)   
log(K) 0.277***    0.170***   
 (0.008)    (0.010)   
log(L) 0.626***    0.405***   
 (0.012)    (0.018)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.83 0.28 0.37  0.97 0.82 0.69 






R&D Research and development expenditures (Worldscope item 01201) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
CAPEX Capital expenditures (Worldscope item 04601) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
CAPEX+R&D Sum of capital expenditures (Worldscope item 04601) and research and development expenditures (Worldscope item 01201) divided by total assets. 
PATENTS Number of patents applied by firm (USPTO). 
EMPLOYEES Number of employees (Worldscope item 07011). 
STAFF_COSTS Staff costs (Worldscope item 01084) divided by sales (Worldscope item 01001). 
AVG_STAFF_COSTS Staff costs in thousands of US$ (Worldscope item 01084) divided by number of employees (Worldscope item 07011). 
SG&A Selling, general and administrative expenses (Worldscope item 01101) divided by sales (Worldscope item 01001). 
SALES Sales in thousands of US$ (Worldscope item 01001). 
TOBIN_Q Total assets (Worldscope item 02999) plus market value of equity (Worldscope item 08001) minus book value of equity (Worldscope item 03501) divided 
by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
CEO_TURNOVER Dummy that equals one if the firm’s CEO is terminated in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
IO_TOTAL Holdings (end-of-year) by all institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR Holdings (end-of-year) by institutions located in a different country from the where the stock is listed as a fraction of market capitalization 
(FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_DOM Holdings (end-of-year) by institutions located in the same country where the stock is listed as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_US Holdings (end-of-year) by U.S.-based foreign institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_NUS Holdings (end-of-year) by non-U.S.-based foreign institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_COMMON Holdings (end-of-year) by common law based institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_CIVIL Holdings (end-of-year) by civil law based institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_INDEPENDENT Holdings (end-of-year) by independent institutions (mutual funds and independent investment advisers) as a fraction of market capitalization 
(FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_GREY Holdings (end-of-year) by grey institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions) as a fraction of market capitalization 
(FactSet/LionShares). 
INV_TURNOVER Investment horizon (short- term vs. long-term) of the firm’s institutional investors measured by the weighted average of the total portfolio churn rates of 
the firm’s investors (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005). 
IO_FOR_ST Holdings (end-of-year) by short-term (churn rate above the median) foreign institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_LT Holdings (end-of-year) by long-term (churn rate below the median) foreign institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
K/L Net property, plant and equipment (Worldscope item 02501) divided by number of employees (Worldscope item 07011). 
R&D_STOCK R&D stock is defined as Gt  = Rt  + (1 − δ) Gt−1 where R is the R&D expenditure in US$ in year t and δ = 0.15, the private depreciation rate of knowledge. 
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CLOSE Number of shares held by insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, such as officers and directors and immediate families, 
other corporations or individuals), as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding (Worldscope item 08021). 
FXSALES Foreign annual net sales (Worldscope item 07101) as a proportion of net sales (Worldscope item 01001). 
GOV Corporate governance index that measures the compliance with 41 governance attributes (RiskMetrics/ISS). 
COMPETITION Product market competition is measured as one minus the industry Lerner index, where the Lerner index equals the median gross profit margin 
(Worldscope item 08306) in a given three-digit SIC code. 
FCF Free cash flow equals net income before extraordinary items (Worldscope item 01551) plus depreciation (Worldscope item 04049) minus capital 
expenditures (Worldscope item 04601) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
LEVERAGE Total debt (Worldscope item 03255) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
DIVIDENDS Dividends (Worldscope item 04551) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
CASH Cash holdings (Worldscope item 02001) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
PPE Net property, plant and equipment (Worldscope item 02501) divided by total assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
KZ_INDEX Kaplan-Zingales index computed as -1.002×FCF+0.283×TOBIN_Q+3.319×LEVERAGE−39.368×DIVIDENDS−1.315×CASH. 
AMIHUD Amihud illiquidity measure calculated as the annual average of the daily ratio between a stock’s absolute return and its dollar volume 
RETURN Stock return minus the local country market return denominated in US$. 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items (Worldscope item 01551) plus interest expenses (Worldscope item 01251) divided by total assets (Worldscope 
item 02999). 
MSCI Dummy that equals one if a stock is a member of the MSCI All Country World Index, and zero otherwise (Bloomberg/MSCI). 
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Matching between USPTO and Worldscope 
This appendix describes the algorithm we follow in order to match patent assignees of the 
patents awarded by The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to firms in the 
Worldscope database in the January 1990 to December 2012 period. Using historical data, for 
each firm in Worldscope, we compile the list of all names used by each firm currently and in the 
past (we use both “name” and “extended name” Worldscope variables), and we also collect each 
firm’s country of incorporation. For each patent, we obtain the set of assignees listed on the 
patent grant publication document issued by the USPTO. For each assignee, USPTO provides 
assignee’s country of domicile and the indicator of its type: “U.S. corporation”, “non-U.S. 
corporation”, “individual”, “government agency”, or other. To be used for matching, we require 
the patent to have at least one patent assignee indicated as a U.S. corporation or non-U.S. 
corporation. 
In the first step of our matching algorithm, we standardize patent assignee names and 
Worldscope firm names using regular expression language. Our standardization focuses on three 
main aspects of assignee/firm names: 
a) We ensure that assignee/firm name strings only contain a-z, A-Z, and 0-9 characters. For 
example, we replace “â” to “a”, “ü” to “u”, “&Oacute;” to “O”, “&Uuml;” to “U”, “&#200;” 
to “E” etc. We do 292 such character replacements. We also remove multiple-character 
endings added to firm name strings by Thomson REUTERS data vendor for reasons 
unrelated to firm names. For example, “- ARD”, “- CONSOLIDATED”, “- PRO FORMA” 
etc. We use 46 regular expressions to perform these removals. 
b) We unify the way suffices (that typically describe the legal form of incorporation) of firm 
names appear in the assignee/firm name strings. For example, German suffices “GmbH”, 
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“G.M.B.H.”, “G. M. B. H.”, “g m b h”, “G m b H”, “G. m. b. H.”, “G m. b. H” etc. are 
replaced by the same unified string “GMBH”. There are 817 different suffices we process 
according to this scheme using regular expression language. This ensures that differences 
between assignee and firm name strings are not due to different ways in which suffices of 
firm names are recorded. To minimize the probability of mistakenly changing a non-suffix 
part of the firm name, this procedure is country-specific, i.e., we only make the above 
replacements if the respective suffice is used by firms incorporated in a given country. 
We shorten non-unique parts of assignee/firm names that have low relevance for matching. For 
example, the word “CORPORATION” appears in many firm names and hence can be used to 
distinguish one firm name from another only marginally. Therefore, we abbreviate it to “CORP” 
taking into account all likely misspellings of this word, e.g., “COPRPORATION”, 
“CORPOIRATION”, “CORPORTATION”, “COROPORTION”, “CORPOORATION” etc. 
Another example is Japanese “KABUSHIKI KAISHA”, which we abbreviate to “KAB KSHA” 
using regular expressions like “K[K]*ABUSH[IS]*KI[ \.&-]*KAISH[I]*A”, 
“KAB[UA]SHI[KN]I[ \.&-]*[KH]AIS[HY]A” etc. Overall, we abbreviate 302 terms like 
“CORPORATION” using 1,212 different regular language expressions. This step makes unique 
elements of assignee/firm names longer relative to non-unique elements, which increases the 
efficiency of the fuzzy-string matching procedure. We describe this procedure next. 
In the second step, we create a dataset that contains all pairwise combinations of standardized 
patent assignee name strings and standardized Worldscope firm name strings. There are 156,609 
different standardized Worldscope firm name strings and 405,666 different standardized patent 
assignee name strings, leading to approximately 63.5 billion pairs. We match all assignee-firm 
name pairs using the Bigram string comparison algorithm. The Bigram algorithm compares two 
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strings using all combinations of two consecutive characters within each string. For example, the 
word “bigram” contains the following bigrams: “bi”, “ig”, “gr”, “ra”, and “am”. We coded the 
Bigram comparison function to return a value between 0 and 1, such that it counts the total 
number of bigrams that are common between the two strings divided by the average number of 
bigrams in the two strings. The Bigram algorithm is very effective for our purposes since it is 
fast, and handles very well misspellings, omission of characters, as well as the swapping of 
words in the string. 
For assignee-firm name pairs with the Bigram score above 0.5, we also compute the 
Levenshtein distance between the two strings. Intuitively, the Levenshtein distance between two 
strings is the minimum number of single-character edits (specifically, insertion, deletion, and 
substitution of characters) required in order to change one string into the other. Using the Bigram 
score, Levenshtein distance, and the length of the two strings in the assignee-firm name pairs, we 
identify the closest Worldscope firm name for each patent assignee. Next, for each patent 
assignee, we decide whether the assignee was matched to a Worldscope firm or not based on a 
metric that combines the Bigram score with the Levenshtein distance. We also impose a 
condition that the firm’s country of incorporation obtained from Worldscope is the same as the 
assignee’s country of domicile recorded in USPTO data. These steps result in a database that 
uniquely links USPTO patent numbers to Worldscope firm codes. 
We perform extensive checks on our standardization-matching algorithm. Specifically, first, 
to find closest matches, we use different thresholds for the Bigram score and the Levenshtein 
distance. Second, instead of standardizing suffices of firm names, we eliminate them from the 
firm name and we perform matching on so-called “stem” name. These alterations, even for rather 
extreme parameter values, have limited impact on the matching outcome: assignments of less 
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than 5% of patents in our data are affected. Last, using random subsamples of patents, we 
manually check the results of the standardization-matching algorithm and compute the Type I 
and Type II errors. We find that both errors are lower than 1%. 
We do not have data on the list of subsidiaries owned by Worldscope firms at each point in 
time. For this reason, the patent portfolio we assign to firms in our sample might be smaller than 
the patent portfolio these firms effectively control. The robustness checks on the matching 
procedure we discuss above partially address this concern since names of subsidiaries are often 
very similar to names of their parent companies; typically, they share the unique part of the name 
like “SIEMENS” or “LAFARGE” for example. 
For patents awarded to Worldscope firms that are incorporated in the US, we compare the 
outcome of our matching algorithm with the matching provided by the NBER Patent Data 
Project.1 We first compile a link table between firm codes in Worldscope and GVKEYs in 
Compustat. Next, for Worldscope firms in our final regression sample where GVKEY is 
available, we compare the annual counts of patents in our data with that of the NBER Patent 
Data Project. Table A.1 provides four examples of firms with large patent portfolios: IBM, 
Microsoft, Honeywell, and Google. The table shows that, since the NBER dataset is based on 
patents awarded by USPTO up to 2006, the NBER data can represent innovation output (patents 
filed) only up to year 2002. In contrast, we use patent grant publication documents issued by the 
USPTO up to the end of June 2013, which allows us to have a representative measure of 
innovation output over our entire sample period. In the 2000-2002 period for which NBER data 
are available, patent counts in our data are comparable to that of the NBER data. Specifically, the 
last column of Table A.1 shows that the correlation coefficient between counts of patents in our 
                                                 
1 See https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/. 
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data and the NBER data is above 0.95 in the 2000-2002 period. Table A.2 shows, for each year 
in our sample, summary statistics that compare the distribution of the counts of patents in our 
data with that of the NBER data. We show that the two distributions are comparable in the 2000-
2002 period for which NBER data are available. 
Finally, we check to what extent the set of patents in our sample represent the entire set of 
USPTO patents awarded to all corporations (public as well as private) in each country. To this 
end, Table A.2 reports, for each country, the ratio of the number of patents matched to the 
Worldscope firms in our sample to the total number of patents assigned to corporations from the 
same country as indicated by USPTO. Overall, our “Non-U.S.” sample contains 44% of patents 





Comparison to NBER Patent Matching 
This table shows, in each year, the total number of patents and the number of patents assigned to selected firms by our matching algorithm as well as the total 
number of patents and the number of patents assigned to the same firms according to the NBER dataset. Patents are counted toward years in which they were 
applied for with USPTO. The last column reports, in each year, the correlation between the total numbers of patents obtained in these two ways for U.S. firms in 
our sample. 
 IBM  Microsoft  Honeywell  Google  Total  
Year Matching 
NBER 
Matching  Matching 
NBER 
Matching  Matching 
NBER 
Matching  Matching 
NBER 





2001 4,016 3,456 938 641 480 487 0 0  37,856 40,977 0.96 
2002 3,547 2,361 1,127 474 570 501 0 0  38,057 34,102 0.95 
2003 3,971 1,842 1,762 266 593 434 0 0  36,550 25,724 0.92 
2004 3,730 802 2,918 321 746 286 0 2  35,857 12,738 0.85 
2005 3,731 179 3,382 160 822 58 178 0  35,141 3,246 0.83 
2006 3,691 6 2,050 10 741 3 193 0 31,906 182  
2007 5,252 0 1,664 0 728 0 249 0 30,722 0  
2008 6,937 0 1,174 0 684 0 229 0 27,117 0  
2009 2,223 0 566 0 312 0 205 0 16,258 0  




Table IA.2  
Comparison to NBER Patent Matching: Summary Statistics 
This table shows, for U.S. firms in our sample in each year, summary statistics of the number of patents assigned by 
our matching algorithm (column “BFMP Matching”) and of the number of patents obtained from the NBER dataset 
(column “NBER Matching”). 
 Matching  NBER Matching 
  
Standard 95th   Standard 95th 
Year Mean Deviation Percentile  Mean Deviation Percentile 
2001 6.38 80.11 13 6.91 73.63 14 
2002 6.85 79.25 15 6.14 59.40 14 
2003 7.07 87.11 14 4.98 47.91 12 
2004 7.40 87.85 16 2.63 24.21 6 
2005 7.30 88.26 15 0.67 6.24 2 
2006 6.76 76.00 15 0.04 0.37 0 
2007 6.59 89.41 14 0 0 0 
2008 6.02 109.29 12 0 0 0 
2009 3.88 42.53 10 0 0 0 






Table IA.3  
Coverage of Patents by Country 
This table shows, for each country, the number of patents matched to firms in our sample using “BFMP Matching” 
and the total number of patents assigned to firms (public and private) in the same country as reported by USPTO. 
USPTO Patents are based on the universe of utility patents issued by USPTO. Triadic Patents are based on patents 
that are simultaneously applied for with USPTO, EPO, and JPO. 
   USPTO Patents  Triadic Patents 












of Patents Coverage 
North America United States  298,200 789,978 38%  64,065 185,788 34% 
 
Canada  5,957 23,987 25%  949 4,812 20% 
Europe Germany  29,484 96,424 31%  9,895 38,025 26% 
 
France  8,767 32,297 27%  3,748 15,789 24% 
 
Netherlands  7,893 21,014 38%  6,702 12,447 54% 
 
Switzerland  5,759 17,781 32%  1,918 9,346 21% 
 
Finland  5,347 9,496 56%  1,349 2,719 50% 
 
Sweden  4,407 14,329 31%  1,759 6,619 27% 
 
United Kingdom  2,476 19,875 12%  1,734 8,244 21% 
 
Denmark  1,343 4,158 32%  834 1,956 43% 
 
Belgium  875 4,524 19%  621 2,497 25% 
 
Italy  751 11,726 6%  273 4,127 7% 
 
Norway  304 2,035 15%  111 710 16% 
 
Austria  231 3,339 7%  60 1,135 5% 
 
Ireland  12 2,238 1%  5 782 1% 
 
Spain  42 2,118 2%  25 838 3% 
 
Hungary  53 237 22%  42 134 31% 
Asia Pacific Japan  212,034 379,595 56%  80,275 127,350 63% 
 
South Korea  56,020 79,502 70%  9,291 12,467 75% 
 
Taiwan  41,147 60,837 68%  550 912 60% 
 
India  1,869 2,824 66%  1,162 1,553 75% 
 
Singapore  1,289 5,686 23%  90 679 13% 
 
China  752 12,356 6%  226 1,038 22% 
 
Australia  372 9,265 4%  133 5,031 3% 
 
Hong Kong  32 3,116 1%  6 237 3% 
 
New Zealand  77 832 9%  49 311 16% 
 
Malaysia  14 307 5%  4 70 6% 
Other Israel  825 8,151 10%  298 2,539 12% 
 
Brazil  192 662 29%  60 178 34% 
 
South Africa  17 520 3%  5 163 3% 
 
Non-U.S.  388,341 828,569 47%  122,174 262,708 47% 
 





Foreign Institutional Ownership and Long-Term Investment 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of R&D expenditures (Panel A) and capital expenditures 
(Panel B) on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-
2010 period. The dependent variable is either the annual R&D expenditures as a percentage of assets (Panel A) or 
the annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) as a percentage of assets (Panel B). Regressions include the same control 
variables as in Table 3 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. For fixed-effects regressions of R&D a firm is required to have disclosed in its 
books R&D expenditures in at least one fiscal year. In addition, a firm must have at least two observations. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: R&D Expenditures 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL -0.007***    -0.014***   
 (0.002)    (0.004)   
IO_FOR  0.023*** 0.021***   0.008* 0.008* 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.005) (0.005) 
IO_DOM   -0.011***    -0.019*** 
   (0.002)    (0.005) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.30 0.30 0.31  0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of observations 179,125 179,125 179,125  88,851 88,851 88,851 
 
Panel B: Capital Expenditures 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.009***    0.012***   
 (0.001)    (0.003)   
IO_FOR  0.018*** 0.019***   0.017*** 0.017*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.004) 
IO_DOM   0.007***    0.011*** 
   (0.001)    (0.003) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.20 0.20 0.20  0.58 0.58 0.58 





Long-Term Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership: Non-U.S. vs. U.S. Firms 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment (Panel A) and innovation output 
(Panel B) on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-
2010 period. The dependent variable is either the sum of annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D 
expenditures (R&D) as a percentage of assets (Panel A) or the logarithm of one plus the annual number of patents 
applied with the USPTO (Panel B). Columns (1)-(3) report the results for Non-U.S. firms and columns (4)-(6) report 
the results for U.S. firms. Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3 (Panel A) or Table 4 (Panel 
B) (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.  For fixed-effects regressions of patents a firm is 
required to have made at least one patent application at USPTO. In addition, a firm must have at least two 
observations. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level (columns (1)-(3)) or industry-year level 
(columns (4)-(6)) clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Long-Term Investment 
 Non-U.S. Firms  U.S. Firms 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.030***    0.006   
 (0.005)    (0.004)   
IO_FOR  0.031*** 0.030***   0.067*** 0.062*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)   (0.018) (0.017) 
IO_DOM   0.031***    0.005 
   (0.006)    (0.004) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.18 0.18 0.18  0.21 0.21 0.21 
Number of observations 131,056 131,056 131,056  48,069 48,069 48,069 
 
Panel B: Patent Counts 
 Non-U.S. Firms  U.S. Firms 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.232***    0.349***   
 (0.056)    (0.034)   
IO_FOR  0.623*** 0.637***   2.757*** 2.429*** 
  (0.076) (0.076)   (0.321) (0.311) 
IO_DOM   -0.235***    0.280*** 
   (0.061)    (0.032) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.24 0.24 0.24  0.31 0.31 0.31 




Foreign Institutional Ownership and Innovation Output: Poisson Regressions 
This table shows estimates of firm-level Poisson panel regressions of innovation output on institutional ownership 
using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variable 
is the annual number of patents applied with the USPTO. Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 
4 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. For fixed-effects regressions of patents a firm is required to have made at least one patent application at 
USPTO. In addition, to be included in firm fixed effects regressions a firm must have at least two observations. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level (columns (1)-(3)) or firm-level (columns (4)-(6)) clustering 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.808***    0.176**   
 (0.030)    (0.074)   
IO_FOR  1.805*** 1.935***   0.772*** 0.782*** 
  (0.178) (0.190)   (0.164) (0.164) 
IO_DOM   0.611***    0.062 
   (0.036)    (0.080) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 





Foreign Institutional Ownership and Innovation Output: Triadic Patents 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of innovation output, measured by triadic patent counts, 
on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 
period. The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the annual number of patents applied simultaneously 
with the three main patenting offices (USPTO, EPO and JPO). Regressions include the same control variables as in 
Table 4 (coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. For fixed-effects regressions of patents a firm is required to have made at least one patent 
application over the sample period. In addition, a firm must have at least two observations. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IO_TOTAL 0.175***    0.205***   
 (0.027)    (0.058)   
IO_FOR  0.358*** 0.379***   0.222** 0.239** 
  (0.055) (0.056)   (0.112) (0.111) 
IO_DOM   0.151***    0.199*** 
   (0.031)    (0.066) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
R
2 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.73 0.73 0.73 




Foreign Institutional Ownership and Long-Term Investment: Robustness 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment (CAPEX+R&D) on institutional 
ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The 
dependent variable is the sum of annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D expenditures (R&D) as a 
percentage of assets. Column (1) restricts the sample to the 2001-2008 period. Column (2) restricts the sample to the 
2005-2010 IFRS adoption period. Column (3) controls for country-industry-year fixed effects. In column (4) the 
dependent variable is the sum of annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D expenditures (R&D) as a 
percentage of Sales. Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 3 (coefficients not shown). Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IO_FOR 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.443*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.047) 
IO_DOM -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.149*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Country-industry-year fixed effects No No Yes No 
R
2 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.15 





Foreign Institutional Ownership and Innovation Output: Robustness 
This table shows estimates of firm-level panel regressions of innovation output on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope non-financial and non-
utility firms in the 2001-2010 period. The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the annual number of patents applied with the USPTO. Column (1) 
restricts the sample to firms with at least one patent application in the sample period. Column (2) restricts the sample to the 2001-2008 period. Column (3) 
controls for country-industry-year fixed effects. In column (4) the dependent variable is the log of patent counts. In columns (5)-(7) the dependent variable is the 
patent counts using a three-year rolling window, patent counts scaled by the technological class, and patents counts three years in the future, respectively. In 
column (8) the dependent variable is the ratio of patent counts to R&D stock. Regressions include the same control variables as in Table 4 (coefficients not 
shown). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IO_FOR 1.300*** 0.704*** 0.629*** 1.286*** 0.826*** 0.796*** 0.641*** 0.150*** 
 (0.181) (0.100) (0.091) (0.214) (0.109) (0.105) (0.101) (0.019) 
IO_DOM 0.280*** 0.352*** 0.348*** 0.253*** 0.474*** 0.402*** 0.319*** -0.021*** 
 (0.058) (0.043) (0.045) (0.075) (0.072) (0.042) (0.056) (0.006) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-industry-year fixed effects No No Yes No No No No No 
R
2 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.04 











                                                 
* Co-authors: Miguel A. Ferreira (Nova School of Business and Economics), Pedro Matos (University of Virginia  – 




Mutual fund companies manage trillions of dollars, but many of these companies are not stand-
alone entities. About 40% of mutual funds domiciled outside the United States are run by asset 
management divisions of groups whose primary activity is commercial banking. This 
phenomenon is less prevalent in the United States largely as a result of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
which kept banking and asset management as separate activities for many decades. However, 
since the repeal of Glass-Steagall by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, many U.S. banking 
groups have developed asset management divisions.1  
There are reports that bank-affiliated funds underperform funds operated by independent 
fund management companies, particularly in Europe (Financial Times (2011)), although there is 
little academic research about the potential spillover effects between the commercial banking and 
asset management divisions. While fund managers have a fiduciary responsibility to the fund’s 
investors, managers are also employees of banking groups for which the revenue generated by 
bank lending usually dominates revenue from asset management.  
In this paper, we examine the potential conflict of interest when fund management companies 
are owned by commercial banking groups, which may lead fund managers to benefit the bank’s 
interests at the expense of fund investors.2 Commercial banks may use affiliated funds to boost 
their voting rights and hence increase influence over the borrower’s board of directors. This 
influence could help to build long-term relationships that lead to future loan business. In this 
case, we would expect affiliated funds to systematically overweight the stock of the bank’s 
lending clients. Moreover, affiliated funds could also be used to temporarily support the stock 
                                                 
1 As of the end of 2010, according to the Investment Company Institute (2011), mutual funds managed about $25 
trillion. Equity funds had about $10 trillion in assets under management or 20% of the world market capitalization. 
2 See Mehran and Stulz (2007) for a review of the literature on conflicts of interest in financial institutions. 
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price of the bank’s lending clients and hence gain the favor of the borrower’s management.3 
The alternative hypothesis (information advantage hypothesis) is that bank lending generates 
private information about borrowers via credit origination, monitoring, and renegotiation that is 
valuable for the affiliated fund manager. Thus, commercial banking groups gain an information 
advantage on their borrowing firms, which can have positive spillover effects for bank-affiliated 
funds. The null hypothesis (Chinese walls hypothesis) is that groups impose “Chinese walls” to 
prevent communication between the asset management and the lending divisions, so that bank-
affiliated funds operate independently of other parent bank divisions.  
We test these hypotheses using a comprehensive sample of open-end equity mutual funds 
domiciled in 28 countries over 2000-2010. We focus our tests on actively managed equity funds 
that invest in domestic equities because banks typically have stronger lending relationships with 
local firms. We identify the fund management company’s ultimate owner to determine whether a 
fund is affiliated with a commercial bank. We define as “bank-affiliated” mutual funds that 
belong to a management company that is either majority-owned by a commercial parent bank or 
that is part of a group that owns a commercial bank. For example, funds managed by Wells 
Fargo Fund Management (the asset management arm of Wells Fargo & Co) and funds managed 
by DWS Investments (the asset management arm of Deutsche Bank) are classified as bank-
affiliated. Fidelity Funds (parent company is FMR LLC, a stand-alone management company) 
and Pictet & Cie Funds (a Swiss private bank with no lending arm) are classified as unaffiliated.  
We find that, on average, bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds by about 70 
basis points per year as measured by four-factor alphas. This result is consistent with the conflict 
                                                 
3 Bank-run funds could also impact borrowing firms’ stock volatility and liquidity. Assuming the equity-debt link as 
predicted by structural credit risk models (e.g., Merton (1974)), interventions on the stock would positively impact 
credit spreads in the secondary loan (and bond) market and the mark-to-market pricing of the loans on the bank’s 
balance sheet.  
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of interest hypothesis, and holds when we use different risk-adjustment methods, samples, and 
regression specifications. We use fund fixed effects to address the concern that the decision to 
operate a fund management company as affiliated might be related to some unobserved fund 
characteristics that explain performance. We also use quasi-natural experiments (disinvestments 
of asset management divisions and regulatory reforms) to address the concern that past 
performance might affect the current organizational form of a management company.  
There is a trade-off if the parent bank uses its affiliated funds to support their lending 
business by overweighting the stock of the bank’s clients. On the one hand, using fund resources 
may help build long-term relationships with the borrowers and increase the likelihood of acting 
as lead arranger in future loans. Following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007, 
2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2012), we show that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers 
in loans when they exert control over borrowers by holding shares through their asset 
management divisions. Ownership by the banks’s fund family increases both the probability of 
initiating a new lending relation and the probability of continuing an existing lending relation.  
On the other hand, this biased portfolio allocation may impose a cost. If bank-affiliated funds 
underperform their peers, they can experience significant outflows and erosion of asset 
management revenues. Therefore, we expect affiliated management companies to be more 
conflicted when the benefits outweigh the costs, namely, when lending division revenue 
dominates asset management division revenue. We find that bank-affiliated funds underperform 
more when the ratio of outstanding loans to assets under management is higher. This evidence is 
consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis.  
To examine more directly whether the parent bank’s lending activity is directly linked to 
fund underperformance, we measure the overlap between lending clients and fund stock holdings 
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using the parent bank’s activity in the global syndicated loan market. A “client stock” is a firm 
that obtained a syndicated loan from the parent bank in the previous three years and whose 
shares are held in the portfolio of a fund affiliated with the parent bank. We show that bank-
affiliated funds’ portfolio holdings are biased toward client stocks over non-client stocks. We 
find that bank-affiliated funds with higher portfolio exposure to client stocks tend to 
underperform more. The results are robust when we measure the bank-affiliated fund’s portfolio 
bias in excess of the average weight of peer funds and also when we restrict the analysis to the 
top ten parent bank lending clients.  
We also consider alternative explanations for our results. It could be that bank-affiliated 
funds underperform because they have a captive investor clientele, as stand-alone fund providers 
find it difficult to establish a distribution network in countries where banks have a strong 
presence. Banks also have a competitive advantage in their brand recognition that allows them to 
cross-sell by offering mutual funds jointly with other financial products. Therefore, bank-
affiliated funds could exploit their market power and charge higher fees, resulting in lower net-
of-fees performance of bank-affiliated funds.4 These alternatives are unlikely to explain our 
findings, because we find similar underperformance when we examine gross-of-fees returns and 
buy-and-hold returns based on portfolio holdings. Additionally, if investor clienteles were 
captive, we would expect flows to bank-affiliated funds to be less responsive to poor 
performance. We find, however, that flow-performance relationships do not differ significantly 
between bank-affiliated and unaffiliated funds.  
To further rule out these alternative channels, we repeat the tests using placebo samples. 
                                                 
4 A similar argument explains the underperformance of broker-sold mutual funds in the United States, which could 
result from conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients or from substantial non-tangible benefits offered by 
brokers (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009)). Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013) document other 
biases with broker-intermediated funds. 
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First, we find that index-tracking funds run by bank-affiliated management companies do not 
underperform unaffiliated funds. We would not expect significant conflicts of interest stemming 
from bank lending activity in the case of passive funds that have little discretion to overweight 
client stocks. Second, we find that the underperformance of bank-affiliated funds is much less 
pronounced for international funds than domestic funds. This is consistent with the idea that fund 
managers’ portfolio decisions in international funds are less distorted by lending relationships, as 
any conflict should be more important in the case of local borrowers. Our results also do not 
appear to be driven by systematic differences in managerial skill between bank-affiliated and 
unaffiliated funds. Finally, we find less pronounced underperformance of affiliated funds for 
U.S. domiciled funds. This is consistent with the idea that “Chinese walls” between bank lending 
and asset management are more strictly enforced and fund investors’ rights are better protected 
in the United States than elsewhere in the world (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005, 2009)).  
Examination of year-by-year regressions reveals more pronounced conflicts of interest in 
bear-market periods when bank clients are more likely to benefit from stock price support. Fund 
managers’ compensation incentives are more likely to dominate in bull markets, while 
employment incentives are more likely to dominate in bear markets when manager career 
concerns are higher. Thus, fund managers are more likely to be team players within the fund 
management company during periods of market downturns.5  
We test more formally whether the price support to client stocks is concentrated in bear 
markets using calendar-time portfolios. The evidence shows that bank-affiliated funds tend to 
follow a contrarian (rather than a momentum) strategy on their client stocks. Additionally, the 
                                                 
5 During bear markets net inflows into mutual funds are generally weak (Karceski (2002)) and fund family 
profitability is lower. Both effects lead to lower compensation incentives for fund managers in bear markets, as 
compensation is linked to fund size and fund family profitability (Farnsworth and Taylor (2006)). Moreover, the 
probability of job loss for fund managers is generally higher in bear markets (Chevalier and Ellison (1999)) when 
there are more fund closures and managers have fewer employment options (Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009)).  
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strategy that goes long client stocks and shorts non-client stocks held by bank-affiliated funds 
produces negative abnormal returns in bear markets.  
An important concern with our results is reverse causality. Past performance may affect the 
decision on whether to operate a fund management company as a bank-affiliated or stand-alone 
company. To strengthen the causal interpretation of the results, we exploit two quasi-natural 
experiments. The first consists of exogenous disinvestments of asset management divisions by 
commercial banking groups in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis due to the need of 
banks to improve their regulatory capital ratios (The Economist (2009)). We find that funds that 
switch from bank-affiliated to unaffiliated due to these disinvestments subsequently reduce their 
holdings of client stocks, particularly their exposure to top lending clients. As a second 
identification strategy, we explore whether the fund regulatory overhaul mandated by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after the 2003 trading scandals reduced conflicts of 
interest in U.S. funds vis-à-vis non-U.S. funds. Using a difference-in-differences regression, we 
show that U.S. funds improve performance more than non-U.S. funds after the 2004 SEC reform, 
and this differential effect is more pronounced among bank-affiliated funds.  
Our work contributes to the literature examining agency conflicts in fund complexes in U.S. 
markets (Massa (2003), Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), 
Cohen and Schmidt (2009)). In particular, there is a recent line of research that studies spillover 
effects that other businesses have on asset management companies affiliated with financial 
groups. In the United States, Massa and Rehman (2008) find that bank-affiliated funds 
overweight lending client holdings around new loan announcements and that this strategy has a 
short-term positive effect on funds’ performance. This evidence is consistent with the 
information edge hypothesis that bank-affiliated fund managers have access to private 
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information from their parent company. Other studies, however, find conflicts of interest within 
investment banks between their underwriting and asset management businesses (Ritter and 
Zhang (2007), Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2009), Hao and Yan (2012), Berzins, Liu, and 
Trzcinka (2013)). Most recently, Sialm and Tham (2014) study the spillover effects across 
business segments of publicly traded fund management companies.  
Our contribution is to study the effects of lending relationships on mutual fund performance 
within commercial banking groups. We use a worldwide sample, as commercial banks with 
affiliated asset management divisions are more prevalent outside the United States. Using 
Spanish data, Golez and Marin (2015) show that bank-affiliated funds support the prices of their 
own-parent stock and Gil-Bazo, Hoffman and Mayordomo (2015) show that bank-affiliated 
funds hold parent banks’ bond issues after the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis and European 
sovereign debt crisis. Ghosh, Kale, and Panchapagesan (2014) find conflicts of interest in 
business group affiliated funds in India. These papers, however, do not examine funds’ holdings 
of lending clients. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence of conflicts 
of interest between the lending and equity asset management divisions within commercial 
banking groups.    
2. Data 
2.1 Sample of Equity Mutual Funds  
Data on equity mutual funds come from the Lipper survivorship bias-free database, which covers 
many countries worldwide in the 1997-2010 period.6 Although multiple share classes are listed 
as separate observations in Lipper, they have the same holdings and the same returns before 
                                                 
6 Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013) and Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2015) provide a detailed 
description of this data source. Lipper’s worldwide data coverage is comprehensive when compared to aggregate 
statistics from the Investment Company Institute (2011). 
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expenses. Thus, we keep the primary share class as our unit of observation, and aggregate fund-
level variables across different share classes. We exclude funds-of-funds, closed-end funds, and 
index tracking funds, which reduces the sample to 38,400 open-end actively managed equity 
funds (23,653 funds that managed over $7.5 trillion as of December 2010).  
To classify each mutual fund as either affiliated or unaffiliated with a commercial bank, we 
follow two steps. First, we collect information on each fund’s ultimate owner from FactSet/ 
LionShares. In order to do this, we match each Lipper fund with the fund’s portfolio holdings 
data provided by LionShares using ISIN and CUSIP fund identifiers, as well as management 
company and fund names.7 Second, we match the fund’s ultimate parent obtained from 
LionShares with the ultimate owners of banks from the Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. 
A fund is classified as bank-affiliated if: (1) the fund’s ultimate owner is a commercial bank (the 
entity is classified in BankScope as either Bank Holding & Holding Companies, Cooperative 
Bank, Commercial Bank, Savings Bank, or Specialized Governmental Credit Institution) with 
total assets over $10 billion; or (2) there is a commercial bank within the fund’s ultimate owner 
group.8 After the match, the sample includes 19,969 funds (13,801 funds that managed $6.9 
trillion as of December 2010).   
For our main tests, the sample includes a total of 7,220 domestic funds in 28 countries over 
the 2000-2010 period. We focus on domestic funds (i.e., funds that invest in their local market), 
but we also perform placebo tests using international funds and index-tracking funds. Table 1 
presents the number and total net assets (TNA) of the sample of domestic funds by country as of 
December 2010. There are 4,981 domestic funds that managed $3.6 trillion of assets in 2010. 
                                                 
7 While the Lipper data are survivorship bias-free, the LionShares data provide only the current header on the fund’s 
ultimate owner. Therefore, we use historical ultimate owner information from LionShares backfiles to capture 
changes on the funds’ ultimate owner due to mergers and acquisitions in the financial industry. 
8 For insurance groups, we consider only commercial bank subsidiaries with significant assets relative to the total 
assets of the group. For example, funds affiliated with Allianz SE are not considered bank-affiliated.  
137 
 
Funds affiliated with a commercial banking group represent 32% of the number of funds and 
18% of TNA. There is considerable variation in the market share of bank-affiliated funds across 
countries. While bank-affiliated funds represent only 11% of TNA in the United States, they 
represent 40% outside the United States. The market share of bank-affiliated funds exceeds 50% 
of TNA in the majority of continental European countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
Switzerland. Figure 1 shows the time series of the number and TNA of unaffiliated and affiliated 
funds, where we see a downward trend in the share of affiliated funds. 
Table IA.1 in the Internet Appendix provides a list of the top five fund management 
companies per country and whether they are bank affiliated. In the United States, none of the top 
five fund companies is part of a commercial banking group, while in major countries in 
continental Europe most of the top five fund companies are bank affiliated.  
2.2 Measuring Risk-Adjusted Performance 
We estimate the fund’s risk-adjusted returns (alphas) in U.S. dollars using the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model. Following Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009), we estimate four-factor 
alphas using regional factors based on a fund’s investment region in the case of domestic, foreign 
country, and regional funds. We use world factors in the case of global funds.9 
For each fund-quarter, we estimate factor loadings using the previous 36 months of return 
data (we require a minimum of 24 months of return data) using the regression: 





, + , (1) 
 
where  is the return in U.S. dollars of fund i in month t in excess of the one-month U.S. 
                                                 
9 We construct country-level factors using individual stock returns in U.S. dollars obtained from Datastream, 
following closely the method of Fama and French (1993). The regional and world factors are value-weighted 
averages of country factors. The regions are Asia Pacific, Europe, North America, Emerging Markets, and World. 
Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2013) provide a detailed description of the factors 
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Treasury bill rate; 
, (market) is the excess return on the fund’s stock investment region in 
month t; 
, (small minus big) is the average return on the small-capitalization stock 
portfolio minus the average return on the large-capitalization stock portfolio in the fund’s 
investment region; 
, (high minus low) is the difference in return between the portfolio with 
high book-to-market stocks and the portfolio with low book-to-market stocks in the fund’s 
investment region; 

, (momentum) is the difference in return between the portfolio with the 
past 12-month stock winners and the portfolio with the past 12-month stock losers in the fund’s 
investment region. Next, using the estimated factor loadings, we subtract the expected return 
from the realized fund return to obtain the fund’s abnormal return in each quarter (alpha). In an 
alternative approach, we perform robustness checks using benchmark-adjusted returns (i.e., the 
difference between the fund’s return and the return on its benchmark). 
2.3 Measuring Conflicts of Interest  
We use several proxies for conflicts of interest within the commercial banking group based on 
the relative importance of the lending and asset management divisions. First, we use the ratio of 
the parent bank’s total loans outstanding from BankScope over the total net assets (TNA) 
managed by the asset management division (Loans/TNA). Second, we use the ratio of total 
syndicated loans outstanding arranged by the parent bank from DealScan over the TNA 
(Syndicated Loans/TNA). Finally, we use the ratio of the U.S. dollar value of all-in drawn interest 
rate spreads (including fees) on outstanding syndicated loans over the total annual U.S. dollar 
value of fees of the asset management division (Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues).10 
To test more directly the lending channel, we use fund holdings data to analyze whether the 
                                                 
10 The TNA is given by the sum of all open-end active domestic equity funds managed by the management 
companies owned by the parent bank. 
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portfolio choices of bank-affiliated funds are biased toward client stocks. We obtain data on 
funds’ portfolio holdings from the LionShares database.11 We classify each fund’s holdings as 
either a lending client stock or non-client stock using the Thomson Reuters Dealscan database, 
which provides information on the global syndicated loan market. We use all loans initiated 
between 1997 and 2010 with facility amounts above $25 million. A fund’s stock holding is 
classified as a client stock if the fund’s parent bank, subsidiary or branch acted as lead arranger 
for the firm’s loans in the previous three years. To measure the intensity of the bank-firm 
relationship we define an additional measure that classifies a stock holding as a client stock only 
if a firm is among the top ten borrowers of the fund’s parent bank in terms of the total amount of 
syndicated loans in the previous three years.  
To better understand how fund portfolio holdings are classified as client or non-client stocks, 
consider the following example of two selected funds (as of December 2010): 
DWS Investa Fund JPMorgan U.S. Equity Fund 
Ultimate Owner Deutsche Bank AG Ultimate Owner JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Management Company DWS Investments Management Company JPMorgan Asset Mgmt. 
Country of Domicile Germany Country of Domicile United States 
Fund Benchmark DAX 30 TR Fund Benchmark S&P 500 TR 
Number of Holdings 43 Number of Holdings 217 
%TNA in Client Stocks 56.9 %TNA in Client Stocks 40.4 
Bias in Client Stocks (%) 11.6 Bias in Client Stocks (%) 11.0 
Top 5 Holdings: Top 5 Holdings: 
Stock Country Client Weight 
(%) 
Stock Country Client Weight 
(%) 
BASF SE Germany Yes 10.92 Apple U.S. No 3.70 
Siemens AG Germany Yes 9.81 Exxon Mobil U.S. Yes 2.51 
Daimler AG Germany Yes 7.72 Microsoft U.S. Yes 2.42 
E.ON SE Germany Yes 5.35 Procter & Gamble U.S. Yes 2.19 
Allianz SE Germany No 4.46 Chevron U.S. No 2.07 
 
In the first case, the DWS Investa fund, which is domiciled in Germany, invests primarily in 
domestic firms and is managed by DWS Investments (the asset management arm of Deutsche 
                                                 
11 Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide a detailed description of this database.  
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Bank). Deutsche Bank acted as lead arranger in the syndicated loan market over the previous 
three years for BASF, Siemens, Daimler, and E.ON, which are among the top five fund holdings 
of DWS Investa. Overall, 56.9% of the fund’s TNA is invested in client stocks, which 
corresponds to an overweight of 11.6 percentage points compared to peer funds. The second 
example is the JPMorgan U.S. Equity Fund, which is domiciled in the United States and is 
managed by JPMorgan Asset Management (the asset management division of JPMorgan Chase 
& Co). Three of its top five holdings are classified as client stocks for which JPMorgan acted as 
lead arranger over the previous three years. The fund has 40.4% of its TNA invested in client 
stocks, corresponding to an overweight of 11.0 percentage points compared to peer funds. 
We construct several variables based on client stocks. First, we measure the fund’s investment 
in client stocks as a percentage of TNA (%TNA Invested in Client Stocks). Second, we measure 
whether a bank-affiliated fund overweights client stocks compared to peer funds with the same 
benchmark (Bias in Client Stocks).12 We also compute both measures using only the holdings of 
the top ten borrowers of the parent bank (%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks, Bias in Top 10 
Client Stocks). Finally, for some of the falsification tests, we measure the fund bias on client 
stocks not held by computing the average weight in the stocks of lending clients that are not held 
by the fund (Bias in Client Stocks Not Held, Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks Not Held). 
2.4 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics on funds’ risk-adjusted performance, bank-
affiliated dummy, and other proxies for conflicts of interest, as well as fund-level control 
variables (Fund TNA, Fund Family TNA, Age, Total Expense Ratio, Total Load, Fund Flow, Nr. 
                                                 




of Countries of Sale, Team Managed Dummy, Past Performance). Table A.1 in the Appendix 
provides variable definitions. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the sample means of the variables separately for unaffiliated and 
affiliated funds as well as univariate tests of the equality of coefficients between the groups. 
Panel C of Table 2 reports summary statistics on the proxies for conflicts of interest in bank-
affiliated funds. The average Loans/TNA is above 100 with a median of 22.75. The average 
Syndicated Loans/TNA is 17.1 with a median of 4.2. On average, affiliated funds have about 15% 
of their holdings in client stocks, which corresponds to 6.5 percentage points more than peer 
funds hold of the same stocks. 
Deutsche Bank is a good example of a commercial banking group with a large asset 
management division, DWS Investments. Deutsche Bank was the second-largest commercial 
bank worldwide, with total assets of $2,500 billion (outstanding loans of $545 billion), and 
second in the league table of syndicated loan arrangers in Europe with $183 billion in 2008-
2010. DWS is the largest fund management company in Germany and the third-largest in 
Europe, with TNA of $90 billion in equity funds ($24 billion in domestic equity funds). Thus, 
the lending business is several times the size of the asset management business. DWS funds’ 
equity holdings show a strong average bias to client stocks, with 25% of TNA invested in client 
stocks compared to 17% among their peer funds. 
3. Performance of Bank-Affiliated Funds 
3.1 Baseline Test 
We start by comparing the performance of bank-affiliated funds relative to unaffiliated funds. 
We estimate fund-quarter panel regressions of four-factor alphas on the commercial bank-
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affiliated dummy variable and a set of control variables (measured with a one-quarter lag). The 
regressions include quarter fixed effects and country of domicile fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the ultimate-owner level. 
The main results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that bank-affiliated 
funds underperform unaffiliated funds, as indicated by the negative and significant bank-
affiliated dummy coefficient. The effect is economically significant. Using four-factor alphas, 
affiliated funds underperform by about 17.5 basis points per quarter (which corresponds to about 
70 basis points per year). The coefficients on the control variables are in line with other studies 
that find that performance is negatively related to fund size and total expense ratio, but positively 
related to family size and flows (e.g., Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004)).  
To investigate further why commercial bank-run funds underperform, we replace the bank-
affiliated dummy with the variables Loans/TNA, Syndicated Loans/TNA, and Lending/Asset 
Mgmt. Revenues, which measure the relative size of the lending division versus the asset 
management division within a banking group. Columns (2), (3), and (4) show negative and 
statistically significant coefficients on these three variables. We conclude that the 
underperformance of bank-affiliated funds is more pronounced when the lending activity 
dominates the asset management division.13 
A legitimate concern with our results so far is an omitted-variables problem. To address this 
concern, we include fund fixed effects in our regressions to control for unobserved sources of 
fund heterogeneity. By using fund fixed-effects regressions, we analyze only the within-fund 
changes in the bank-affiliated dummy (i.e., disinvestments or acquisition of asset management 
divisions by banking groups in which the other party is not a commercial banking group). This 
                                                 
13 These effects are economically significant. For example, a one-standard deviation increase to the proxy for 
conflicts of interest, Loans/TNA, is associated with a decline in four-factor alphas of 10 basis points per quarter. 
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solves a “joint determination” problem in which an unobserved fund-level time-invariant 
variable determines both performance and affiliation with a banking group. 
Columns (5)-(8) of Table 3 report our main results using a fund fixed-effects model. There is 
a significant negative relation between performance and the bank-affiliated dummy (column (5)). 
The affiliated funds underperformance gap relative to unaffiliated funds is 28.3 basis points per 
quarter, which is stronger than the estimate in column (1). Because this specification focuses on 
the effects of within-fund changes in bank affiliation, fund-specific omitted variables cannot 
explain the observed relation between bank affiliation and performance. Moreover, columns (6)-
(8) of Table 3 show negative and significant coefficients on the measures of the relative size of 
the lending and asset management divisions are, with the exception of the Syndicated Loans/TNA 
variable, which is estimated with less precision.  
We also explore the time series by running our baseline regression year-by-year. Figure 2 
plots the evolution of the coefficients on the bank-affiliated dummy and our three proxies for 
conflict of interests (Loans/TNA, Syndicated Loans/TNA, and Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues) 
over the sample period. The left top panel shows the coefficient on the bank-affiliated dummy. 
The underperformance of bank-affiliated funds was more pronounced in the 2000-2002 period 
(the dot-com bubble burst); underperformance lessened during the 2003-2006 bull market, but 
again became more pronounced during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The other panels of Figure 
2 show that coefficients on the more direct proxies for conflicts of interest follow a similar time 
pattern. The evidence suggests that conflicts of interest are more pronounced in bear market 
periods when we expect bank clients to need more stock price support.14 
                                                 
14 We test this more formally running multivariate regressions on affiliated funds’ performance gap in market 
downturns (as proxied by the bear market dummy or the market return of fund’s geographic focus region). The 
estimates in Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix show that the underperformance of affiliated funds is more 
pronounced during market downturns. 
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3.2 Benefits to the Bank 
We examine the trade-off between the lending and asset management divisions when the parent 
bank uses its affiliated funds to support their lending business by overweighting the stock of the 
bank’s clients. On the one hand, this biased portfolio allocation may impose a cost as the 
affiliated funds may underperform their peers and therefore experience significant outflows and 
erosion of asset management revenues. On the other hand, using fund resources may help build 
long-term relationships with the borrowers and increase the likelihood of the bank acting as lead 
arranger in future loans.  
We start by examining whether affiliated fund holdings in lending client stocks (borrowing 
firms) makes it more likely that the bank will be chosen as a lead arranger for future loans.15 To 
perform this test, we follow a methodology similar to Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 
(2007, 2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2012). For each facility, we pair borrowing firms with 
each of the top 20 banks in a country in terms of loan volume in U.S. dollars. We then estimate a 
logit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
bank acted as a lead arranger and zero otherwise.  
Table 4 reports the results. The results in column (1) indicate that commercial banks tend to 
obtain more loans from firms in which their affiliated funds hold stock (Fund Ownership 
Dummy). On average, banks that hold stock of the borrower firms are 3.2% more likely to be 
chosen as lead arrangers than banks without affiliated institutional holdings in borrower firms 
(the probability increases from 12.6% to 15.8%). The relative importance of affiliated fund 
holdings to increase the bank’s lending business depends on whether or not the bank has already 
                                                 
15 Conflicts of interest between bank’s asset management and lending divisions are not unnoticed in the mutual fund 
industry. In a recent article (Financial Times, 2011), Guillaume Prache, managing director of the European 
Federation of Investors, stated: “Banks tend to double up their shares, combining the ones they hold directly with the 
proxy votes from shares owned by asset management arms. Banks invariably vote in ways that suit their commercial 
lending or investment banking arms, not in ways that reflect the interests of end-investors”. 
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a past lending relationship (over the preceding three years) with the borrower firm. While for 
new lending relationships, holding affiliated institutional holdings in the borrower stock, 
increases the likelihood of the bank being chosen as lead arranger by 2.6% (the probability 
increases from 9.4% to 12%), for past lending relationships, banks are 6.6% more likely to be 
chosen as lead arrangers (the probability increases from 41.3% to 47.9%). 
It is likely that the probability of the bank being chosen as lead arranger increases with the 
size of the affiliated funds ownership in the borrowing firm. Thus, we repeat our analysis using a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the bank’s affiliated funds, on aggregate, hold at least 1% of 
the borrowing firm’s shares. The results in column (3) show that, on average, banks that hold at 
least 1% of the borrower firm’s shares are 4.6% more likely to be chosen as lead arrangers than 
banks that hold less than 1% of the firm’s shares. While for new relationships the probability of 
being chosen as lead bank increases by 3.7% for past lending clients this probability increases by 
8.6%. 
Columns (3) and (4) show that the results are robust when we include bank fixed-effects, 
bank-specific controls (assets, return on assets) and borrower-specific controls (market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, leverage, tangibility, stock volatility, and stock return).  
In short, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert 
control over borrowers by holding stock through their asset management divisions. Ownership 
by the lender’s fund family increases both the probability of initiating a new lending relation and 
amplifies the probability of continuing a past lending relationship with lending clients. 
3.3 Alternative Explanations 
There are alternative hypotheses that could explain why bank-affiliated funds underperform 
unaffiliated funds. A first alternative hypothesis is that funds affiliated with commercial banking 
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groups must offer competitive compensation packages to attract top talent in fund management. 
Our regression tests already control for other factors that could explain the underperformance of 
bank-affiliated funds such as manager skill. To control for different organizational structure or 
managerial skill we use the Team Managed Dummy variable. If fund managers’ personal names 
are featured, then career concerns are higher and the portfolio manager may be more reluctant to 
be a “team player” and cooperate with the fund family strategy.16 
A second alternative hypothesis is that bank-affiliated funds underperform because they have 
a captive investor clientele that is less sophisticated (Frye (2001)).17 We control for this 
alternative in our baseline regressions using several proxies (Total Expense Ratio, Total Loads, 
Number of Countries of Sale). To further rule out the investor clientele explanation, we 
implement three additional tests.  
The first strategy is to run our regressions using gross-of-fees returns by adding back expense 
ratios. Table 5 reports the results. Column (1) of Table 5 shows that bank-affiliated funds 
underperform unaffiliated funds when we use gross returns. The extent of the performance gap 
remains practically unchanged at 17.3 basis points per quarter. The coefficients on the other 
proxies of conflicts of interest in columns (2)-(4) of Table 5 are also negative and significant. 
This result suggests that the ability of bank-affiliated funds to charge higher expense ratios does 
not explain the underperformance of affiliated funds. 
The second strategy consists of estimating our regressions using the funds’ buy-and-hold 
return in excess of the benchmark return, as the performance gap could come from higher loads, 
                                                 
16 In the U.S. mutual fund industry, Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2010) study the choice between named and 
anonymous management. These authors show that funds with named managers are less likely to engage in cross-
fund subsidization (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)). 
17 This argument is similar to that of Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) for why U.S. retail mutual funds sold through 
brokers face weaker incentives to generate alpha than mutual funds sold directly. These authors build their work on 
the prior findings by Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) and Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013). 
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wrap fees, and other hidden costs. The results are reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 5. We 
continue to find that bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds by a similar 
difference at 15.6 basis points per quarter. Results for the other three proxies of conflicts of 
interest are also robust.  
The third strategy is to estimate the sensitivity of fund flows to past fund performance (e.g., 
Sirri and Tufano (1998), James and Karceski (2006)). In each quarter and country, fractional 
performance ranks ranging from zero (poorest performance) to one (best performance) are 
assigned to funds according to their returns in the past four quarters. We estimate both a linear 
regression using the performance ranks (Rank) and a piecewise linear regression with three 
performance rank segments: ),2.0min( 1,1, −− = titi Rank Low , ),6.0min( 1,1, −− −= titi LowRank  Mid , 
and )( 1,1,1, −−− +−= tititi MidLowRank High . We then test whether the sensitivity of flows to past 
performance is statistically different between affiliated and unaffiliated funds by including 
interaction variables of the Bank-Affiliated Dummy with Rank or with Low, Mid, and High. 
Table 6 reports the results. Column (1) shows the estimates of the linear specification and 
column (2) of the piecewise linear specification. The interaction variable coefficients with the 
bank-affiliated dummy are statistically insignificant in both columns (1) and (2). Thus, there is 
no evidence that the clientele of bank-affiliated funds is less responsive to fund performance and 
exerts less monitoring efforts. 
3.4 Placebo Tests 
We also perform falsification tests of our main results using alternative samples of funds. First, 
we use index-tracking funds, because we expect that bank-affiliated fund managers of passive 
products do not have discretion to overweight client stocks. These index fund managers have 
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their “hands tied” in terms of portfolio holdings as they need to closely follow a benchmark. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of these falsification tests using the bank-affiliated dummy 
and the three other proxies for conflicts of interest. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7, Panel A, show 
the results for the sample of index-tracking funds. The coefficient on the bank-affiliated dummy 
is statistically insignificant. As expected, we do not find evidence of conflicts of interest with the 
lending division in the sample of passive funds.  
We also use international equity funds (i.e., funds that invest outside their local market) 
because we expect bank lending relationships to be less important in the international syndicated 
loan market than in the domestic market. Columns (5)-(8) of Table 7, Panel A, show the results 
for the sample of international funds. The performance gap between bank-affiliated and 
unaffiliated funds is statistically insignificant in column (5) and weakly significant in columns 
(6)-(8). The results support a conclusion that the source of underperformance of bank-affiliated 
domestic funds seems to be the conflict of interest, which is stronger for the local bank lending 
activity, rather than inherent differences in skill across bank-affiliated and unaffiliated funds. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of an additional test that compares the 
underperformance of bank-affiliated funds in the United States versus other countries. The 
intuition is that “Chinese walls” between bank lending and asset management are more strictly 
enforced in the United States due to the legacy effect of the Glass-Steagal Act and stronger fund 
investors’ rights. In columns (1) and (5) of Table 7, Panel B, we find much less pronounced 
underperformance by bank-affiliated U.S. funds (11.9 basis points per quarter) than for non-U.S. 
funds (24.9 basis points per quarter). The difference between U.S. and non-U.S. funds is even 
more striking in columns (3) and (4) versus columns (7) and (8) when we use other proxies for 
conflicts associated with lending (Syndicated Loans/TNA, Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues). This 
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indicates that conflicts of interest are more pronounced in markets with weaker fund regulation.  
4. Portfolio Holdings Tests 
4.1 Fund Performance 
We next use portfolio holdings data to test more directly whether fund manager investment 
decisions favor the parent bank’s lending business over the interests of fund investors. In 
particular, we assess the cost from the portfolio exposure to client stocks.  
Panel C of Table 2 shows that bank-affiliated funds hold, on average, about 14.9% of the 
fund’s TNA in client stocks (%TNA Invested in Client Stocks). This compares with about 8.5% 
when we consider the average weight on the same stocks among peer funds (i.e., funds that track 
the same benchmark). This corresponds to a 6.5 percentage point overweighting of client stocks 
by bank-affiliated funds relative to peer funds (Bias in Client Stocks). The allocation bias to 
client stocks is 0.44 percentage points when we consider the top ten borrowers of the fund’s 
parent bank (Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks).18  
The fact that fund managers have biased allocations toward client stocks does not necessarily 
imply that these portfolio choices are detrimental to performance, as funds might have acquired 
private information through the lending business. To test which hypothesis (conflicts of interest 
or information edge) dominates, we estimate our baseline regressions of fund performance using 
these more direct portfolio holdings measures.  
Table 8 presents the results. Columns (1) and (3) show negative and statistically significant 
coefficients on both %TNA Invested in Client Stocks and %TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks. 
The effects are also economically significant. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in 
                                                 
18 We also find that affiliated funds overweight client stocks using fund-stock-quarter regression tests (see Table 
IA.3 in the Internet Appendix). 
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the affiliated fund’s allocation to client holdings is associated with a decline in performance of 8 
basis points per quarter (11 basis points in the case of top ten clients). This explains about half 
the size of the bank-affiliated dummy in the baseline tests in Table 3. The evidence shows that 
bank-affiliated funds with greater portfolio exposure to client stocks tend to underperform more, 
which supports the conflicts of interest hypothesis. 
Next, we re-estimate our regressions when we measure the bank-affiliated fund’s excess 
allocations to client stocks over peer funds. We find negative and statistically significant 
coefficients on both Bias in Client Stocks and Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks. For example, a one-
standard deviation increase in the bias in client holdings is associated with a decline in 
performance of 4 basis points per quarter (10 basis points in the case of top ten clients).  
Figure 3 reports the yearly estimates of the coefficients on %TNA Invested in Client Stocks, 
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks, Bias in Client Stocks, and Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks. 
The results are robust when we use gross returns (Panel B) and buy-and-hold returns (Panel C) as 
dependent variables.  
We also conduct a falsification test using portfolio holdings. We investigate whether the 
excess allocation to client stocks not held by affiliated funds produces the same results as the 
client stocks held. For this test, we use the average weights by peer funds on client stocks not 
held by the affiliated fund. Table 9 reports the results.  
We find that the coefficient on Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks Not Held is positive and 
statistically significant, but the coefficient on Bias in Client Stocks Not Held is statistically 
insignificant. The conclusion is that funds would have outperformed had they held these stocks. 
These results show that affiliated funds are more biased toward the worse-performing client 
stocks within the investable universe of stocks of their lending clients. This is consistent with the 
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price support hypothesis. 
4.2 Calendar-Time Stock Portfolios 
As an alternative approach, we use calendar-time portfolios to study how much of the bank-
affiliated funds’ underperformance is due to portfolio allocation to client holdings. At the 
beginning of each quarter, we assign stock holdings of bank-affiliated funds to client or non-
client portfolios. Stocks are weighted by the fund’s U.S. dollar holdings, and portfolios are 
rebalanced every calendar quarter. We then compute value-weighted monthly returns by 
averaging across funds, weighting individual fund portfolios by the fund’s TNA at the end of the 
previous quarter. This approach has the advantage of corresponding to a simple investment 
strategy of investing in client and non-client securities in proportion to the amount held by the 
universe of affiliated funds.19  
We analyze the risk-adjusted returns of calendar-time portfolios using the four-factor model. 
Since Figure 2 suggests that there is some time-series variation in bank-affiliated funds’ price 
support to client stocks, we define as bear markets the years associated with the dot-com bubble 
burst (2000, 2001, 2002) and the global financial crisis (2008, 2009). We expect client firms to 
need more price support from bank-affiliated funds in bear markets (i.e., when the majority of 
stock prices drop substantially). 
Table 10 shows the results. The strategy of going long affiliated funds’ client stocks has a 
negative factor loading on momentum (MOM), while the factor loading on momentum for the 
portfolio of non-client stocks is statistically insignificant. This suggests that bank-affiliated funds 
tend to follow a contrarian strategy, which is evidence of price support of the parent bank’s client 
                                                 




stocks. Additionally, the zero-cost strategy that goes long client stocks and short non-client 
stocks held by bank-affiliated funds earns 12 basis points per month in bull markets (the 
intercept of the regression is the alpha in bull markets), but the estimate is statistically 
insignificant. The BEAR dummy coefficient is -0.344 and statistically significant indicating that 
the long-short strategy returns are different in bear markets and bull markets. The long-short 
strategy loses 23 basis points (= 0.119 − 0.344) per month in bear markets, which suggests that, 
during market downturns, price support activities of client stock holdings have an adverse effect 
on the wealth of bank-affiliated funds’ investors.20  
5. Identification and Robustness  
An important concern with our results is reverse causality. Strong past performance may prompt 
a fund management company to operate as unaffiliated, while poorly performing funds may not 
be able to operate as stand-alone. Another concern is the possibility of confounding effects. In 
order to strengthen the causal interpretation of the effect of a fund affiliation with a commercial 
banking group, we exploit variation generated by two quasi-natural experiments. 
5.1 Disinvestment of Asset Management Divisions 
The first identification strategy uses asset management division disinvestments by commercial 
banking groups to identify changes in fund bank affiliation that are exogenous to fund 
performance. While disinvestment decisions of fund management companies in general are not 
exogenous, we focus our analysis on the eight quarters of the global financial crisis period from 
2007:Q3 through 2009:Q2. During this period, several commercial banking groups were forced 
to divest non-core business assets to improve their regulatory capital ratios (The Economist 
                                                 
20 In untabulated tests, we find similar results when we allow the loadings on the four factors to shift with the market 
regime using an interaction with the bear market dummy. 
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(2009)) rather than for other factors such as fund underperformance. Some high-profile deals 
include the divestitures of the asset management division of Credit Suisse to Aberdeen, Barclays 
Global Investors to Blackrock, and Cominvest (owned by Commerzbank) to Allianz.  
We expect to find that switches of fund management companies from bank affiliated to 
unaffiliated due to disinvestments will lead to reduction in the holdings of lending client stocks 
and improvement in performance. For comparison, we also analyze acquisitions of fund 
management companies by commercial banking groups, where we expect to find the opposite 
effects. The sample includes 10 disinvestments of fund management companies (9 unique 
ultimate owners and 16 domestic equity funds) and 4 acquisitions (4 ultimate owners and 20 
domestic equity funds) by commercial banking groups when the other party is not a commercial 
banking group. This is an unusually high level of M&A transactions when compared to other 
years in our sample.  
Figure 4 shows the portfolio holdings of client stocks in the four quarters before and after the 
disinvestment of fund management companies. The top panel shows the evolution of the %TNA 
Invested in Client Stocks and the bottom panel shows the evolution of the %TNA Invested in Top 
10 Client Stocks. The switch of a company from affiliated to unaffiliated is accompanied by 
significant reductions in the holdings of client stocks. The switch of a fund from unaffiliated to 
affiliated, however, is accompanied by significant increases in the holdings of client stocks.21 
We estimate regressions to examine whether portfolio holdings of client stocks and 
performance change after a fund management company switches from affiliated to unaffiliated or 
vice-versa. The dependent variable is the portfolio holding (or performance) four quarters before 
                                                 
21 In the case of a switch from affiliated to unaffiliated, we take the real (fictitious) list of client stocks associated 
with a parent bank when the fund management company is still affiliated (versus afterward when it is not). In the 
case of a switch from unaffiliated to affiliated, we do the opposite and take the fictitious (real) client stocks before 
(and after) it is affiliated with a parent bank. 
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and four quarters after each event. The explanatory variable is a dummy variable (After Dummy) 
that takes a value of one in the four quarters after the event.  
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 11 report estimates for the sample of disinvestments (i.e., 
management companies that switch from bank-affiliated to unaffiliated). Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 11 show that fund managers reduce their holdings of stocks of clients of the parent bank 
after a switch from affiliated to unaffiliated. On average, the holdings of lending client stocks 
(%TNA Invested in Client Stocks) decline by 5.28 percentage points of TNA (with a t-statistic of 
-2.45), and the holdings of top ten lending clients (%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks) 
decline by 1.13 percentage points (with a t-statistic of -1.76).  Column (3) of Table 11 shows 
evidence that benchmark-adjusted returns increase after a switch from affiliated to unaffiliated, 
but the evidence is weaker for the four-factor alphas in column (4). 
Columns (5)-(8) of Table 11 report estimates for the sample of acquisitions (i.e., switches 
from unaffiliated to bank-affiliated). Columns (5) and (6) show that portfolio managers increase 
exposure to stocks of the lending clients of the new fund’s parent bank following the acquisition. 
The allocation to top ten client stocks, on average, increases by 2.08 percentage points of TNA 
(with a t-statistic of 3.52). Columns (7) and (8) show a negative effect on fund performance of a 
switch from unaffiliated to affiliated, but the effect is imprecisely estimated. 
Overall, the results of disinvestments of fund management companies suggest that affiliated 
fund portfolio managers act as team players and place larger bets in lending client stocks. We 
also find some evidence that fund performance improves following a disinvestment of a 
management company by a commercial banking group. 
5.2 SEC 2004 Regulatory Reform 
The second identification strategy explores the fund regulatory overhaul mandated by the SEC in 
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the aftermath of the 2003 late trading and market timing scandals.22 We hypothesize that SEC 
fund governance reforms may have reduced conflicts of interest in U.S. funds vis-à-vis non-U.S. 
funds.  
While U.S. open-end mutual funds share many similarities with equivalent financial products 
offered in other parts of the world, namely, with UCITS in Europe, U.S. mutual fund governance 
differs. U.S. funds have a board of directors, while funds in Europe are overseen by senior 
managers with no independence requirement. Prior to repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, 
independent board chairs were required for bank-affiliated funds, but this mandate disappeared 
with enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Investment Company Institute (2009)). In 2004 
the SEC enacted more stringent requirements for board of directors of mutual funds imposing 
that boards are composed of more than 75% independent directors and have an independent 
chairman (Securities and Exchange Commission (2006)). The intent was to reduce potential 
conflicts of interest with affiliated parties and to protect fund investors.23 Mutual fund companies 
consented to the reforms, as the compliance rate with the percentage of independent directors 
rule increased from 59% in 2002 to 88% in 2006 and up to 91% by 2010 (Investment Company 
Institute (2013)).24 
We test whether the exogenous SEC reforms to U.S. funds’ governance improved their 
performance over the performance of non-U.S. funds using a difference-in-differences 
regression. The 2001-2007 sample period includes the three-year period before and the three-
                                                 
22 Zitzewitz (2006) finds significant evidence of widespread late trading by fund families. 
23 These reforms were controversial. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued and a Federal appeals court invalidated 
the requirements in 2006, but mutual fund board structures had already changed considerably. The SEC reviewed a 
number of academic papers in its economic analysis of board independence (Securities and Exchange Comission 
(2006)) and the Investment Company Institute (2007) provides a critique. Tufano and Sevick (1997) show the 
impact of boards on fee-setting while Ding and Wermers (2012) find that independent boards affect pre-expense 
performance. 




year period after the SEC reforms. Treated Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if a fund is domiciled in the United States, and zero otherwise. After Dummy is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one in 2005 and thereafter. The explanatory variable of interest is the 
interaction Treated Dummy × After Dummy, which compares changes in performance between 
U.S. funds and non-U.S. funds around the reform date. The regression also includes fund-level 
characteristics, year and country of domicile fixed effects; the coefficients on Treated Dummy 
and After Dummy are not separately identified. 
Table 12 presents the results. Column (1) shows that the interaction term coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the performance of U.S. funds 
relative to non-U.S. funds improves after the reforms. Columns (2) and (3) present estimates 
separately for the samples of affiliated and unaffiliated funds. The differential effect is more 
pronounced in the sample of affiliated funds than in the sample of unaffiliated funds. Column (4) 
shows that the difference between these two groups of 0.338 percentage points (as indicated by 
the triple interaction Bank-Affiliated Dummy × Treated Dummy × After Dummy coefficient) 
funds is statistically significant at the 10% level. In short, we find that governance reforms had a 
positive impact on the performance of U.S. funds versus non-U.S. funds, especially among bank-
affiliated funds where there is a greater potential for conflicts of interest.  
One concern about inferences from this treatment-effects framework is whether the treatment 
and control groups follow parallel trends prior to the treatment. Figure 5 shows no differential 
pre-trends in performance between U.S. and non-U.S. funds. 
5.3 Robustness  
Table 13 presents some robustness checks of our primary finding that bank-affiliated funds 
underperform unaffiliated funds in Table 3. First, column (1) shows that the results are robust 
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when we use benchmark-adjusted returns in alternative to four-factor alphas. In untabulated tests, 
we also find similar results when we use market model alphas. 
Second, we use alternative estimation methods such as Fama and MacBeth (1973) and 
weighted least squares (WLS) using fund’s TNA as weights. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 13 
show that these alternative estimation methods provide estimates of the Bank-Affiliated Dummy 
coefficient that are comparable to the baseline results in Table 3. 
Third, we check for the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of small funds and earlier 
sample years with lower coverage of the population of mutual funds. Columns (4) and (5) 
indicate that results are robust when we exclude funds with assets under management below $10 
million or exclude the first year of the sample (2000).  
Finally, we check for the robustness of the findings when we control for the fund’s Active 
Share measure (Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2015)). 
Active share is an additional proxy for managerial skill, we include it to alleviate concerns that 
bank-affiliated funds hire less skilled fund managers. Column (6) shows a similar estimate of the 
Bank-Affiliated Dummy coefficient to that of Table 3, which indicates that our results are not 
driven by systematic differences in fund manager skills between bank-affiliated and unaffiliated 
funds. 
6. Conclusion  
We show that mutual fund performance is negatively affected when a management company is 
owned by a commercial banking group. We find that bank-affiliated funds underperform 
unaffiliated funds by about 70 basis points per year. The underperformance is more pronounced, 
the larger the size of the lending division relative to the asset management division, and the 
higher the funds’ direct exposure to the stock of the bank’s lending clients. We interpret this to 
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indicate that the bank-affiliated fund underperformance seems to be driven by a conflict of 
interest between the bank’s lending business and the asset management division. Our findings 
suggest that affiliated funds systematically overweight stocks of borrowing firms that help their 
parent bank build long-term relationships with borrowers and future lending business. We also 
find that affiliated funds are used to temporarily support the lending clients’ stock price, 
particularly during market downturns.  
Alternative explanations such as differences in investor clientele, cross-selling of financial 
products, and fund manager skill do not seem to explain our findings. We use fund fixed effects 
to address the concern that the decision to operate a fund management company as affiliated 
might be related to some unobserved fund characteristics that explain performance. We use 
quasi-natural experiments involving disinvestments of asset management division and U.S. 
regulatory reforms to address the concern that past performance might affect the organizational 
form of a management company. To validate our interpretation further, we also perform 
falsification tests using passive and international funds in which conflicts of interests are not 
expected to play an important role.  
Overall, our results suggest that the underperformance of bank affiliated funds results from a 
double agency problem in that portfolio managers put aside the interests of one principal (fund 
investors) in order to benefit another principal (the parent bank). Our findings have important 
implications, as about a third of mutual funds worldwide do not operate as stand-alone entities, 
but rather as divisions of commercial banking groups.  
Future research should examine other spillover effects on asset managers run by financial 
groups that go beyond just commercial bank lending studies in this paper, which can come from 
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Number of Funds and Total Net Assets by Country 
This table presents number of funds, total net assets (TNA), and number of ultimate owners (parents) by domicile country as of 
December 2010. The table also presents the percentage of bank-affiliated funds. The sample consists of open-end actively 
managed equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. 
Country 














Australia 98 32.6 28  27.6 16.5 14.3 
Austria 13 1.4 11  61.5 81.0 54.5 
Belgium 23 1.7 8  73.9 78.6 50.0 
Brazil 48 42.0 17  79.2 78.4 58.8 
Canada 366 194.6 66  28.4 44.5 21.2 
China 69 76.0 35  11.6 8.0 8.6 
Denmark 22 3.1 15  54.5 70.0 46.7 
Finland 28 5.5 14  71.4 89.8 50.0 
France 180 42.2 48  48.9 57.8 27.1 
Germany 47 34.8 20  51.1 71.7 45.0 
India 242 37.4 31  18.6 17.7 25.8 
Israel 37 0.8 15  2.7 1.8 6.7 
Italy 30 4.5 15  60.0 55.0 60.0 
Japan 515 36.6 43  45.6 36.8 30.2 
Malaysia 91 6.4 20  62.6 92.3 45.0 
Netherlands 12 4.3 7  66.7 69.9 57.1 
Norway 58 15.7 15  58.6 60.2 46.7 
Poland 29 5.8 15  58.6 71.0 53.3 
Portugal 19 0.5 11  84.2 72.4 81.8 
Singapore 13 1.6 10  61.5 28.6 50.0 
South Africa 109 21.8 27  38.5 42.3 14.8 
Spain 63 2.3 31  65.1 72.4 58.1 
Sweden 101 63.2 20  71.3 77.1 40.0 
Switzerland 77 20.7 31  55.8 52.1 32.3 
Taiwan 147 10.2 31  43.5 26.8 35.5 
Thailand 118 5.3 16  62.7 86.0 56.3 
United Kingdom 406 215.3 90  17.7 18.0 14.4 
United States 2,020 2,683.2 365  20.3 10.9 11.0 
        
Total 4,981 3,569.7 831  32.2 18.1 18.2 
Total (ex-U.S.) 2,961 886.5 513  40.3 39.8 25.7 
 Domestic and International Equity Funds  Bank-Affiliated Funds 
Total 13,801 6,868.2 1,151  41.1 22.3 16.7 







Panels A and C present mean, median, standard deviation, 1st percentile, 99th percentile and number of observations for each 
variable. Panel B presents mean and number of observations for the samples of unaffiliated funds and bank-affiliated funds, and 
the associated mean difference p-value. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 
period.  
Panel A: Fund Characteristics 









Bank-Affiliated Dummy 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00       127,880  
Loans/TNA 36.22 0.00 428.03 0.00 548.92       126,782  
Syndicated Loans/TNA 5.82 0.00 220.57 0.00 54.59       127,880  
Lending / Asset Mgmt. Revenues 8.23 0.00 113.03 0.00 106.2 127,880 
%TNA Invested in Client Stocks 5.10 0.00 12.92 0.00 61.23       127,880  
Bias in Client Stocks 2.21 0.00 6.82 -1.01 37.90       127,238  
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks 0.56 0.00 2.49 0.00 12.83       127,880  
Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks 0.15 0.00 0.97 -0.64 4.11       127,238  
Four-Factor Alpha (%) 0.25 -0.18 5.88 -15.34 19.05       127,880  
Gross Four-Factor Alpha (%) 0.51 0.09 5.43 -13.73 18.45       116,554  
Buy and Hold Benchmark Adj. Return (%) 0.45 0.28 4.12 -12.36 14.78       123,174  
Benchmark Adjusted Return (%) 0.06 -0.09 4.18 -12.28 13.61       125,988  
TNA ($ million) 909 158 3,980 1 12,522       127,880  
Family TNA ($ million) 35,581 5,501 104,401 15 58,8055       127,880  
Age (years) 12.46 9.25 11.16 2.33 59.25       127,880  
Total Expense Ratio (%) 1.44 1.38 0.57 0.31 3.50       127,880  
Total Load (%) 2.42 2.00 2.40 0.00 10.84       127,880  
Flow (%) 0.61 -1.45 15.45 -33.70 69.92       127,880  
Number of Countries of Sale 1.16 1.00 0.84 1.00 4.00       127,880  
Team Managed Dummy 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00       127,880  
 
Panel B: Fund Characteristics of Unaffiliated and Bank-Affiliated Funds 
 Unaffiliated Funds  Bank-Affiliated Funds  Difference 
 Mean 
Number of 
Observations  Mean 
Number of 
Observations  p-value 
Four-Factor Alpha (%) 0.26 84,227  0.22 43,653  0.26 
Gross Four-Factor Alpha (%) 0.53 78,536  0.48 38,018  0.19 
Buy and Hold Benchmark Adj. Return (%) 0.49 81,481  0.38 41,693  0.00 
Benchmark Adjusted Return (%) 0.11 83,189  -0.04 42,799  0.00 
TNA ($ million) 1,122 84,227  499 43,653  0.00 
Family TNA ($ million) 47,024 84,227  13,501 43,653  0.00 
Age (years) 12.54 84,227  12.30 43,653  0.00 
Total Expense Ratio (%) 1.44 84,227  1.45 43,653  0.04 
Total Load (%) 2.52 84,227  2.24 43,653  0.00 
Flow (%) 1.02 84,227  -0.17 43,653  0.00 
Number of Countries of Sale 1.16 84,227  1.16 43,653  0.31 
Team Managed Dummy 0.59 84,227  0.65 43,653  0.00 
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Table 2: continued 
Panel C: Conflicts of Interest Variables – Sample of Bank-Affiliated Funds 









Loans/TNA 107.90 22.75 733.56 0.17 1,148.47 42,555 
Syndicated Loans/TNA 17.05 4.20 377.26 0.00 89.82 43,653 
Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues 24.12 8.25 192.46 0.00 169.09 43,653 
%TNA Invested in Client Stocks 14.94 6.70 18.49 0.00 69.83 43,653 
Bias in Client Stocks 6.46 2.38 10.44 -3.52 49.15 43,400 
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks 1.65 0.00 4.05 0.00 19.24 43,653 






Mutual Fund Performance and Bank-Affiliated Funds  
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) and fund fixed effects regressions of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable is the alpha from the Carhart four-
factor model in each quarter. Bank Affiliated is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial banking group, and 
zero otherwise. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate 
owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 OLS  Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank Affiliated -0.1750***     -0.2830**    
 (-3.98)     (-1.97)    
Loans/TNA (log)  -0.0582***     -0.1050**   
  (-4.90)     (-2.12)   
Syndicated Loans/TNA (log)   -0.0490***     -0.0946  
   (-2.60)     (-1.28)  
Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues (log)    -0.0452***     -0.1310** 
    (-2.95)     (-2.06) 
TNA (log) -0.0509*** -0.0524*** -0.0496*** -0.0496***  -0.6180*** -0.6180*** -0.6190*** -0.6210*** 
 (-4.63) (-4.71) (-4.44) (-4.45)  (-15.61) (-15.50) (-15.61) (-15.61) 
Family TNA (log) 0.0423*** 0.0404*** 0.0409*** 0.0411***  -0.0974 -0.1110 -0.1060 -0.1130 
 (3.83) (3.55) (3.48) (3.52)  (-1.25) (-1.41) (-1.36) (-1.44) 
Age (log) -0.0322 -0.0279 -0.0348 -0.0346  -0.3170* -0.3380* -0.3130* -0.3160* 
 (-1.18) (-1.01) (-1.27) (-1.27)  (-1.69) (-1.78) (-1.66) (-1.67) 
Total Expense Ratio -0.0299 -0.0297 -0.0268 -0.0286  -0.0727 -0.0793 -0.0790 -0.0791 
 (-0.61) (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.58)  (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.51) 
Total Load -0.0233** -0.0256** -0.0221* -0.0221*  -0.0228 -0.0255 -0.0202 -0.0210 
 (-2.06) (-2.25) (-1.95) (-1.95)  (-0.53) (-0.58) (-0.46) (-0.48) 
Flow 0.0073*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0074***  0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 
 (5.35) (5.38) (5.41) (5.41)  (3.65) (3.61) (3.65) (3.67) 
Number Countries of Sale -0.0054 -0.0068 -0.0055 -0.0055      
 (-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.29) (-0.29)      
Team Managed -0.1020** -0.1070*** -0.1070** -0.1060**      
 (-2.53) (-2.61) (-2.58) (-2.56)      
Past Performance 0.0260*** 0.0260*** 0.0261*** 0.0261***  -0.0174** -0.0171** -0.0173** -0.0173** 
 (3.79) (3.77) (3.80) (3.80)  (-2.43) (-2.39) (-2.43) (-2.43) 
          
Number of Observations 127,880 126,782 127,880 127,880  127,880 126,782 127,880 127,880 





Probability of Getting Future Lending Business and Mutual Fund Ownership 
This table presents results for a logit model of whether the existence of a bank-firm(i, j) link through equity fund holdings prior to 
the loan affects the probability that the firm j chooses bank i as lead arranger in the syndicated loan market. For each facility, we 
create a choice set of 20 potential lead arrangers (top 20 lenders ranked by U.S. dollar volume of loans in each country). The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank i acted as a lead arranger and zero otherwise. Fund 
Ownership Dummy is a dummy that takes the value of one if the fund families affiliated with bank i own equity of the borrowing 
firm at the end of the previous year. Fund Ownership >1% Dummy is a dummy that takes the value of one if the fund families 
affiliated with bank i own at least 1% of the borrower’s shares at the end of the previous year. Lender Market Share is the 
fraction of bank i on the U.S. dollar volume of loans in each country in the previous year. Lending Relationship is a dummy that 
takes the value of one if firm j chose bank i as lead arranger in a loan in the three years preceding the quarter of the loan. 
Borrower-specific controls include stock market capitalization (log), book-to-market ratio, leverage, tangibility, stock volatility 
and stock return (coefficients not shown). The sample consists of syndicated loans by publicly listed borrowers in the 2000-2010 
period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the firm- and bank-level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fund Ownership Dummy 0.268***  0.192***  
 (5.70)  (3.00)  
Fund Ownership >1% Dummy  0.347***  0.344*** 
  (3.53)  (3.89) 
Lender Market Share 13.272*** 13.525*** 13.593*** 13.825*** 
 (22.72) (23.56) (16.70) (15.99) 
Lending Relationship 1.909*** 1.944*** 1.745*** 1.747*** 
 (27.35) (29.08) (24.63) (24.79) 
Lender Assets (log)   0.120 0.109 
   (1.28) (1.12) 
Lender ROA   0.096 0.105 
   (1.15) (1.32) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Controls No No Yes Yes 
Lender Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 499,615 499,615 403,133 403,133 
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 
     
Probability of being chosen as the lead lender using    
the column (1) specification   Existing lending relationship 
  Average No Yes 
Fund Ownership Dummy = 0  0.126 0.094 0.413 
Fund Ownership Dummy = 1  0.158 0.120 0.479 
Change in Probability  0.032 0.026 0.066 
     
Probability of being chosen as the lead lender using     
the column (2) specification   Existing lending relationship 
  Average No Yes 
Fund Ownership >1% Dummy = 0  0.135 0.101 0.441 
Fund Ownership >1% Dummy = 1  0.181 0.138 0.527 






Mutual Fund Performance and Bank-Affiliated Funds: Gross Returns and Buy and Hold Returns  
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable are the alpha from the Carhart four-factor model using 
gross fund returns, and the buy and hold benchmark-adjusted return using fund’s stock holdings in each quarter. Bank Affiliated is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ultimate 
owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial banking group, and zero otherwise. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. All control 
variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 
2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 Gross Returns  Buy and Hold Benchmark-Adjusted Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank Affiliated -0.1730***     -0.1560***    
 (-4.02)     (-3.36)    
Loans/TNA (log)  -0.0589***     -0.0337***   
  (-5.12)     (-2.96)   
Syndicated Loans/TNA (log)   -0.0586***     -0.0464***  
   (-3.28)     (-2.70)  
Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues (log)    -0.0428***     -0.0405*** 
    (-2.85)     (-2.89) 
TNA (log) -0.0629*** -0.0643*** -0.0615*** -0.0614***  -0.0641*** -0.0644*** -0.0630*** -0.0630*** 
 (-5.97) (-6.04) (-5.74) (-5.74)  (-3.24) (-3.18) (-3.13) (-3.14) 
Family TNA (log) 0.0409*** 0.0390*** 0.0398*** 0.0398***  0.0171 0.0152 0.0160 0.0161 
 (3.77) (3.50) (3.46) (3.45)  (0.84) (0.71) (0.75) (0.76) 
Age (log) -0.0230 -0.0187 -0.0252 -0.0253  0.0721** 0.0722** 0.0695** 0.0696** 
 (-0.91) (-0.72) (-0.99) (-0.99)  (2.40) (2.37) (2.29) (2.30) 
Total Expense Ratio 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.161***  -0.00413 0.00308 -0.00102 -0.00259 
 (3.09) (3.05) (3.16) (3.13)  (-0.09) (0.07) (-0.02) (-0.06) 
Total Load -0.0203* -0.0225* -0.0194* -0.0191  -0.0263** -0.0268** -0.0253** -0.0252** 
 (-1.74) (-1.92) (-1.65) (-1.62)  (-2.29) (-2.32) (-2.19) (-2.19) 
Flow 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0066***  0.0024** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0025** 
 (5.01) (5.04) (5.07) (5.08)  (2.13) (2.18) (2.18) (2.17) 
Number of Countries of Sale -0.00900 -0.0103 -0.00974 -0.00917  0.0320* 0.0320* 0.0317* 0.0319* 
 (-0.50) (-0.59) (-0.56) (-0.53)  (1.73) (1.78) (1.76) (1.77) 
Team Managed -0.1130*** -0.1170*** -0.1160*** -0.1160***  -0.0239 -0.0263 -0.0279 -0.0272 
 (-2.76) (-2.80) (-2.73) (-2.74)  (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.62) (-0.61) 
Past Performance 0.0317*** 0.0317*** 0.0318*** 0.0318***  0.0611*** 0.0613*** 0.0612*** 0.0612*** 
 (4.96) (4.93) (4.96) (4.97)  (12.56) (12.57) (12.60) (12.60) 
          
Number of Observations 116,266 115,172 116,266 116,266  120,198 119,156 120,198 120,198 





Flow-Performance Relationship and Bank Affiliated Funds 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of fund flows (net growth in total net assets) on lagged performance. 
Fractional performance ranks ranging from zero to one are assigned to funds according to their average Carhart four-factor model 
in the past four quarters in a given quarter and country. Column (1) uses a linear specification and column (2) uses a piecewise 
linear specification using three performance rank segments: Lowi,t-1 = min(0.2,Ranki,t-1), Midi,t-1 = min(0.6 Ranki,t-1 - Lowi,t-1), and 
Highi,t-1 = Ranki,t-1 - (Lowi,t-1 + Midi,t-1). Bank Affiliated is a dummy takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s 
management company is a commercial banking group, and zero otherwise. The regressions include the same control variables 
(coefficients not shown) as in Table 3. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in 
the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Linear Piecewise 
 (1) (2) 
Bank Affiliated -0.2670 -0.8240 
 (-0.84) (-1.42) 
Rank 6.0070***  
 (21.26)  
Bank Affiliated × Rank -0.9040  
 (-1.60)  
Low  6.8270*** 
  (3.55) 
Bank Affiliated × Low   2.3710 
  (0.80) 
Mid  4.7290*** 
  (12.76) 
Bank Affiliated × Mid  -0.7880 
  (-1.27) 
High  14.470*** 
  (6.96) 
Bank Affiliated × High  -3.9660 
  (-1.14) 
   
Number of Observations 119,424 119,424 






Falsification Tests: Passive Funds, International Funds, U.S. and Non-U.S. Funds 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable is the alpha from the Carhart four-factor model in each quarter. Bank 
Affiliated is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial banking group, and zero otherwise. The regressions 
include the same control variables (coefficients not shown) as in Table 3. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided 
in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of passive and active international equity mutual funds in Panel A and U.S.-domiciled and non-U.S.-domiciled active domestic 
equity mutual funds in Panel B in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Passive and International Funds 
 Passive Funds  International Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank Affiliated 0.0651     -0.0646    
 (1.13)     (-1.30)    
Loans/TNA (log)  -0.0020     -0.0248*   
  (-0.18)     (-1.78)   
Syndicated Loans/TNA (log)   -0.0034     -0.0374*  
   (-0.24)     (-1.83)  
Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues (log)    -0.0043     -0.0381** 
    (-0.39)     (-2.04) 
          
Number of Observations 23,083 23,033 23,083 23,083  114,637 113,991 114,637 114,637 
R-squared 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117  0.062 0.063 0.062 0.062 
 
Panel B: U.S and Non-U.S. Funds 
 U.S. Funds  Non-U.S. Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank Affiliated -0.1190**     -0.2490***    
 (-2.08)     (-3.52)    
Loans/TNA (log)  -0.0410**     -0.0664***   
  (-2.47)     (-4.21)   
Syndicated Loans/TNA (log)   -0.0441     -0.0478*  
   (-1.56)     (-1.85)  
Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues (log)    -0.0276     -0.0646*** 
    (-1.23)     (-2.75) 
          
Number of Observations 77,016 76,061 77,016 77,016  50,864 50,721 50,864 50,864 




Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio Allocation to Client Stocks 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable are the alpha from 
the Carhart four-factor model using net returns (Panel A) and gross returns (Panel B), and the buy and hold benchmark-adjusted 
return using fund’s stock holdings in each quarter (Panel C). %TNA Invested in Client Stocks is percentage invested in stocks of 
firms that borrow from the fund's affiliated bank and are held by the fund. Bias in Client Stocks is the portfolio bias in stocks of 
firms that borrow from the fund's affiliated bank versus the average weight of active peer funds. %TNA Invested in Top 10 Client 
Stocks and Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks are similarly defined for the set of top ten borrowers of the fund's affiliated bank. All 
these variables are zero if the fund is unaffiliated. The regressions include the same control variables (coefficients not shown) as 
in Table 3. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 
in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: 4-Factor Alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%TNA Invested in Client Stocks -0.0042***    
 (-3.58)    
Bias in Client Stocks  -0.0042*   
  (-1.76)   
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks   -0.0265**  
   (-2.13)  
Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks    -0.0639** 
    (-2.17) 
     
Number of Observations 127,880 127,238 127,880 127,238 
R-squared 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 
 
Panel B: 4-Factor Alpha - Gross Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%TNA Invested in Client Stocks -0.0054***    
 (-3.74)    
Bias in Client Stocks  -0.0042*   
  (-1.74)   
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks   -0.0329**  
   (-2.24)  
Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks    -0.0757** 
    (-2.20) 
     
Number of Observations 116,266 115,649 116,266 115,649 
R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 
 
Panel C: Buy and Hold Benchmark-Adjusted Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%TNA Invested in Client Stocks -0.0028**    
 (-2.52)    
Bias in Client Stocks  -0.0040**   
  (-2.02)   
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks   -0.0102*  
   (-1.82)  
Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks    -0.0177 
    (-1.02) 
     
Number of Observations 120,198 120,198 120,198 120,198 




Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio Allocation to Client Stocks Not Held 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable is the alpha from the 
Carhart four-factor model in each quarter. Bias in Client Stocks Not Held is the portfolio bias in stocks of firms that borrow from 
the fund's affiliated bank but not held by the bank-affiliated fund. Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks Not Held is similarly defined for 
the set of top ten borrowers. All these variables are zero if the fund is unaffiliated. The regressions also include domicile country 
and quarter fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Bias in Client Stocks Not Held 0.00207  
 (0.83)  
Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks Not Held  0.0979** 
  (2.43) 
TNA (log) -0.0544*** -0.0550*** 
 (-4.90) (-4.98) 
Family TNA (log) 0.0394*** 0.0402*** 
 (3.23) (3.39) 
Age (log) -0.0265 -0.0261 
 (-0.98) (-0.97) 
Total Expense Ratio -0.00574 -0.00742 
 (-0.12) (-0.16) 
Total Load -0.0227** -0.0234** 
 (-2.03) (-2.10) 
Flow 0.0073*** 0.0073*** 
 (5.38) (5.37) 
Number of Countries of Sale -0.00287 -0.00236 
 (-0.15) (-0.13) 
Team Managed Dummy -0.0954** -0.0959** 
 (-2.26) (-2.28) 
Past Performance 0.0253*** 0.0252*** 
 (3.65) (3.63) 
   
Number of Observations 127,238 127,238 






Performance of Client Stocks and Non-Client Stocks Portfolios 
This table shows risk-adjusted performance and loadings of client and non-client stock portfolios, and the associated difference, using the Carhart four-factor model. Calendar time 
monthly portfolio returns are constructed using the sample of bank-affiliated funds’ portfolio holdings. Every quarter, stocks are assigned to the client or non-client stock portfolio. 
Client stocks include holdings of firms that borrow from the fund’s affiliated bank over the past three years, and non-client stocks include holdings of firms that have not borrowed 
from the fund’s affiliated bank over the past three years. The U.S. dollar-weighted average monthly return of these portfolios are computed for each fund every month and then 
averaged across all funds (value-weighted by total net assets at the beginning of the quarter). Bear Market is a dummy that takes a value of one in the 2000-2002 and 2008-2009 
periods, and zero otherwise. MKT is the excess return on the fund’s stock investment region. SMB is the average return on the small-capitalization stock portfolio minus the 
average return on the large-capitalization stock portfolio on the fund’s investment region. HML is the difference in return between the portfolio with high book-to-market stocks 
and the portfolio with low book-to-market stocks on the fund’s investment region. MOM is the difference in return between the portfolio with the past 12-month stock winners and 
the portfolio with the past 12-month stock losers on the fund’s investment region. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Constant Bear Market MKT SMB HML MOM R-squared 
Client Stocks 0.0464 0.3000 1.1700*** 0.0082 -0.1690*** -0.0467** 0.969 
 
(0.34) (1.44) (51.55) (0.16) (-4.39) (-2.03) 
 
Non-Client Stocks -0.0721 0.6450*** 1.1500*** -0.0286 -0.1380*** -0.0003 0.970 
 
(-0.57) (3.29) (54.00) (-0.58) (-3.81) (-0.01) 
 
Client Stocks − Non-Client Stocks 0.1190 -0.3440** 0.0196 0.0369 -0.0313 -0.0464** 0.143 
  (1.09) (-2.05) (1.07) (0.87) (-1.01) (-2.50)  




Disinvestments and Acquisitions of Fund Management Companies by Commercial Banking Groups  
This table presents fund’s holdings and risk-adjusted performance (benchmark-adjusted return and four-factor alpha) in the four quarters before and after the disinvestment or 
acquisition of a fund management company. The sample of events is from the third quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. %TNA Invested in Client Stocks is percentage 
invested in stocks of firms that borrow from the fund's affiliated bank and are held by the fund. %TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks is similarly defined for the set of top ten 
borrowers of the fund's affiliated bank. The sample of disinvestments includes funds of management companies affiliated to commercial banking groups that are sold to an 
unaffiliated management companies. The sample of acquisitions includes funds of unaffiliated management companies that are sold to fund management companies affiliated to 
commercial banking groups. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of one after the disinvestment or acquisition, and zero otherwise. The sample consists of actively 
managed domestic equity mutual funds. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Sample of Disinvestments  Sample of Acquisitions 
 
%TNA Invested 
in Client Stocks 
%TNA Invested in 







in Client Stocks 
%TNA Invested in 





 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
After -5.28** -1.13* 1.12* -0.68  1.90 2.08*** -0.41 -1.76 
 (-2.45) (-1.76) (1.77) (-0.49)  (1.39) (3.52) (-0.58) (-1.63) 
Constant 27.86*** 4.06** -0.18** 1.12  18.69*** 1.60** -0.39 1.20 
 (4.46) (2.19) (-0.24) (1.20)  (4.13) (2.30) (-0.88) (1.35) 
          
Number of Observations 144 144 144 132  180 180 180 178 





Differences-in-Differences Tests Around 2004 SEC Fund Regulatory Reforms 
This table presents difference-in-difference regressions of the quarterly risk-adjusted performance around the SEC mutual fund regulatory reform in 2004. The dependent variable 
is the alpha from the Carhart four-factor model in each quarter. Treated is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a fund is domiciled in the United States, and zero 
otherwise. After is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in 2005 and thereafter, and zero otherwise. The regressions include the same control variables (coefficients not 
shown) as in Table 3. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists 
of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2001-2007 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
   All Funds Bank-Affiliated Funds Unaffiliated Funds All Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated × After 1.2450*** 1.3980*** 1.1030*** 1.0950*** 
 
(12.14) (9.13) (7.83) (7.89) 
Bank Affiliated × Treated × After 
   
0.3380* 
    
(1.71) 
Bank Affiliated × Treated 
   
-0.2770* 
    
(-1.74) 
Bank Affiliated × After 
   
-0.2190 
    
(-1.28) 
Bank Affiliated  
   
0.0235 
    
(0.17) 
     
Number of Observations 77,083 27,559 49,524 77,083 






This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable is the benchmark-adjusted return (the difference between 
the fund net return and its benchmark return) in column (1) and the alpha from the Carhart four-factor model in columns (2)-(6) in each quarter. Column (2) uses the Fama-
MacBeth method. Column (3) use weighted least squares (WLS) regressions using funds’ TNA as weights. Column (4) excludes funds with assets under management below $10 
million. Column (5) excludes the first year of the sample. Column (6) includes the fund’s Active Share as a control variable. Bank Affiliated is a dummy takes a value of one if the 
ultimate owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial banking group, and zero otherwise. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. 
All control variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual 
funds in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Benchmark-
Adjusted Return Fama-MacBeth WLS 
TNA above  
$10 million 2001-2010 Active Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank Affiliated -0.1880*** -0.1790*** -0.2300*** -0.1650*** -0.1910*** -0.1620*** 
 (-4.19) (-3.10) (-3.97) (-3.56) (-4.13) (-3.69) 
TNA (log) -0.0828*** -0.0441 -0.0321 -0.0504*** -0.0736*** -0.0589*** 
 (-3.98) (-1.29) (-1.42) (-3.93) (-5.65) (-5.17) 
Family TNA (log) 0.0390* 0.0357*** 0.0349* 0.0465*** 0.0425*** 0.0488*** 
 (1.76) (3.45) (1.82) (4.13) (3.60) (4.26) 
Age (log) 0.0819*** -0.0460 -0.0434 -0.0071 0.0323 -0.0114 
 (2.70) (-0.83) (-0.64) (-0.27) (1.11) (-0.43) 
Total Expense Ratio -0.1980*** -0.1520 -0.0125 -0.0014 -0.0528 -0.0388 
 (-4.08) (-1.28) (-0.10) (-0.03) (-1.03) (-0.79) 
Total Load -0.0262** -0.0176 -0.0201 -0.0299*** -0.0244** -0.0270** 
 (-2.21) (-1.17) (-1.07) (-2.62) (-2.12) (-2.41) 
Flow 0.0022** 0.0059 0.0219*** 0.0080*** 0.0036*** 0.0059*** 
 (2.22) (1.36) (4.41) (5.55) (2.68) (4.56) 
Number of Countries of Sale 0.0412** -0.0644 -0.0241 -0.0075 -0.0003 -0.0091 
 (2.06) (-1.15) (-1.45) (-0.41) (-0.01) (-0.49) 
Team Managed -0.0375 -0.1180*** -0.1260** -0.0991** -0.0731* -0.0827** 
 (-0.76) (-2.97) (-2.34) (-2.39) (-1.75) (-2.00) 
Past Performance 0.0806*** 0.0395 0.0503*** 0.0234*** 0.00679 0.0214*** 
 (16.60) (1.28) (4.49) (3.36) (0.96) (2.88) 
Active Share      0.6770*** 
      (5.75) 
       
Number of Observations 125,920 127,880 127,880 118,316 122,972 124,369 





Market Share of Bank-Affiliated Mutual Funds 
This figure shows the number of funds (top panel) and total net assets (bottom panel) of bank-affiliated and unaffiliated mutual 
funds by year. A fund is classified as bank affiliated if the ultimate owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial 
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  Figure 2 
Time Series of the Effect of Bank Affiliation on Mutual Fund Performance 
This figure shows point estimates and associated 90% confidence interval (shaded area) of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of fund risk-adjusted performance. Regressions are separately estimated for each year. The dependent variable is the 
alpha from the Carhart four-factor model in each quarter. Coefficients are scaled to an annual basis by multiplying by four. The 
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Time Series of the Effect of Client Holdings on Mutual Fund Performance 
This figure shows point estimates and associated 90% confidence interval (shaded area) of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of fund risk-adjusted performance. Regressions are separately estimated for each year. The dependent variable is the 
alpha from the Carhart four-factor model in each quarter. Coefficients are scaled to an annual basis by multiplying by four. The 
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Portfolio Allocation to Client Stocks Around Disinvestments and Acquisitions 
This figure shows fund’s holdings around disinvestment and acquisitions of fund management companies during the global 
financial crisis from the third quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. %TNA Invested in Client Stocks is percentage 
invested in stocks of firms that borrow from the fund's affiliated bank and are held by the fund. %TNA Invested in Top 10 Client 
Stocks is similarly defined for the set of top ten borrowers of the fund's affiliated bank. The sample of disinvestments includes 
funds of management companies affiliated to commercial banking groups that are sold to an unaffiliated management companies. 
The sample of acquisitions includes funds of unaffiliated management companies that are sold to fund management companies 
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Mutual Fund Performance Around 2004 SEC Fund Regulatory Reforms 
This figure shows point estimates and associated 90% confidence interval of differences in risk-adjusted performance (four-factor 
alpha) around the SEC mutual fund regulatory reform in 2004. Treated group contains funds domiciled in the United States, and 
control group contains domiciled outside of the United States. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual 
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Bank-Affiliated Dummy Dummy that takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial banking group, and zero 
otherwise. 
Loans/TNA Loans outstanding of fund’s parent bank divided by total net assets (in equity funds) of fund management company. 
Syndicated Loans/TNA Syndicated loans outstanding of fund’s parent bank divided by total net assets (in equity funds) of fund management company. 
Lending/Asset Mgmt. Revenues Fund’s parent bank syndicated loan revenue, defined as the sum of loans outstanding times all-in drawn spread, divided by revenues of 
fund management company, defined as the sum of TNA times the total expense ratio (in equity funds). 
%TNA Invested in Client Stocks Sum of portfolio holdings in stocks of firms that are among the fund’s parent bank lending clients over the past three years. 
Bias in Client Stocks (%TNA) Sum of portfolio bias in stocks of firms that are among the fund’s parent bank lending clients over the past three years. 
%TNA Invested in Top 10 Client Stocks Sum of portfolio holdings in stocks of firms that are among the top ten lending clients of the fund's parent bank over the past three 
years. 
Bias in Top 10 Client Stocks Sum of portfolio bias in stocks of firms that are among the top ten lending clients of the fund's parent bank over the past three years. 
Bias in Client Stocks Not Held Sum of portfolio holdings in stocks of firms that are among the fund's parent bank lending clients and are not held by the fund. 
Bias in Top10 Client Stocks Not Held Sum of portfolio bias in stocks of firms are among the top ten lending clients of the fund's parent bank over the past three years and are 
not held by the fund. 
Four-Factor Alpha Four-factor alpha (percentage per quarter) estimated with three years of past monthly fund net returns in U.S. dollars and regional 
factors (Asia, Europe, North America or Emerging Markets) or world factors in the case of world funds. 
Gross Four-Factor Alpha Four-factor alpha (percentage per quarter) estimated with three years of past monthly fund gross returns in U.S. dollars and regional 
factors (Asia, Europe, North America, or Emerging Markets) or world factors in the case of world funds. 
Buy and Hold Benchmark-Adjusted Return Difference between the fund buy-and-hold return and its benchmark return (percentage per quarter). 
Benchmark-Adjusted Return Difference between the fund net return and its benchmark return (percentage per quarter). 
TNA Total net assets (in U.S. dollar millions) of fund. 
Family TNA ($ million) Total net assets (in U.S. dollar millions) of funds managed by the fund management company to which the fund belongs. 
Age Number of years since the fund launch date. 
Total Expense ratio Total annual expenses as a fraction of total net assets. 
Total Load Sum of front-end and back-end loads as a fraction of new investments. 
Flow Percentage growth in TNA in a quarter, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). 
Number of Countries of Sale Number of countries where the fund is sold. 
Team Managed Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the fund is managed by a team, and zero otherwise. 
Active Share Share of portfolio holdings that differs from the benchmark index holdings computed as 
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Top Management Companies by Country 
This table presents number of funds and total net assets of the top five management companies by fund domicile in terms of total 
net assets (TNA) in U.S. dollars as of 2010. Bank Affiliated is a dummy takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s 
management company is a commercial banking group, and zero otherwise. The sample consists of actively managed domestic 
and international equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. 







Australia Platinum Asset Management Ltd. 0 14.70 8 
Australia Perpetual Ltd. 0 5.81 9 
Australia Schroders Plc 0 5.20 10 
Australia AMP Ltd. 0 4.54 7 
Australia Westpac Banking Corp. 1 4.16 24 
Austria Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG 1 3.21 13 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 1 3.16 32 
Austria UniCredit SpA (Pioneer) 1 2.00 20 
Austria Investec Plc (Investec Bank Ltd.) 1 0.99 3 
Austria Wellington Management Co. LLP 0 0.51 5 
Belgium KBC Groupe SA 1 17.21 393 
Belgium Petercam SA/NV 0 2.59 14 
Belgium Dexia SA 1 2.56 24 
Belgium BNP Paribas SA 1 2.52 66 
Belgium Banque Degroof SA 0 1.56 13 
Brazil Government of Brazil (Banco do Brasil) 1 24.63 17 
Brazil The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. 1 7.97 1 
Brazil Banco Opportunity SA 0 5.88 4 
Brazil Credit Suisse Group AG 1 1.03 4 
Brazil Dynamo Administração de Recursos Ltda. 0 0.85 1 
Canada Power Corp. of Canada (IGM Financial) 0 56.73 111 
Canada Royal Bank of Canada 1 40.66 54 
Canada Bank Of Nova Scotia (The) - Scotiabank 1 21.91 41 
Canada Macquarie Group Ltd. 1 16.29 21 
Canada FMR LLC (Fidelity) 0 12.74 34 
China China Merchants Securities Co. Ltd. 0 6.02 3 
China Invesco Great Wall Fund Management Co. Ltd. 0 5.90 7 
China China Post & Capital Fund Management Co., Ltd. 0 5.43 2 
China Yinhua Fund Management Co. Ltd. 0 4.54 4 
China Lion Fund Management Co. Ltd. 0 4.33 2 
Denmark Nordea Bank AB 1 5.31 21 
Denmark Danske Bank A/S 1 4.51 28 
Denmark BI Holding A/S 0 2.90 11 
Denmark Sparinvest Holdings A/S 0 2.83 13 
Denmark Aberdeen Asset Management Plc 0 2.83 6 
Finland Nordea Bank AB 1 8.54 20 
Finland Pohjola Bank Plc 1 4.33 14 
Finland Danske Bank A/S 1 2.69 23 
Finland FIM Group Oyj 0 1.66 17 
Finland Svenska Handelsbanken AB 1 1.24 8 
France Rue de la Boetie SAS (Crédit Agricole) 1 34.76 149 
France Carmignac Gestion SA 0 16.77 4 
France BPCE SA - Banque Populaire, Caisse d'Epargne (Natixis) 1 16.23 119 
France BNP Paribas SA 1 12.99 89 
France LCF Rothschild Group 0 12.75 35 
Germany Deutsche Bank AG 1 50.59 69 
Germany Allianz SE 0 20.23 42 
Germany Union Asset Management Holding AG / Union Gruppe 0 19.15 21 
Germany DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale 1 13.54 27 
Germany Lingohr & Partner Asset Management GmbH 0 2.99 9 
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India Reliance Capital Ltd. 0 7.69 15 
India Housing Development Finance Corp. Ltd. 1 4.30 10 
India UTI Asset Management Co. Ltd. 0 3.58 20 
India Franklin Resources, Inc. (Franklin Templeton) 0 3.18 15 
India Birla Sun Life Asset Management Co. Ltd. 0 2.61 21 
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (Eurizon Financial Group) 1 8.59 25 
Italy Asset Management Holding SpA (Anima Holding) 0 8.13 19 
Italy Unione Di Banche Italiane Scpa-Ubi Banca 1 3.17 8 
Italy UniCredit SpA (Pioneer) 1 2.97 8 
Italy Arca SGR SpA 0 2.95 13 
Japan Daiwa Securities Group Inc 0 16.05 96 
Japan Nomura Holdings Inc 1 12.80 95 
Japan FMR LLC (Fidelity) 0 7.68 36 
Japan HSBC Holdings Plc 1 5.65 12 
Japan Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings, Inc. 1 5.59 65 
Malaysia Public Bank Bhd. 1 5.59 14 
Malaysia CIMB-Principal Asset Management Bhd. 1 1.27 18 
Malaysia Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. (Pacific Mutual Fund Bhd.) 1 0.32 11 
Malaysia OSK Holdings Bhd. 0 0.25 10 
Malaysia Hong Leong Co. Malaysia Bhd. 1 0.25 14 
Netherlands Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank (Rabobank Group) 1 10.19 8 
Netherlands BNP Paribas SA 1 8.38 12 
Netherlands ING Groep NV 1 5.97 25 
Netherlands Delta Lloyd NV 0 3.61 6 
Netherlands Van Lanschot NV 1 1.83 6 
Norway Skagen AS 0 15.40 3 
Norway DnB NOR ASA 1 7.44 44 
Norway SpareBank 1 Gruppen AS 1 5.04 13 
Norway Storebrand ASA 0 3.93 24 
Norway Government of Norway (KLP / KBN) 1 2.42 8 
Poland Aviva Plc 0 2.02 2 
Poland BZ WBK Asset Management SA 0 1.25 3 
Poland UniCredit SpA (Pioneer) 1 1.19 4 
Poland ING Groep NV 1 1.13 5 
Poland Legg Mason, Inc. 0 0.53 1 
Portugal Banco BPI SA 1 0.59 6 
Portugal Caixa Geral de Depósitos SA 1 0.58 10 
Portugal F&C Asset Management Plc 0 0.45 8 
Portugal Santander AM Holding SL / Banco Santander SA 1 0.27 10 
Portugal Banco Espírito Santo SA 1 0.23 7 
Singapore Schroders Plc 0 1.67 12 
Singapore United Overseas Bank Ltd. (Singapore) 1 1.47 24 
Singapore Aberdeen Asset Management Plc 0 1.01 10 
Singapore Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. 1 0.96 20 
Singapore Deutsche Bank AG 1 0.70 6 
South Africa Insite Service Management Ltd. (Orbis) 0 3.90 1 
South Africa Nedbank Group Ltd. 1 3.74 17 
South Africa Standard Bank Group Ltd. 1 2.73 19 
South Africa Investec Ltd. (Investec Bank Ltd.) 1 2.64 8 
South Africa Coronation Fund Managers Ltd. 0 2.12 8 
Spain Grupo Entrecanales SA / Acciona (Bestinver) 0 3.29 3 
Spain Santander AM Holding SL / Banco Santander SA 1 2.44 23 
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 1 1.56 18 
Spain Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid / Caja Madrid (Bankia) 1 0.83 45 
Spain Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona / La Caixa (Invercaixa) 1 0.74 20 
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Sweden Swedbank AB 1 44.76 75 
Sweden Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 1 11.27 25 
Sweden Svenska Handelsbanken AB 1 9.92 17 
Sweden Nordea Bank AB 1 9.87 19 
Sweden AMF Pensionsförsäkring AB 0 6.27 7 
Switzerland UBS AG 1 11.20 45 
Switzerland Swisscanto Holding AG 0 6.83 22 
Switzerland Credit Suisse Group AG 1 6.82 24 
Switzerland Pictet & Cie 0 2.19 10 
Switzerland Bank Sarasin & Cie. AG 0 2.05 7 
Taiwan JPMorgan Chase & Co., Inc. 1 2.47 19 
Taiwan Yuanta Financial Holding Co. Ltd. 0 1.63 17 
Taiwan Prudential Financial, Inc. 0 1.54 18 
Taiwan Cathay Securities Investment Trust Co. Ltd. 0 1.53 8 
Taiwan Allianz SE 0 1.40 7 
Thailand Kasikornbank Public Co. Ltd. 1 1.61 15 
Thailand Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd. 1 1.44 15 
Thailand Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. 1 0.42 9 
Thailand Aberdeen Asset Management Plc 0 0.35 7 
Thailand TMB Bank Public Co., Ltd. 1 0.34 4 
United Kingdom Prudential Plc 0 44.98 36 
United Kingdom Invesco Ltd. 0 44.52 31 
United Kingdom FMR LLC (Fidelity) 0 32.16 31 
United Kingdom Schroders Plc 0 27.48 38 
United Kingdom Ameriprise Financial, Inc. 0 25.12 31 
United States The Capital Group Cos., Inc. 0 673.39 16 
United States FMR LLC (Fidelity) 0 535.26 165 
United States T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. 0 191.38 59 
United States Franklin Resources, Inc. (Franklin Templeton) 0 127.02 48 




Mutual Fund Performance and Bank-Affiliated Funds: Market Downturns 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) of fund risk-adjusted performance. The dependent variable is the alpha from the 
Carhart four-factor model in each quarter. Bank Affiliated is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s 
management company is a commercial banking group, and zero otherwise. Bear Market is a dummy that takes a value of one in 
the 2000-2002 and 2008-2009 periods, and zero otherwise. Investment Region Return is the stock market return in the fund’s 
investment region. The regressions also include domicile country and quarter fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by 
one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic 
equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the ultimate owner level are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Bank-Affiliated -0.1170*** -0.1850*** 
 (-2.91) (-5.82) 
Bank-Affiliated × Bear Market -0.1420*  
 (-1.81)  
Bank-Affiliated × Investment Region Return  0.0184*** 
  (2.61) 
Investment Region Return  -0.1680*** 
  (-9.55) 
TNA (log) -0.0509*** -0.0517*** 
 (-4.73) (-4.79) 
Family TNA (log) 0.0423*** 0.0419*** 
 (4.74) (4.69) 
Age (log) -0.0327 -0.0337 
 (-1.32) (-1.36) 
Total Expense Ratio -0.0306 -0.0330 
 (-0.78) (-0.84) 
Total Load -0.0231*** -0.0234*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.82) 
Flow 0.0073*** 0.0070*** 
 (5.95) (5.72) 
Number of Countries of Sale -0.0053 -0.0047 
 (-0.39) (-0.34) 
Team Managed -0.1020*** -0.1020*** 
 (-3.22) (-3.22) 
Past Performance 0.0260*** 0.0262*** 
 (6.06) (6.12) 
   
Number of Observations 127,880 127,880 




Portfolio Weight Regressions 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) of fund portfolio weights. The dependent variable in the regressions is the fund’s U.S. dollar investment in a stock as a percentage 
of total net assets of the fund. Bank Affiliated is a dummy that takes a value of one if the ultimate owner of the fund’s management company is a commercial banking group, and 
zero otherwise. Client Stock is a dummy that takes a value of one if the stock holding is from a fund’s parent bank lending client. The regressions also include domicile country and 
quarter fixed effects. Fund-level controls include size, family size, age, total expense ratio, total load, flow, number of countries of sale, team managed, and past performance. 
Stock-level control variables include firm size, book-to-market, stock return, stock volatility, and leverage. All control variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of actively managed domestic equity mutual funds in the 2000-2010 period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering 
at the ultimate owner level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bank Affiliated 0.1800* 0.2090** -0.0722** -0.0536 -0.0648*** -0.0466** -0.0474 -0.0381 
 
(1.78) (1.99) (-1.98) (-1.45) (-3.07) (-2.36) (-1.20) (-0.95) 




































0.3090*** 0.3100*** 0.3090*** 0.3100*** 0.2360*** 0.2350*** 
   
(21.99) (22.02) (18.13) (18.11) (20.10) (20.09) 
Book-to-Market 
  
0.0219 0.0230 0.0277** 0.0291** -0.0285*** -0.0286*** 
   
(1.40) (1.48) (2.14) (2.25) (-3.14) (-3.16) 
Stock Return 
  
0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
   
(4.76) (4.75) (5.54) (5.53) (9.38) (9.38) 
Stock Volatility 
  
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
   
(-1.08) (-1.23) (-1.42) (-1.61) (-4.16) (-4.22) 
Leverage 
  
-0.1360*** -0.1310*** -0.1130*** -0.1080*** 0.0305** 0.0303** 
   
(-7.94) (-7.74) (-9.30) (-9.05) (2.37) (2.36) 
         
Fund-Level Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domicile Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Fund Benchmark Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Stock Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Fund Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Stock Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 14,094,422 14,094,422 11,168,224 11,168,224 13,541,533 13,541,533 11,216,462 11,216,462 





The financial globalization and the substantial growth of the global mutual fund industry have 
expanded the investment opportunities for global investors. This fact led to the rise in the 
internationalization of firm ownership structures. In this dissertation, we show that foreign 
institutions perform as well as local institutions on average. However, we also find evidence for 
a local advantage in environments more favorable to the presence of information asymmetries.  
Importantly, we also document that greater foreign institutional ownership fosters long-term 
investment in R&D, fixed capital and employment. Foreign portfolio investment also leads to 
significant increases in innovation productivity, total factor productivity, and shareholder value. 
This positive effect is explained by the monitoring role of foreign institutions when managers are 
entrenched.  
Finally, we also show that different forms of ownership structure might have a pernicious 
effect for the outcomes of mutual fund investors. More specifically, we find that equity mutual 
funds run by asset management divisions of commercial banking groups worldwide 
underperform relative to unaffiliated funds and show that this underperformance is consistent 
with the existence of conflicts of interest by bank-affiliated funds supporting their lending 
division operations at the expense of fund investors. 
